In the below you make an important point, George.
It's precisely because CHRISTIAN theism claims that creation is something other than the creator which validates a scientific methodology which approaches creation WITHOUT specific reference to the creator (and in this, science merely formalizes our regular approach to things).
To then argue that such a methodology entails a world-view contrary to Christian theism is not, in my opinion, the least tenable.
We may, of course, argue about what it means to assert the extent to which creation is independent from the creator - and there are obviously a range of possible views here from Van Till's "Fully Gifted Creation" in which the created order is fully autonomous to a "Calvinist" view which asserts that God controls every detail ("not even one sparrow falls to the ground" and etc.).
Point being, anyway, that what we're discussing here is the question of what constitutes the proper contours of a CHRISTIAN notion of God - and even if we assert that God makes himself known in nature, that presupposes that he is making himself known indirectly, and hence he is, to some extent, hidden "behind" the very medium through which he makes himself known.
Indeed, it occurs that even of Jesus we sing "VEILED in flesh, the Godhead see" - even in his incarnation God is not directly known.
Blessings,
Murray
George Murphy wrote:
> Let me piggyback on this. The Christian claim is not just that there is
> "something," or even "a God," who is in some sense not limited to the
> reality that the sciences study, but that there is a specific such God.
> If that God characteristically hides himself (and Cameron may want to
> check Is.45:15 before accusing me of gnosticism), then something like
> methodological naturalism is implied while the metaphysical variety is
> denied.
>
> (Of course the whole argument for the hiddenness of God - & even for
> what Jungel calls "the worldly nonnecessity of God" - does not rest on
> one Bible verse.)
>
> Shalom
> George
> http://home.roadrunner.com/~scitheologyglm
>
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Murray Hogg" <muzhogg@netspace.net.au>
> To: "ASA" <asa@calvin.edu>
> Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2009 5:03 PM
> Subject: Ontology determines epistemology (was Re: [asa] Re: Coyne vs
> Collins)
>
>
>>
>>
>> Cameron Wybrow wrote:
>> > First, on methodological naturalism versus metaphysical naturalism.
>> We > know that Eugenie Scott and many TEs make a big deal about the >
>> distinction. But they do that largely to fend off attacks from both >
>> sides. Eugenie uses it to fend off attacks that Darwinism implies >
>> atheism. She wants to look professionally neutral on the subject of >
>> religion. The TEs use it to fend off charges that Christians can't do
>> > science because they will be using miracles to explain things all
>> the > time. In sum, the whole discussion is politically charged. Why
>> would > any philosopher or scientist, outside the
>> constitutionally-charged > religion-in-the-schools atmosphere of the
>> USA, want to make a > distinction between epistemology and ontology
>> ("I'm methodologically > naturalist, but not metaphysically
>> naturalist")? As if we should study > reality in one way, while
>> knowing that it's really another? So that > we're supposed to study
>> nature as if there's no God, or at least no God > who has any active
>> part it, while believing in our heart of hearts that > God does have
>> an active part in it? This is another example of modern >
>> schizophrenia; the ancients did not think about life in such a bizarre
>> > way. The ancient atomists, like Lucretius, made their epistemology
>> > match their metaphysics. You don't find Lucretius arguing that we >
>> should treat the world *as if* everything can be explained by atoms >
>> falling through a void, while believing in his heart of hearts that
>> God > is behind it all somehow. No; for Lucretius we should look only
>> for > mechanical explanations for things, because that's all the
>> universe is: > a dead mechanism of colliding atoms. Epistemology
>> matches metaphysics. > And this is a sane attitude. (Not the atheism,
>> but the unity of > epistemology and metaphysics.)
>>
>> Hi Cameron,
>>
>> I realize I owe you a response to one of your previous posts, but I
>> wanted to jump in on the above.
>>
>> It's proper, let me say, to insist that "epistemology matches
>> metaphysics." But the proper order of precedence is "ontology
>> determines epistemology" and not the other way around.
>>
>> That is, epistemology is logically secondary to ontology - how we can
>> know is determined by the nature of the object being investigated and
>> not vice versa.
>>
>> Or, to put it less abstractly, what we want to assert is GIVEN a
>> particular ontology/metaphysic THEN what sort of epistemology follows.
>>
>> What this means is that one cannot BEGIN with an epistemology and
>> "work backwards" to assert that it DEMANDS a particular
>> metaphysical/ontological point-of-view, as it may well be the case a
>> given epistemological programme can be compatible with MULTIPLE
>> metaphysical/ontological points-of-view. To do so, to argue that "you
>> are a methodological naturalist, therefore you must consistently be a
>> metaphysical naturalist" is technically to commit the logical fallacy
>> of affirming the consequent ("if A therefore B, B, therefore A")
>>
>> And this, of course, is the rub with Methodological Naturalism: it is
>> consistent with an ontology in which the natural order is "all there
>> was, is and ever will be" (metaphysical naturalism) or an ontology in
>> which God creates a natural order which functions in a regular, hence
>> predictable, manner (metaphysical super-naturalism).
>>
>> On either view it is perfectly consistent to affirm methodological
>> naturalism as a legitimate guiding principle in investigation of the
>> natural order - whether the later is indeed "all there was, is, and
>> ever will be" or whether it was divinely created to function in a
>> regular, hence predictable, manner.
>>
>> To labour the point, both the following are logically correct;
>>
>> IF "Metaphysical Naturalism" THEN "Methodological Naturalism"
>> "Metaphysical Naturalism" THEREFORE "Methodological Naturalism"
>>
>>
>> IF "Creation functions in a regular, hence predictable, manner" THEN
>> "Methodological Naturalism"
>> "Creation functions in a regular, hence predictable, manner" THEREFORE
>> "Methodological Naturalism"
>>
>> You may, of course, argue as to whether the Creation does, indeed,
>> function in a regular, hence predictable manner - by which I don't
>> mean you would suggest anything utterly silly like there is NO
>> predictability, rather you may well question the extent to which God
>> overrides the regular, hence predictable, manner of nature's function
>> in specific circumstances - but you can't, logically, argue that
>> accepting MN demands of the Christian scientist anything other than a
>> commitment to a divinely ordained regularity in nature.
>>
>> Methodological naturalism, in short, most emphatically does NOT entail
>> - or even lend the slightest credence to - metaphysical naturalism.
>>
>> Blessings,
>> Murray
>>
>>
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Received on Thu Apr 30 18:38:45 2009
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