Re: [asa] Natural Agents - Cause and Effect, Non-Natural Agents

"For instance, can a purely naturalistic, mechanistic view
explain and adequately study such sciences as sociology or psychology? "

I read a tome by Berger a few years ago which attempted to do this.
Unsuccessfully, IMHO.

I think that the answer must be "no." There are other fields of study
to which this also must apply.

For physics and chemistry, the answer must be a "yes." Not being
trained in biology, I'm not sure about it.

The root question seems to be -- should the word "science" be defined
as encompassing more than physics and chemistry?

The answer to that must certainly be "yes."

And so, MN, while a valuable foundational tool, is clearly not
all-encompassing for scientific investigations. In this assessment, I
agree with Gregory.

jb

On 4/22/09, Gregory Arago <gregoryarago@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> “I can't answer for him, Ted, but I think it's clear that Gregory isn't
> asking about ID, but rather about the nature of science itself. “ – Jon
>
> Yes, this is entirely correct, though again with the caveat that saying “the
> nature of science” (tNoS) presumes a lot already. Jon realizes what I meant
> about being ‘fixated’ on ‘intelligent + design,’ Ted, because I wasn’t
> asking about it and needn’t involve it. The ID folks I know would for all
> I’ve seen stumble on distinguishing ‘non-natural agents that are not
> supernatural’ too. But here I was interested in MN as an appropriate or
> inappropriate philosophical assumption for ‘doing science’ and not in ID.
>
> “What if there is truly a ‘non-natural, but non-supernatural’ component to
> humanity?” – Jon
>
> This is a golden question for human-social sciences, even for all of
> anthropic thought, but it is likely uninteresting or deemed an irrelevant
> question for all of the natural or physical scientists on the list, up to
> the point when they engage with human-social sciences or when theology is
> involved because theology involves people and interpretation and
> reflexivity. You have to remember that ‘science’ in the sense meant by A.
> Comte is ‘positive’ and natural-physical science is based on this
> assumption. I am arguing as much with the view that science must be
> positivistic as I am with the notion that science must be naturalistic; so
> please include my challenge to Methodological Positivism and to
> Methodological Physicalism as well. This is probably starting to sound too
> theoretical and philosophical for you, Jon? But it needs to be made clear
> upfront.
>
> “Can science study the ‘non-natural’ part of humanity?  And what does
> non-natural really mean in this case, if not supernatural?” – Jon
>
> These are good questions. Let’s take an example. Is language ‘natural’? In
> the beginning was the word, wasn’t it (a theological assumption)? Was ‘the
> word’ before nature or Nature, as Moorad is now capitalising it? Are people
> being reductionistic if they conclude that all language is ‘natural’? Is
> ‘discourse analysis’ a scientific method of studying language? Is philology
> a ‘science?’ It is undoubtedly ‘in’ the academy and scholarly work is done
> on languages. Sure, linguistics or philology is almost certainly within a
> ‘Faculty of Arts’ at respective American Universities (as it is in Canada),
> so does this make it ‘not-scientific’ or ‘not-natural’? What if we simply
> drop the MN assumption here and treat ‘language’ *as if* it were
> ‘non-natural’?
>
> I have taken this a step further in previous conversations at ASA in
> distinguishing between human-made things and non-human-made things. Neither
> ID nor TE or EC makes this distinction.
>
> “Humans are ‘non-natural’ agents in the sense meant by your question” – Ted
> Davis
>
> Earlier I referred to the term ‘natural-plus,’ which applies to human
> persons. I don’t believe human beings are supernatural because we are of the
> Earth, just as all of the other creatures on this planet. We are natural,
> but we are also ‘more than just natural.’ It surprises me that you folks
> don’t offer more possibilities than just spiritual or soul, though these are
> legitimate and I believe them to be accurate and true categories (if one can
> call a category ‘true’). But the main point I’m making here is: there are
> other ‘non-natural’ categories as well. Keith Miller failed to acknowledge
> this and in so doing proved empty his rhetoric about MN – what he could not
> fathom is what overturns his philosophical assumption about ‘science’
> because it reveals a bias towards either natural or supernatural, and away
> from anything ‘non-natural that is not supernatural.’ I’ll address this in
> another thread which shows why he and his
> MN were defeated on this issue.
>
> It seems to me what needs to happen when a natural or physical scientist
> starts to think about the ‘non-natural’ components of humanity is that he or
> she must ‘take off’ their ‘natural-physical scientific method hat’ and ‘put
> on’ another way of looking at humankind. Don’t look at human beings just as
> objects; you are a human being yourself! Human-social science doesn’t drive
> like a robot. One can’t understand ‘structure’ as discussed by
> anthropologists, sociologists or economists if one is defining ‘structure’
> as an engineer would and thinking about human beings through engineer’s
> spectacles (though the term ‘social engineering’ is sometimes used). One
> needs to confront the language with respect to human beings on the terms in
> which it is discussed within the human-social sciences. One cannot be an
> outsider here and expect linguistic success and understanding of the
> ‘meaning’ that Jon is asking me for.
>
> Science ‘works’ through processes, not through a single process; this is not
> news to anyone here. I don’t accept the total package of David Hull’s view
> of ‘science as process’ because it easily slips back into a particular
> philosophical commitment to materialism or physicalism or naturalism,
> depending on one’s conceptualisation (as Moorad has clearly shown by
> insisting on speaking not about ‘natural’ with regard to defining science,
> but rather speaking about what is or is not ‘physical’). The same goes for
> Kuhn’s notion of ‘scientific revolution’ or ‘paradigm shift;’ these are
> dependent upon prior philosophical assumptions when it comes to defining
> science as if it could deal with ‘non-natural things that are not
> supernatural.’ This is why one cannot simply discard philosophy or try to
> speak just about ‘science in action’ (like Bruno Latour did, in
> scientifically studying the activities of scientists) because there
> is a deeper level of commitments and beliefs that inevitably enters the
> discussion somewhere. It is this ‘somewhere’ that is a place Keith Miller,
> as he has indicated by silence, is not willing to go.
>
> “Some [of God’s activities] are within the ordinary action of the natural
> world, and we refer to them as nature, and study them using scientific
> methods.  Maybe some of God's activities are both.  What then is this middle
> category that has been suggested?  What does Gregory suggest we call it -
> does it have a name?” – Jon
>
> If I am reading properly, Jon is asking for a name for the so-called ‘middle
> category’ between God and nature. Well, the holiday just celebrated was
> Easter. Jon asks for a ‘name’ of the methods that are aimed at the
> non-natural. Then are many such methods that are used, which are outside of
> the scope of natural-physical science.
>
> “What are those methods called, and how do they work in practice?” - Jon
>
> I suggest you go to those who study non-natural things all the time and ask
> them, without wearing a lab-coat, without wearing MN spectacles and without
> expecting answers that will correspond with the language used in natural
> science.  Sovereignty is a beautiful and cruel card for us to play. I had to
> include a section in my dissertation which includes ‘methods,’ just as every
> human-social scientist has to do. Unfortunately, on this ASA list I appear
> to be a community of one who can speak about these things and you seem to
> need more convincing than just hearing from me that ‘methods’ exist in
> non-natural sciences too.
>
> “fundamentally goes back to a question of what science is and what is its
> scope” - Jon
>
> The German-Russian tradition is the better one for looking at this question
> holistically than the Anglo-American one because it recognizes the
> ‘scientificity’ of non-natural sciences. This is likely at the heart of many
> of my disagreements with those on the ASA list who would define ‘science’ –
> ‘what it is and what is its scope,’ in Jon’s words – as being limited to MN.
> That philosophical assumption (and I certainly agree with Keith Miller than
> MN is a philosophical assumption), folks, leads to a silly definition of
> science because it is (or should be) obvious to everyone that science can be
> applied to ‘non-natural things’ as well, even those ‘non-natural things that
> are not supernatural.’ HPSS has demonstrated a new understanding of
> ‘science’ loud and clear in recent decades (e.g. Lakatos, Feyerabend and
> Popper) and sooner or later this knowledge will catch-up with (or
> trickle-down to) natural-physical scientists
> themselves.
>
> This brings us to the place where George’s suggested ‘inferiority complex’
> was simply an ad-hominem attack on my character. Jon asked: “Do you consider
> sociology and psychology to be superior to other sciences, because it has
> moved beyond the simple dichotomy of natural vs. supernatural?” No, I don’t
> consider any field in the academy ‘superior’ to another; they each serve in
> their own sphere of study. Many of the spheres overlap with one another in
> practical applications and when taking a holistic approach to the unity of
> the university or of the academy or of knowledge entirely, once
> interdisciplinarity is accepted and celebrated.
>
> Sociology, the field in which I’m currently engaged (having studied and
> received academic degrees in two other fields as well), should not be said
> to have “moved beyond the simple dichotomy of natural vs. supernatural,” but
> rather that it offers its own sovereign view of what those terms mean –
> natural, supernatural and non-natural. There are many categories that
> sociology studies that are ‘non-natural’ categories. Thus, the philosophical
> assumption of MN does not apply to sociology, which is why I opened the door
> for Keith to say that MN applies only to natural sciences and not to all
> sciences. It is a second surprise, after his silence in general, that he did
> not take this easy way out.
>
> “If there is a natural component of human behavior, can those aspects be
> studied by scientists using naturalistic means?” - Jon
>
> Yes, one can apply natural-physical scientific methods to study the
> natural-physical aspects of humanity. One needs other methods than
> natural-physical ones to study the non-natural or non-physical aspects of
> humanity, i.e. the nature-plus that we so obviously exhibit. ‘Behaviour’ is
> a stick category because it can involve ideology as well, e.g. Skinner’s
> behaviourism. ‘Action’ and ‘agency’ are more common master categories today,
> at least in sociology, than is ‘behaviour.’
>
> Finally, Jon writes:
> “I'm more interested in real, practical application to the operation of
> science.  For instance, can a purely naturalistic, mechanistic view explain
> and adequately study such sciences as sociology or psychology? Or on the
> other hand, does a ‘supernatural’ element in human existence mean that those
> sciences can (or should) be open to investigating the supernatural?  Or if
> there is a third category, is it distinct from the other two in genuinely
> scientific processes, or is it actually just a compound of the natural and
> spiritual elements that exist within us?”
>
> Yes, there are many sociologists and psychologists (e.g. virtually all eVo
> psychs) who study their field or discipline with a naturalistic, mechanistic
> or physicalistic underlying philosophy. Yes, the ‘non-natural’ elements in
> human existence are what those sciences can and do study. One doesn’t need a
> ‘third category’ here, a kind of half-breed or centaur, which is
> half-natural, half-non-natural because it wouldn’t make sense. One simply
> needs to respect those categories that are ‘non-natural but also not
> supernatural’ in order to engage with the sciences, philosophies and
> theologies of those things. If there *IS* a spiritual element in us, this
> contradicts the purely naturalistic approach to psychology by definition,
> wouldn’t you say Jon?
>
> So, those psychologists who philosophically assume there is a non-natural,
> e.g. spiritual, dimension to human existence are not practising MN in their
> work; they are involving an extra-natural category. MN may thus work for
> geology, but not for psychology IF one assumes that non-natural aspects of
> humankind are legitimate subjects/objects of study for psychological
> sciences. Here the commitments, beliefs and motivations of the scientist
> significantly impact how they perceive the meaning, scope and limits of the
> academic discipline and/or scientific field.
>
> In his first post in the thread, Jon asked:
> “If ‘methodological naturalism’ is too simplistic for studying human
> activity, and if purely theological/spiritual mechanisms are inappropriate
> for a scientific field of study, what other category of scientific research
> would you offer instead?  You mention philosophy and theology – do you
> consider these to be scientific means of investigating either the natural,
> supernatural, or other non-natural aspect of humanity?”
>
> Could you say what a ‘theological/spiritual mechanism’ is Jon? I don’t quite
> understand the meaning. One needs an ‘anthropic method’ to study human
> activity, by definition. (This approach differs from Brandon Carter’s
> ‘anthropic principle’ in cosmology and astrophysics, a concept duo that was
> coined in 1973, a decade before MN.) Philosophy and theology are not
> ‘scientific means,’ rather they are independent and interrelated realms of
> knowledge that work best together with sciences (both natural-physical and
> human-social) in seeking a holistic understanding of the universe and our
> human selves in it; past, present and future. If I were an atheist I would
> likely just speak of science and philosophy working together; theology would
> be a hidden or covered realm of mystery to the agnostic as well.
>
> Hopefully that helps to clarify a few things, though probably in another
> language than Jon expected. At least, I think I’ve addressed all of his
> questions.
>
> Yours sincerely,
>
> Gregory
>
> p.s. again, this would have been two pages in my dissertation, rather than
> on the ASA list. Hopefully it is worth something here to Jon and Ted and
> others…
>
> --- On Wed, 4/22/09, Jon Tandy <tandyland@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
> From: Jon Tandy <tandyland@earthlink.net>
> Subject: RE: [asa] Natural Agents - Cause and Effect, Non-Natural Agents
> To: asa@calvin.edu
> Received: Wednesday, April 22, 2009, 8:10 AM
>
> Ted,
>
> I have always tended to see human character as dualistic, with the natural
> and supernatural (spirit and body) overlapping in what we often refer to as
> the "soul" in a theological sense. What exactly that means, I'm
> sure I couldn't fully explain if I had to, or how science can completely
> delineate
> between them or identify a truly distinct "middle category".
>
> Human agency may be one example, but is it really "implicitly
> supernatural" (in the sense of "beyond nature," or in the other sense of
> "divine")? There may be other examples, which I would invite anyone
> including Gregory to
> suggest. But my clarification of the two meanings of "supernatural"
> may be revealing - when we talk about the supernatural, do we mean divine,
> or just
> beyond nature? Here again, it doesn't matter what ID or any particular ID
> enthusiast may say here, it fundamentally goes back to a question of what
> science is and what is its scope.
>
> For Gregory, I continue to wait for him to expound what
> non-natural/non-supernatural means to science. Sure, science as a
> discipline is made (as well, its principles are discovered) by humans, but
> the subject of science (rocks, stars, light, organisms, human behavior) is
> *not* generally made by humans, but observed and investigated by us. By
> contrast, the activities of God are not subject to human investigation
> except to the degree that God makes them known in the real world. Some of
> those activities that He reveals are outside the ordinary action of the
> natural world - we refer to them as miracle. Some are within the ordinary
> action of the natural world, and we refer to them as nature, and study them
> using scientific methods. Maybe some of God's activities are both. What
> then is this middle category that has been suggested? What does Gregory
> suggest we call it - does it have a name? And what methods does science
> employ to study them, if philosophers of science define what science can
> include? What are those methods called, and how do they work in practice?
>
> Another thing I suspect from Gregory's response is that he is looking at a
> very philosophical view of "what science is", rather than defining
> some process of how science works, in regard to a middle category between
> natural
> and supernatural. If so, I will leave the discussion to the philosophers,
> because I'm more interested in real, practical application to the operation
> of science. For instance, can a purely naturalistic, mechanistic view
> explain and adequately study such sciences as sociology or psychology? Or
> on the other hand, does a "supernatural" element in human existence
> mean that those sciences can (or should) be open to investigating the
> supernatural? Or if there is a third category, is it distinct from the
> other two in genuinely scientific processes, or is it actually just a
> compound of the natural and spiritual elements that exist within us?
>
> Jon Tandy
>
>
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-- 
Burgy
www.burgy.50megs.com
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