Re: [asa] Contemplations on Chance & Free Will - Comments?

Christine,
It seems to me that you are still looking at God's eternity as analogous
to the mathematical continuum, extending infinitely before and after any
point in the sequence. Thus moments in divine time can be put into a one
to one relationship to the numbers in the continuum. The classic view is
that there are no subdivisions to the divine eternity, which has been
described as an eternal now--no before, no after, just now.

I tried to analogize this to the situation in Flatland, where Spacelander
can see all of Flatland, including the guts of all the Flatlanders. But
the Flatlanders can only detect Spacelander when he sticks a finger in. I
noted that this involved Spacelander having an additional dimension.
However, it equally requires that he be outside of Flatland, except as he
pokes into it. I was trying to present a time that is multidimensional
and therefore the individual with multidimensional time would find all of
us in monodimensional time open to his inspection. Note that this does
not involve causing any events in our world, for creation is distinct
from the ongoing pattern of the universe, despite the doctrine of
/continuata creatio/. But the divine reality is different in kind from
having an extra dimension.

My now is totally different from God's. It is a moving now. It can be
viewed as beginning with my conception or birth, or with my first
awareness or memory. It is constantly changing. Of course, I place my now
in a greater time frame that encompasses the nows of others, and even of
insensate things. Anything that happens in this world gets a time and a
date, including what I consider the miraculous divine interventions. This
makes it difficult for human beings to disentangle themselves from the
space-time that permeates all of our existence.

If a person takes some hallucinogen and decides "I can fly," God doesn't
say, "No you can't," and pushes the guy down. Natural law establishes
that. If a person says, "I'm on my own and will do as I please," God
doesn't tell him that he'll accept the proffered grace, the way a parent
commands an obstreperous child. But there are consequences built in.
Could God have created a universe that would function like an ideal
machine without the possibility of failing parts that occur in all human
designs? Of course, but he produced one in which his creatures have
various degrees of freedom, freedom within limits, surely, but true
freedom.
Dave (ASA)

On Wed, 4 Feb 2009 11:23:38 -0800 (PST) Christine Smith
<christine_mb_smith@yahoo.com> writes:
> Hi all,
>
> I wanted to follow-up on this thread a bit further; sorry for the
> delayed response time....
>
> Dave & Gordon - see my questions/comments interspersed below....
>
> --- On Tue, 1/13/09, D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com>
> wrote:
>
> > From: D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com>
> > Subject: Re: [asa] Contemplations on Chance & Free Will -
> Comments?
> > To: christine_mb_smith@yahoo.com
> > Cc: asa@calvin.edu
> > Date: Tuesday, January 13, 2009, 9:28 PM
> > Christine,
> > The first obvious point is that, if God changes, then he is
> > in time of
> > some sort. There is no change apart from a before and
> > after--time. This
> > is why William Lane Craig tries to claim that God became
> > somewhat
> > time-bound when he created the universe, though the normal
> > claim is that
> > time, space and matter came into being simultaneously. But
> > Craig requires
> > something before there was time. I think this incoherent.
> > It means that
> > we have to somehow answer the question what God was doing
> > before he
> > created everything, and why he waited until the moment of
> > creation.
>
> CHRISTINE: I think I know what you're trying to say, and I don't
> disagree with you. But my questions remain: what does it mean to say
> that God is "outside of time" and that He doesn't "change"? It seems
> to me that on some fundamental level the Bible supports the
> conception that God is relational with us, and that inherently, this
> means that God experiences things such as love or anger, or can even
> change His mind, depending on how we behave in relation to Him. Of
> course, the way we articulate these things are necessarily limited
> and anthropomorhpic, but at some level they must be true, yes?
> Otherwise, what does it really mean when we say, for example, that
> God is angry with us or rejoices with us? And inherently then, this
> would imply that God has the ability to move from one "emotion" or
> "thought" to another, which of course then implies God experiences
> both change and time in some way. Getting back to the original point
> though - I concur that God is
> outside of *our* time because He created it; but isn't it possible
> that God Himself resides in His own eternal time (and space??)? That
> in essence, time is an attribute of God in the same way that
> holiness is? And that having His own time, certain things may change
> (i.e. His "emotions" or "thoughts" in relation to us) while His
> essence remains unchanged? (Not sure I'm articulating this
> well...but the basic question I guess is, doesn't God have to
> experience time/change in *some* capacity in order to relate to
> time-bound, ever-changing creatures?)
> >
>
> Dave writes:
> > There is an analogy that I like that grows out of
> > /Flatland/. The
> > Spacelander could see everything within the
> > Flatlander's world, including
> > the innards of the populace, and stick a finger in at will.
> > At least in
> > principle, Flatlander could see the whole of
> > Linelander's domain. The
> > difference is the addition of a dimension. But, when
> > Spacelander stuck a
> > finger into Lineland, it could only be perceived as
> > two-dimensional. One
> > may also view the distinction as Spacelander being
> > essentially outside of
> > Lineland. To us, time is one-dimensional. A being with two
> > or more
> > temporal dimensions could "see" everything in our
> > one dimension. This
> > applies even more obviously if God is outside of time, with
> > a clear
> > vision of all time and all space
> > "simultaneously."
>
> CHRISTINE: I'm not familiar with Flatlander, but I think I see where
> you're going with this...this is akin to C.S. Lewis's conception of
> God being outside of time, yes?
>
> Dave writes:
> > There is a common confusion about divine foreknowledge,
> > confusing knowing
> > with causing. I know that there are an infinite number of
> > integers in the
> > ordinary number system, but I do not cause it. I know that
> > we may have
> > geometries with one, more than one or no parallel lines on
> > a plane, or
> > may have absolute geometry without consideration of
> > parallels along with
> > messier geometries that I don't understand. But I cause
> > none of it.
>
> CHRISTINE: I appear to still be confused then. Mathematics is a
> means of conceptualizing something that already exists outside of
> us. Its a passive fact that we observe and describe; its not a
> sentient being that we interact with and claim to have a
> relationship with; therefore, I don't see how this kind of analogy
> is applicable to a free will discussion (unless you are claiming
> that we are nothing more than mathematical descriptions in God's
> mind that were brought into being by someone else).
>
> I think the parent-child scenario is more directly applicable; and
> this is where I see that the analogy breaks down. When a parent
> predicts or foreknows an action that their child will take, they do
> not predict or foreknow this with certainty, because they cannot get
> inside their child's mind, which is where the decision's really
> made. Rather, they are making a rational estimation based on a
> variety of factors, including what they themselves were like when
> they were growing up (i.e. genetic influences) and what the
> circumstances are at the time of the event in question (i.e.
> environmental factors). In this way, the parent may be able to
> "know" (in a loose sense) a future event without causing it.
>
> But I don't see how it can work the same way with God, because God
> is the original cause. If you postulate that God fully knows the
> future, then you are inherently stating that God has chosen this
> particular universe, this particular timeline, out of all the
> endless possibilities which might otherwise have been created. He
> chose the actions that I "chose" before I was even created and
> capable of "choosing". If in one possible universe I "chose" to
> become a Christian, and in another possible universe I "chose" not
> to, and then God selects one or the other of these to actually
> create, then He has in essence made my "choice" for me, and my
> "choice" to become a Christian or not is an illusion. It seems to me
> the only universe that can involve true free will, true choice, is
> one in which God is like the parent, who can make His own rational
> estimations of the future, but who nevertheless has His own goals in
> mind such that He can make our free will
> subservient to His, if need be, to guarantee that His goals are
> achieved.
> >
>
> Dave writes:
> > Additionally, if free will involves indeterminism, things
> > happen without
> > being caused, then things are out of my control. I would
> > have no way to
> > predict, when I encounter my wife, whether I would kiss her
> > or kick her,
> > or whatever else might happen. Human freedom is a
> > subcategory of
> > determinism, that is, the realm of causation. But it is not
> > strict
> > determinism, where every effect is the simple result of a
> > previous cause.
> > If there is no wiggle room, there could be no rationality
> > with its
> > weighing of information, but just a jamming of thought into
> > a hole with
> > no rationality involved. A guy who falls off a scaffold is
> > in the grips
> > of strict causality. Can you imagine anyone yelling at him,
> > "Slow down.
> > At the speed you're going you're going to be badly
> > hurt"?
> >
>
> CHRISTINE: I don't follow. Free will in my mind means having the
> ability to make a *decision* that cannot be foreknown or predicted
> by any external entity with 100% certainty... educated predictions,
> rational estimations of the future, yes, but not 100% certainty.
> Free will does not mean having the ability to manipulate the natural
> laws God has set in place; rather, as agents with free will we
> interact with those laws, we interact with our external reality,
> including other agents with free will. Free will doesn't mean that
> what we decide is necessarily what happens; if I'm falling off a
> cliff, I might decide half way down that my will is not to hit the
> ground at 100mph, but at that point, my will is subject to the will
> of God via the laws of gravity He established. In such a scenario,
> He has not eliminated my free will--I might have decided instead
> 'well, I didn't really want to live anyway'--He has only overridden
> it.
>
> Dave writes:
> > Just a question: is God the kind of a monster who
> > determines, no matter
> > what we do, he's going to hell but she's going to
> > heaven? Or is there
> > human responsibility which God respects and, on the basis
> > of knowing all,
> > knows who will believe and who will reject his offer of
> > salvation?
> > Dave (ASA)
>
> And that is precisely the question I am struggling with. Because I
> don't believe that God is, as you put it, a "monster"--but it seems
> to me that this is exactly what Paul argues in Romans 9, and that in
> any scenario where God *fully* knows the future with 100% certainty,
> than this has to be the case. Maybe you can again try to show me
> where my logic as gone awry?
>
> Gordon writes:
> "To me free will does not mean the ability to fool God. Rather I see
> it as the opposite of compulsion, of God overriding or forcing our
> decision making.
>
> Since God is outside time, His knowledge of the future no more
> forces future events than my knowledge of past events influences
> them. We don't say that historic personalities had to do what they
> did in order to make the history books correct.
>
> Even though I don't believe that God's knowledge of the future
> requires Him to coerce people to do what they do, I do believe that
> He determines the future. Let me try to use analogies. What I don't
> believe is that God wrote a script and recruited actors to follow it
> exactly. Rather I think it is more like a TV network newscast in
> which someone chooses which clips to show even though the
> photographer was only a spectator."
>
> CHRISTINE: I think my responses to Dave more or less apply here. I
> don't follow your analogy, perhaps because I'm not familiar with the
> news biz.
>
> But regarding your first comments-
>
> From my perspective, it seems to me that free will is about decision
> making, not necessarily about whether that will is actually
> realized. If a child says "I don't want to go to bed" and the parent
> says, "oh yes you are", is the parent eliminating the child's will?
> No, they are simply overriding it as necessary to achieve their own
> purposes. It seems to me that God could do the very same thing to
> direct the flow of events without necessarily predetermining them.
>
> Again, I think the comparison between our knowing/causing and God's
> knowing/causing breaks down. If God fully knows the future, then
> this must mean from His perspective, the entire timeline already
> exists. In order for the entire timeline to already exist from His
> perspective, He must have already created it. If He created the
> timeline, it follows that He selected which timeline He created out
> of all possible timelines. And if He selected the timeline, then it
> follows that any "choices" we have in that timeline are an illusion,
> because the timeline could not have been anything other than God
> created it to be.
>
> It seems to me rather, that God set certain boundaries (via natural
> laws, for example) and then endowed us with true free will, which is
> subject to, but not eliminated by, the exercise of His own will to
> achieve certain goals that He has in mind. In this scenario, God
> doesn't fully know the future, because the future is not yet created
> in its entirety. In a sense, if this is true, this makes of
> co-creators of not only space (through our actions within the
> material world), but also time.
>
> Anyway, my lunch break is over, so I best get back to
> work....thanks!
>
> In Christ,
> Christine
> >
> > On Tue, 13 Jan 2009 10:33:20 -0800 (PST) Christine Smith
> > <christine_mb_smith@yahoo.com> writes:
> > > Hi Dave,
> > >
> > > Thanks for your comments.
> > >
> > > A few questions/comments in reply...first, to clarify,
> > I'm not
> > > trying to "prove" anything in the scientific
> > sense of the word. I'm
> > > simply trying to come to some sort of conscensus
> > within my own mind
> > > as to what to think on this topic.
> > >
> > > The reason I am splitting, as you say, things between
> > determinism
> > > and free will is that I honestly don't understand
> > how they can
> > > co-exist. If I understand you right, you are basically
> > saying that
> > > we have free will in the sense that we can choose one
> > possible
> > > alternative from a pre-defined set of alternatives--am
> > I correct?
> > >
> > > But here's where I get stumped with this idea. If
> > we can truly,
> > > actually choose between a pre-defined set of
> > possibilities, such
> > > that any outcome we pick can become the reality, than
> > this must mean
> > > (does it not?) that God does *not* have full knowledge
> > of the
> > > future; partial knowledge - yes, but full knowledge -
> > no. But, if
> > > you maintain that God must have full knowledge of the
> > future, in the
> > > sense that He knows ahead of time what you will
> > "choose", and that
> > > it *will not* be anything other than this foreseen
> > conclusion, then
> > > this must mean (does it not?) that it never was really
> > a true choice
> > > to begin with. To use an example, if a parent gives a
> > child a choice
> > > between several pre-defined alternatives, the parent
> > may be able to
> > > predict, with reasonable confidence, what choice the
> > child will
> > > make. But they cannot *know* for certain until the
> > child has
> > > actually made the choice. This is because although
> > parents "create"
> > > their children, they do not "create"
> > > their children's entire timeline. This is free
> > will within the
> > > parent-child relationship. But, in the case of God,
> > before the
> > > universe (the "child" if you will) is ever
> > created, God has the
> > > power to not only create the universe itself, but the
> > entire timeline
> > > of the universe. So when He creates, logically, He
> > must either a)
> > > create the universe and its complete timeline (has
> > full knowledge of
> > > the future, equates to predestination; any "free
> > will" we have is an
> > > illusion), or b) create the universe with an
> > incomplete timeline
> > > (one that allows some variation depending on our
> > choices, God has
> > > only partial knowledge of the future, equates to true
> > free will).
> > >
> > > My understanding is that "option a" is more
> > or less the traditional
> > > view (I'm sure I'm missing some nuances here),
> > and that "option b"
> > > is more or less the open theology view. Is there an
> > "option c" here
> > > that I'm missing? I know that ultimately, all of
> > this is beyond
> > > human comprehension anyway, but still, I'd like to
> > try and wrestle
> > > with this.
> > >
> > > Regarding God's "position" relative to
> > time. It was not my intent to
> > > suggest that God is in time (whether placing God in
> > time is
> > > officially the open theology view, I don't know,
> > I'm still
> > > learning). In what I suggested, I thought I was
> > retaining the
> > > doctrine that God was outside time--I guess my
> > articulation needs
> > > some work. To attempt this again...well, let's
> > back up...what is
> > > meant by saying that God is "outside of
> > time"? Maybe this phrase
> > > needs to be defined first....does it mean outside of
> > our own time
> > > and space (such that God could paradoxically have
> > created His own
> > > time and space?)...does it mean that God cannot change
> > (change at
> > > all, change His "emotions", change His
> > substatitative
> > > character?)...does it mean that God must be/may be
> > present at all
> > > times simultaneously?
> > >
> > > The verses you bring up only complicate this question
> > for me--if God
> > > is outside time, how can we speak of Him
> > "foreknowing" anything?
> > > Wouldn't it be more appropriate to say that He
> > "knows", since every
> > > moment is the "present" for Him? And what or
> > whom does He foreknow
> > > and glorify? Individuals? The Church? Certainly,
> > Romans 9 would
> > > indicate even individuals are foreknown, but I could
> > see the other
> > > verses you cited as possibly being applied to the
> > church body as a
> > > whole (unless there's a translational nuance here
> > that says
> > > otherwise). Is it possible, and theologically
> > appropriate to
> > > suggest, as my husband has to me, that some people
> > (those crucial to
> > > His plan of salvation) are predestined one way or the
> > other, and
> > > other people are not?
> > >
> > > Thanks again for your thoughts,
> > > Christine
> > >
> > > "For we walk by faith, not by sight" ~II
> > Corinthians 5:7
> > >
> > > Help save the life of a homeless animal--visit
> > www.azrescue.org to
> > > find out how.
> > >
> > > Recycling a single aluminum can conserves enough
> > energy to power
> > > your TV for 3 hours--Reduce, Reuse, Recycle! Learn
> > more at
> > > www.cleanup.org
> > >
> > >
> > > --- On Sat, 1/10/09, D. F. Siemens, Jr.
> > <dfsiemensjr@juno.com>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > From: D. F. Siemens, Jr.
> > <dfsiemensjr@juno.com>
> > > > Subject: Re: [asa] Contemplations on Chance &
> > Free Will -
> > > Comments?
> > > > To: christine_mb_smith@yahoo.com
> > > > Cc: asa@calvin.edu
> > > > Date: Saturday, January 10, 2009, 9:39 PM
> > > > I detect a very common error in splitting things
> > between
> > > > determinism and
> > > > free will/chance. Human freedom is
> > self-determination, a
> > > > subdivision of
> > > > causal relationships. It is human choice between
> > > > alternatives in an
> > > > orderly world that is the freedom we have. This
> > cannot be
> > > > proved, because
> > > > no one can go back and choose an alternative. We
> > cannot go
> > > > back to an
> > > > earlier situation once we have passed through it.
> > The
> > > > repeat experiments
> > > > to test a scientific hypothesis are not the same,
> > just
> > > > retain what are
> > > > considered the relevant dimensions.
> > > >
> > > > Open theology puts God in time, so there is a
> > before and
> > > > after for him.
> > > > Classical theology claims that the divine
> > eternity is
> > > > different from ours
> > > > in being timeless. If God has already glorified
> > those whom
> > > > he knew before
> > > > the foundation of the world (Romans 8:29, 30;
> > Ephesians
> > > > 1:4), he has to
> > > > know the end "before" the beginning.
> > This seems
> > > > to me to negate the
> > > > claims of open theology. Time is so much a part
> > of us that
> > > > it is very
> > > > difficult to express timeless existence, as noted
> > in the
> > > > first verses of
> > > > John. And it also is ascribed to all things,
> > because some
> > > > of us can't
> > > > think of any other way to be.
> > > >
> > > > I contend that an omniscient and omnipotent God
> > can create
> > > > a world in
> > > > which we choose between alternatives with free
> > will, not
> > > > indeterminate.
> > > > This is also reflected in that what is called a
> > chance
> > > > mutation, for
> > > > example, has to fit into some rather strict
> > controls. There
> > > > are a limited
> > > > set of changes possible, with some possibility
> > for repairs,
> > > > and only some
> > > > changes can continue as genetic drift and others
> > as
> > > > beneficial
> > > > alterations (or anticipation of beneficial
> > alterations).
> > > > Dave (ASA)
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, 10 Jan 2009 17:32:05 -0800 (PST)
> > Christine Smith
> > > > <christine_mb_smith@yahoo.com> writes:
> > > > > Hi all,
> > > > >
> > > > > Our local ASA chapter met today and
> > discussed
> > > > Dembski's article
> > > > > about chance in the latest issue of PSCF.
> > From that
> > > > discussion, I
> > > > > gained a few, very rough insights that I
> > wanted to put
> > > > into words
> > > > > and get some feedback on...
> > > > >
> > > > > When it comes to determinism vs. chance (and
> > by
> > > > extension,
> > > > > predestination vs. free will), the question
> > basically
> > > > boils down to
> > > > > this: Does God's sovereignty REQUIRE God
> > to be
> > > > fully knowledgeable
> > > > > about the future? As represented by Dembski
> > (I
> > > > haven't read the book
> > > > > he's critiquing, so I give him the
> > benefit of the
> > > > doubt that he's
> > > > > representing the author's viewpoint
> > faithfully),
> > > > Bartholomew is
> > > > > arguing an open theism position in which
> > chance--true
> > > > chance, in
> > > > > which God Himself does not know the outcome
> > of a
> > > > random
> > > > > event--exists and is used by God to achieve
> > His
> > > > purposes--in effect,
> > > > > Bartholomew says "no", full
> > knowledge of the
> > > > future is NOT required
> > > > > for God to remain sovereign. Dembski,
> > representing the
> > > > more
> > > > > traditional viewpoint, argues that yes, for
> > God to be
> > > > sovereign, He
> > > > > must have full knowledge of the future, and
> > therefore
> > > > true chance
> > > > > doesn't exist; he articulates the
> > rebuttal to open
> > > > theism by writing
> > > > > "In particular, strict uncertainty
> > about the
> > > > future
> > > > > means that God cannot guarantee his
> > promises because
> > > > the autonomy
> > > > > of the world can then always overrrule God.
> > Of course,
> > > > to say that
> > > > > God can always step in when things get too
> > out of hand
> > > > defeats the
> > > > > whole point of openness theology."
> > > > >
> > > > > In contemplating this, and the whole
> > question of
> > > > determinism vs.
> > > > > chance (and predestination vs. free will),
> > neither one
> > > > has totally
> > > > > made sense to me. Surely God must be
> > sovereign.
> > > > Dembski's first
> > > > > critique is a valid one--for God to be God,
> > He must be
> > > > able to bring
> > > > > about His will and fulfill His promises. Yet
> > at the
> > > > same time, it
> > > > > has always seemed to me that determinism and
> > > > predestination were
> > > > > inadequate solutions, because implicitly it
> > draws the
> > > > questions
> > > > > "well why bother if everything's
> > already
> > > > foreordained?" and "how can
> > > > > evil exist in a world in which God has
> > predestined
> > > > everything and
> > > > > everyone, except to say that God ordained
> > the
> > > > occurrence of evil
> > > > > itself?
> > > > >
> > > > > But then, going back to Dembski's
> > critique, two
> > > > things struck me.
> > > > > First, why would he assume that strict
> > uncertainty
> > > > means that God
> > > > > can be overruled? Second, why does He assume
> > that
> > > > God's intervention
> > > > > defeats the purpose of open theology?
> > Keeping these
> > > > two questions in
> > > > > mind, a brief digression is in order, which
> > will tie
> > > > in later...
> > > > >
> > > > > ...going back to Genesis 1, we are told that
> > in the
> > > > beginning was
> > > > > chaos, with everything being formless and
> > void, and
> > > > that God imposed
> > > > > order on this chaos. What if, just like the
> > world
> > > > being created
> > > > > "good" but not
> > "perfect", creation
> > > > was made "ordered" but not
> > > > > "perfectly ordered" ...in other
> > words, the
> > > > order in the world that
> > > > > we see (which I'm defining to include
> > true
> > > > randomness as well as
> > > > > natural laws) is not totally reflective of
> > His will,
> > > > but
> > > > > unconsciously defies it in ways that we call
> > > > "natural evil".
> > > > > Similarly, at the beginning, no
> > "will"
> > > > existed, yet we believe that
> > > > > God wanted a people who would *freely* love
> > and serve
> > > > Him. So what
> > > > > if he created a world in which true, free
> > will exists,
> > > > but it is not
> > > > > yet "perfect free will" -- it is
> > not yet a
> > > > free will that completely
> > > > > corresponds to God's Will. In short,
> > what if both
> > > > natural order
> > > > > (including chance) and free will exist in
> > this
> > > > creation, but both
> > > > > are imperfect, waiting to be perfected in
> > the new
> > > > > creation. In the meantime, the corruption
> > of each --
> > > > natural evil
> > > > > and sin-- exist simultaneously alongside the
> > good, in
> > > > defiance of
> > > > > God.
> > > > >
> > > > > How does this relate to the two questions I
> > posed
> > > > earlier? If God's
> > > > > purpose is to take a will-less, chaotic
> > beginning and
> > > > transform it
> > > > > into a perfectly ordered, perfectly willed
> > creation, I
> > > > tentatively
> > > > > propose this undermines Dembski's
> > critique.
> > > > >
> > > > > Specifically (taking question 2 first), if
> > God
> > > > intervenes in the
> > > > > world, it would be for the purpose of
> > correcting the
> > > > problems that
> > > > > arise as a result of imperfect order and
> > imperfect
> > > > free will, in
> > > > > order to redirect creation towards the
> > proper goal.
> > > > Through this
> > > > > process, God is essentially
> > "teaching"
> > > > creation how to properly use
> > > > > the gifts endowed to it, from which God will
> > bring
> > > > forth the new,
> > > > > perfected creation. In intervening then, God
> > does not
> > > > eliminate
> > > > > order and free will, anymore than a
> > professor who
> > > > intervenes to
> > > > > correct a student is eliminating that
> > student's
> > > > innate intelligence.
> > > > > Rather, God is ultimately improving it. As
> > the
> > > > preservation of true
> > > > > free will and true randomness is, as I
> > understand it,
> > > > the
> > > > > philosophical impetus for open theism, this
> > would seem
> > > > to undermine
> > > > > Dembski's second assumption.
> > > > >
> > > > > Likewise, going back to question 1, the lack
> > of
> > > > knowledge about the
> > > > > future does NOT equate to a lack of power to
> > bring
> > > > about His will,
> > > > > if one asserts that His will is the
> > perfection of
> > > > creation in a
> > > > > manner that retains true freedom. This is
> > for two
> > > > reasons: first,
> > > > > there is no set timetable regarding the
> > perfection of
> > > > creation --
> > > > > the goal is a qualitative state that is
> > independent of
> > > > time,
> > > > > therefore the lack of knowledge of the
> > future has no
> > > > bearing on
> > > > > whether this goal is achieved. It simply
> > happens
> > > > whenever this
> > > > > condition is met, whether tomorrow or 50
> > billion years
> > > > from now.
> > > > > Second, because God is the only one who has
> > the power
> > > > to perfect
> > > > > creation by bringing forth the new creation,
> > creation
> > > > itself can not
> > > > > withhold this power from Him; it may resist
> > this power
> > > > through
> > > > > rebellion, but creation cannot escape the
> > fact that
> > > > within it lies
> > > > > the seeds of the new creation that God is
> > constantly
> > > > nurturing and
> > > > > pruning it to ensure it's eventual
> > growth and
> > > > > success.
> > > > >
> > > > > To summarize and conclude my thoughts...I
> > would
> > > > tentatively suggest
> > > > > that true randomness in nature and true free
> > will in
> > > > humanity do
> > > > > exist. God self-limits His knowledge of the
> > future to
> > > > make room for
> > > > > each of these to exist, intending to take
> > what is now
> > > > imperfect, and
> > > > > to make them perfect in the new creation, so
> > that
> > > > ultimately, a
> > > > > perfectly ordered, perfectly willed creation
> > comes
> > > > into being. In
> > > > > the meantime, God retains His sovereignty
> > and
> > > > guaranteers His
> > > > > promises in spite of His lack of knowledge
> > of the
> > > > future, by
> > > > > interacting with creation along its journey,
> > > > responding to errors
> > > > > and countering resistance with measures that
> > keep
> > > > creation on course
> > > > > and help us to better understand how our
> > gifts are to
> > > > be used.
> > > > > Though the old creation can never perfect
> > itself, we
> > > > see in Christ
> > > > > the inauguration of the new creation which
> > > > emphatically asserts that
> > > > > God's will will be done, and that the
> > final
> > > > destination will be
> > > > > reached.
> > > > >
> > > > > Anyway, this is sketched out pretty roughly,
> > and
> > > > I'm sure it has
> > > > > pitfalls in it that I haven't thought of
> > yet, so
> > > > have at it :)
> > > > > Thanks ahead of time for your comments,
> > questions, and
> > > > critiques.
> > > > >
> > > > > In Christ,
> > > > > Christine
> > > > >
> > > > > "For we walk by faith, not by
> > sight" ~II
> > > > Corinthians 5:7
> > > > >
> > > > > Help save the life of a homeless
> > animal--visit
> > > > www.azrescue.org to
> > > > > find out how.
> > > > >
> > > > > Recycling a single aluminum can conserves
> > enough
> > > > energy to power
> > > > > your TV for 3 hours--Reduce, Reuse, Recycle!
> > Learn
> > > > more at
> > > > > www.cleanup.org
> > > > >
> > > > >
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> > > > the message.
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Received on Wed Feb 4 16:51:18 2009