Thanks for this, David.
I wasn't aware that Newbiggin had engaged with Polanyi. This, however, doesn't surprise me given Newbiggin's high calibre of reflection - with which I'm familiar from some of his other works. Given my post-grad work is in religious epistemology, I shall have to chase up this reference.
Thomas Torrance makes a very important appropriation of Polanyi in the context of a dialogue between Christian theology and the natural sciences - "Christian Theology and Scientific Culture" (Christian Journals Limited, Belfast, 1980) comes to mind. I was curious, incidentally, that McGrath, given his admiration for Torrance, doesn't make more of Polanyi's decisive refutation of positivism in his engagement with contemporary uber-positivist Richard Dawkins. So when I once had the opportunity to query McGrath on this point, his response was "we've moved on since then." I can only suggest that "we" doesn't seem to include Dawkins! I was, by the way, impressed by McGrath's understanding of Polanyi's work and consequently even more befuddled by his lack of appropriation of same. I put it down to McGrath's having other fish to fry.
As for your other references, I'll put them on my reading list (although Dooyeweerd is already on same - only time has prevented me from getting to him).
You mention types of evidence and the weight we place upon it. Well a large part of my post-grad study has been in the area of epistemology of testimony and it's interesting how reductionist epistemology of testimony (the idea that I can believe someone's say so only if I can go outside it to verify it for myself) is now seen as implausible in the extreme. At the risk of raising the ire of the assembled masses, I think it incontrovertible that the vast majority of scientists necessarily rely on little more than someones' say so as respects the scientific theory and data upon which they base their own investigations. And when one considers what is broadly involved in the idea of checking the evidence for one's self, it turns out that the concept of verification in the sciences is a grand fiction. Except in the most mundane of instances (and perhaps not even then) NO person has access to ALL the evidence nor do they have the ability to obtain it but must ALWAYS rely on the aut
hority of others. The point is NOT that science is weakened by appeal to testimony or authority, but that science's success shows that appeal to testimony and authority is actually far more credible than has been allowed since around the time of Descarte.
What's so very nice about Polanyi is that he managed to acknowledge such inherently human aspects of the scientific enterprise WITHOUT jumping to the silly conclusion beloved of post-modern anti-scientific types that science therefore is an irrational activity with no more epistemological credibility than reading tea-leaves. It's a very nice way of acknowledging the limitations of science as a human activity AND of acknowledging the fact that science works. Turns out that we humans can do remarkable things despite our many glaring limitations.
Actually, I think that by STARTING with the observation that science DOES work, that it DOES get reliable results, Polanyi was free to study how science is actually done - in contrast to some approaches to philosophy of science which start with an epistemological theory and then try to force scientific method into THAT Procrustean Bed. In that respect Polanyi was (and remains) one of the most SCIENTIFIC of all philosophers of science.
You're right to infer that I like his insights very much!
Blessings,
Murray
David Opderbeck wrote:
> A fellow Polanyi-ite!! This is an excellent summary of Polanyi, Murray,
> and Polanyi was exactly what I was thinking of when I first pushed back
> on the "ALL the evidence" statement.
>
> Leslie Newbiggin did some outstanding work appropriating Polanyi for
> Christian theology -- see his "Proper Confidence," which I think is one
> of the best non-technical books on religious epistemology out there.
> Also, see Esther Meeks Lightcap, "Longing to Know." In addition, Roy
> Clouser's "Knowing With the Heart" and "The Myth of Religious
> Neutrality" are Polanyi-esq and bring in Hermann Dooyeweerd as well.
> Dooyeweerd is another Christian philosopher anyone dealing with
> religious epistemology should know.
>
> I think a grounding in religious epistemology is essential in light of
> the common assertion that we should "follow the evidence wherever it
> leads." We should indeed try to do that, but at the same time we need
> to be clear about what we mean by "evidence" and about the relative
> values we place on different types of evidence. Too often, "follow the
> evidence wherever it leads" is code for positivism.
>
> David W. Opderbeck
> Associate Professor of Law
> Seton Hall University Law School
> Gibbons Institute of Law, Science & Technology
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 8:55 PM, Murray Hogg <muzhogg@netspace.net.au
> <mailto:muzhogg@netspace.net.au>> wrote:
>
> Hi Burgy,
>
> Very nice to have Polanyi introduced into the discussion!
>
> However, I hope you won't mind if I offer some minor correction to
> your remarks on Personal Knowledge?
>
> Strictly Polanyi doesn't offer "Personal Knowledge" (PK) as a third
> category alongside the objective and the subjective. Rather he
> considers that it is a category which embraces these two and so goes
> beyond the false "objective / subjective" dichotomy.
>
> In respects of science Polanyi would argue that there IS no
> knowledge apart from that held by persons AND that this knowledge is
> not so simply connected with "facts" (or "evidence") as the early
> twentieth century positivists (Polanyi's major target) would have us
> suppose. In the context of the current discussion, I'm pretty sure
> that Polanyi would answer Moorad's question "what does "consider ALL
> the evidence" mean?" with the obvious: "it depends who you ask". But
> this is not to reduce the answer to a battle of subjective opinions
> as Polanyi would argue that whether one gets an intelligent answer
> also depends upon who you ask!
>
> Actually, Polanyi would appeal ultimately NOT to what people SAY
> about science, but to how they DO science: and it's simply not a
> simple case of accumulation of facts followed by construction and
> testing of hypotheses - scientists are simply far too intuitive and
> creative for that. And the reason? Because their science is firstly
> a personal pursuit albeit guided by their understanding of and
> engagement with public discourse and data. To appropriate an old
> adage in a somewhat paradoxical way: Polanyi would insist that
> Science is an art and not a science.
>
> Thus, to be a scientist is to possess a skill which, like being able
> to play the violin, is not reducible to a set of rules which one
> could follow without guidance and experience. One has to learn how
> to do science by doing under the supervision of those who already
> know how to do. It's exactly the same process one follows in order
> to learn how to play the violin - the rare self-taught individual or
> child prodigy notwithstanding.
>
> In respects of Christian faith, one can appropriate Polanyi's
> epistemology to argue that just because one's experience of God is
> personal it doesn't follow that such knowledge is "subjective" -
> after all, individuals experience scientific evidence and discourse
> as individuals so such experience is therefore "personal" by
> definition. But we don't thereby relegate it entirely to the
> category of the subjective. Now, to be clear, I don't say that
> Polanyi took this view of Christian faith: he may well have
> considered that religious experience in whole or in part has no
> connection with any objective external reality. I only say that if
> one takes Christian faith as primarily concerned with the knowledge
> of God, and if one takes God as an objective external reality, then
> one will consider that Christian faith is not (contra liberal
> theology) concerned primarily with the subjective but with the
> objective.
>
> There are, of course, clearly elements of the subjective and
> objective in the Christian's knowledge of God. And we are always
> challenged to make a personal appropriation of objective truth, to
> offer subjective response to objective reality, thus recognizing and
> embracing "fact" in our own personal "experience". But it's
> precisely because both fact and experience, the objective and
> subjective, are involved that any schemata which contrasts these
> categories is necessarily inadequate.
>
> Returning to Polanyi, it's only in realizing that his notion of PK
> is a claim about the individual's response to both objective "fact"
> and subjective "experience" that one can see that his category of PK
> is not a third option over against the objective and the subjective,
> but one which embraces and even transcends them.
>
> The really interesting thing is that whilst this sort of discussion
> has very interesting applications in religious epistemology, Polanyi
> himself was primarily concerned with philosophy of science. He
> formulated the idea of PK precisely because he saw no connection
> whatever between the theory and the reality of scientific method as
> it had been propounded by the early twentieth century positivists.
> So Polanyi's notion of PK is PRIMARILY formulated in conscious
> reference to the practice of the physical sciences. So, Burgy, your
> fear that PK is concerned more with metaphysics than with science is
> actually entirely contrary to Polanyi's stated purpose. Personal
> Knowledge is FIRST a theory about scientific knowledge BEFORE it is
> a theory about any other field of knowledge.
>
> Incidentally, Polanyi would dismiss the rule "consider ALL the
> evidence" as hopelessly naive. He would point out that nobody has
> "all" the evidence, most people don't even know where to look to
> find it, if they did know where to look they probably wouldn't see
> it, and even if they DID see "all" of it they would have no ability
> to bring it into any sort of coherent relationship. THESE are the
> sort of abilities Polanyi considered marked one's ability to do
> science: not some trifling ability to jump to an obvious conclusion
> AFTER the data were identified, collected and collated. Think, for
> instance, how OBVIOUS biological evolution becomes AFTER a genius
> like Darwin actually does the REAL scientific work of identifying,
> collecting and collating the relevant data.
> Finally, If Polanyi were to criticise the data selection of YECs I
> don't think it would be simply on the basis that they cherry-picking
> the data - after all, being able to sort the relevant from the
> irrelevant is one of the marks of good science in Polanyi's view.
> His criticism (again, if he was to offer one) would rather be that
> they know so little about science that they not only pick the wrong
> cherries, but also that they have no grasp of what to do with them
> afterward. At least, that is how I think Polanyi would structure a
> response IF, indeed, he were to object to YEC.
> Blessings,
> Murray
>
> John Burgeson (ASA member) wrote:
>
> On 11/26/08, Alexanian, Moorad <alexanian@uncw.edu
> <mailto:alexanian@uncw.edu>> wrote:
>
> Would someone tell me what "Consider All the evidence"
> really means? What
> evidence? How acquired?
>
> A fair question. When I learned those two principles, I had the
> concept that there were only two kinds of evidence, objective and
> subjective, and that -- in science -- only the objective could be
> used, IOW it had to be data that was available to anyone.
>
> Polyani has suggested a third category -- "personal knowledge,"
> which
> I am favorably disposed to. I certainly have personal knowledge that
> is mine alone, not even in principle available to you, which I must
> use in ascertaining the probable truth of some matters. But that
> cannot be "science." Perhaps it is a form of metaphysics, but that
> does not do the concept justice either.
>
> So "Consider all the evidence" means objective evidence. And one
> "sin"
> of some scientists, including at least some YECs, is that they don't
> follow that principle. Some people call that cherry-picking,
> which is
> as good a term as any, I guess.
>
> As I understand Timeous, he seems to adhere to both principles.
>
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Received on Sat Nov 29 15:26:48 2008
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