RE: Polanyi on science (was Re: [asa] C.S. Lewis on ID)

To say that science deals with the purely physical aspect of Nature just
defines what science is and what it is not and thus delimits the field
that science encompasses. I do not see any disrespect of other kinds of
knowledge by clearly defining what science is.

Moorad

From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On
Behalf Of Gregory Arago
Sent: Thursday, November 27, 2008 8:19 AM
To: asa; Murray Hogg; Don Winterstein
Subject: Re: Polanyi on science (was Re: [asa] C.S. Lewis on ID)

Hi Don,

If you'll please forgive me for saying it, I find your perspective one
of the past, that is not consistent with how 'science' is generally
viewed today. First, there are many sciences and many different
scientific methods; there is not a single monolith of 'Science.' Thus,
to say "sciences deal only with quantifiable entities" is rather an
speculative opinion than a view that holds any sort of consensus. For
example, qualities are also shareable, which is antonymous to the notion
of quantities. And there are even non-natural things that are studied
using scientific approaches.

Second, with a more positive and supportive message, 'shareable' is
primarily a matter or concern of communication. The 20th century saw a
raft of scholarly activity in the realm of how communication is
important in the conveyance of scientific (and other important forms of)
knowledge. The notion that information is purely quantitative as an
aspect of communication has been decisively overturned as simplistic and
unsupportable. It is the same with logical positivism, empiricism and
quantificationism (Sorokin coined the term 'quantophrenia' in this
sense); they each must be understood as limited within the contexts that
they arose and related to the problems they attempt(ed) to solve.

In the sense suggested above, you might consider allowing non-physical
things to be involved in scientific processes (even if that suggestion
leaves an initial bad taste in your mouth, I suggest the taste is
palateable and even to be appreciated in the long run!). You write: "If
it's non-physical it can't be quantified." Yet this doesn't mean it is
communicatively unimportant or that what is communicated cannot be
addressed using scientific methods. For example, I can count the number
of ideas I present in a paper, which is a quantity of something
non-physical.

It is after the 'hermeneutic turn' and the 'linguistic turn' (i.e.
important contributions in philosophical thought of the 20th century)
that natural scientists are called to pay more attention to how they
communicate and the importance of communication to what is
'scientifically current' or what counts as 'scientific currency.' This
seems to be part of both Murray's and Polayni's message, the latter
which said:

"The scientist must be granted independence, because only his [sic]
personal vision can achieve essential progress in science...No man can
know more than a tiny fragment of science...I think we are
overestimating the factor of the absolute confirmation, because that is
not the kind of thing which exists in science - certainly it is not
found by backroom boys." (In Man and the Science of Man, 1968: 22, 26,
142)

"I woudn't worry about whether this is science or not. It seems to me
not a substantial question." (163)

I'm worried, Don, that you're using the term 'subjective' pejoratively,
when it needn't be seen or understood that way (e.g. as anti-science).

Gregory

 
--- On Thu, 11/27/08, Don Winterstein <dfwinterstein@msn.com> wrote:

        From: Don Winterstein <dfwinterstein@msn.com>
        Subject: Re: Polanyi on science (was Re: [asa] C.S. Lewis on ID)
        To: "asa" <asa@calvin.edu>, "Murray Hogg"
<muzhogg@netspace.net.au>
        Received: Thursday, November 27, 2008, 3:24 PM

        just because one's experience of God is personal it doesn't
follow that such knowledge is "subjective"

        Sciences deal only with quantifiable entities and testable
relationships among quantities. Quantities in principle are accessible
to everyone, and that's a major reason why sciences make progress.
Scientists don't know how other scientists perceive quantities, just
that the quantities turn out to be the same for everyone. IOW,
quantities are shareable.

        Christians commonly "share" experiences of God and other
non-quantifiables, but "share" is in quotes because as they "share" they
don't have any sure way of knowing whether anyone grasps what they are
talking about. We believe God is real and exists independently of
ourselves, but any experience of him is fundamentally unshareable. Any
attempt to share the experience amounts only to making suggestions,
dropping hints. Our "sharing" may stimulate others to seek such
experience, but even if they succeed, they won't know whether their
experience is the same as ours. For these reasons knowledge from such
experience is subjective.

        Don

                ----- Original Message -----

                From: Murray Hogg <mailto:muzhogg@netspace.net.au>

                To: ASA <mailto:asa@calvin.edu>

                Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2008 5:55 PM

                Subject: Polanyi on science (was Re: [asa] C.S. Lewis on
ID)

                Hi Burgy,
                
                Very nice to have Polanyi introduced into the
discussion!
                
                However, I hope you won't mind if I offer some minor
correction to your remarks on Personal Knowledge?
                
                Strictly Polanyi doesn't offer "Personal Knowledge" (PK)
as a third category alongside the objective and the subjective. Rather
he considers that it is a category which embraces these two and so goes
beyond the false "objective / subjective" dichotomy.
                
                In respects of science Polanyi would argue that there IS
no knowledge apart from that held by persons AND that this knowledge is
not so simply connected with "facts" (or "evidence") as the early
twentieth century positivists (Polanyi's major target) would have us
suppose. In the context of the current discussion, I'm pretty sure that
Polanyi would answer Moorad's question "what does "consider ALL the
evidence" mean?" with the obvious: "it depends who you ask". But this is
not to reduce the answer to a battle of subjective opinions as Polanyi
would argue that whether one gets an intelligent answer also depends
upon who you ask!
                
                Actually, Polanyi would appeal ultimately NOT to what
people SAY about science, but to how they DO science: and it's simply
not a simple case of accumulation of facts followed by construction and
testing of hypotheses - scientists are simply far too intuitive and
creative for that. And the reason? Because their science is firstly a
personal pursuit albeit guided by their understanding of and engagement
with public discourse and data. To appropriate an old adage in a
somewhat paradoxical way: Polanyi would insist that Science is an art
and not a science.
                
                Thus, to be a scientist is to possess a skill which,
like being able to play the violin, is not reducible to a set of rules
which one could follow without guidance and experience. One has to learn
how to do science by doing under the supervision of those who already
know how to do. It's exactly the same process one follows in order to
learn how to play the violin - the rare self-taught individual or child
prodigy notwithstanding.
                
                In respects of Christian faith, one can appropriate
Polanyi's epistemology to argue that just because one's experience of
God is personal it doesn't follow that such knowledge is "subjective" -
after all, individuals experience scientific evidence and discourse as
individuals so such experience is therefore "personal" by definition.
But we don't thereby relegate it entirely to the category of the
subjective. Now, to be clear, I don't say that Polanyi took this view of
Christian faith: he may well have considered that religious experience
in whole or in part has no connection with any objective external
reality. I only say that if one takes Christian faith as primarily
concerned with the knowledge of God, and if one takes God as an
objective external reality, then one will consider that Christian faith
is not (contra liberal theology) concerned primarily with the subjective
but with the objective.
                
                There are, of course, clearly elements of the subjective
and objective in the Christian's knowledge of God. And we are always
challenged to make a personal appropriation of objective truth, to offer
subjective response to objective reality, thus recognizing and embracing
"fact" in our own personal "experience". But it's precisely because both
fact and experience, the objective and subjective, are involved that any
schemata which contrasts these categories is necessarily inadequate.
                
                Returning to Polanyi, it's only in realizing that his
notion of PK is a claim about the individual's response to both
objective "fact" and subjective "experience" that one can see that his
category of PK is not a third option over against the objective and the
subjective, but one which embraces and even transcends them.
                
                The really interesting thing is that whilst this sort of
discussion has very interesting applications in religious epistemology,
Polanyi himself was primarily concerned with philosophy of science. He
formulated the idea of PK precisely because he saw no connection
whatever between the theory and the reality of scientific method as it
had been propounded by the early twentieth century positivists. So
Polanyi's notion of PK is PRIMARILY formulated in conscious reference to
the practice of the physical sciences. So, Burgy, your fear that PK is
concerned more with metaphysics than with science is actually entirely
contrary to Polanyi's stated purpose. Personal Knowledge is FIRST a
theory about scientific knowledge BEFORE it is a theory about any other
field of knowledge.
                
                Incidentally, Polanyi would dismiss the rule "consider
ALL the evidence" as hopelessly naive. He would point out that nobody
has "all" the evidence, most people don't even know where to look to
find it, if they did know where to look they probably wouldn't see it,
and even if they DID see "all" of it they would have no ability to bring
it into any sort of coherent relationship. THESE are the sort of
abilities Polanyi considered marked one's ability to do science: not
some trifling ability to jump to an obvious conclusion AFTER the data
were identified, collected and collated. Think, for instance, how
OBVIOUS biological evolution becomes AFTER a genius like Darwin actually
does the REAL scientific work of identifying, collecting and collating
the relevant data.
                
                Finally, If Polanyi were to criticise the data selection
of YECs I don't think it would be simply on the basis that they
cherry-picking the data - after all, being able to sort the relevant
from the irrelevant is one of the marks of good science in Polanyi's
view. His criticism (again, if he was to offer one) would rather be that
they know so little about science that they not only pick the wrong
cherries, but also that they have no grasp of what to do with them
afterward. At least, that is how I think Polanyi would structure a
response IF, indeed, he were to object to YEC.
                
                Blessings,
                Murray

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Received on Thu Nov 27 13:25:46 2008