Re: [asa] Re: Malebranche and Causes

Moorad -

If what you're focusing on is the fact that our perceptions of the world can't simply be identified with the way the world really is, something like Kant's distinction between the phenomenal worlds & noumenal worlds, OK. I would insist though on some sort of critical realism. When we say that a neutron colliding with a
U-235 nucleus is the cause of a fission event, we have to admit that we don't know the Ding an sich of whatever it is that corresponds to our theoretical construct of "neutron" or "U-235 nucleus." But there are some entities that do correspond to those theoretical constructs - otherwise we're reduced to some sort of solipsism in which everything that we think we observe - and predict - might as well be taking place inside our heads. (Of course since the fission event is quantum mechanical & we can really talk only about probabilities for various things happening in such a collision, the concept of "cause" needs to be dealt with carefully, but I don't think that amounts to saying that nothing really happens.)

But from a theological standpoint, all of this has to do with secondary causes. The only primary cause - the First Efficient Cause to be more precise - is God. But God is not the only cause.

Shalom
George
http://home.neo.rr.com/scitheologyglm

----- Original Message -----
From: "Alexanian, Moorad" <alexanian@uncw.edu>
To: <gregoryarago@yahoo.ca>; <asa@calvin.edu>; "George Murphy" <GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com>
Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2008 7:08 AM
Subject: RE: [asa] Re: Malebranche and Causes

I have a rather naive notion of primary and secondary causes, which may or may not agree with what philosophers have to say. The world out there as understood by man is made up of mental concepts. In fact, this is true in general where human knowing and understanding is taking place.

The secondary causes are the causes that one ascribes to, viz. cause and effect, in this mental construct. On the other hand, primary causes are the real causes taking place actually in reality where the notion of being or existence is paramount.

Moorad

-----Original Message-----
From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu on behalf of Gregory Arago
Sent: Thu 10/30/2008 5:35 PM
To: asa@calvin.edu; George Murphy
Subject: [asa] Re: Malebranche and Causes
 
I'd really appreciate it if someone could explain this notion of primary (or First) cause and secondary causes more in depth. I've read about it (as well as having read Malebranche), but the notion seems confusing, especially when compared with Aristotle's four causes, none of which is called 'primary' or 'secondary.'

Can we attribute this primary/secondary distinction mainly to Aquinas? Is it mainly meant to deal with theodicy? Should it hold as a necessary dichotomy or an unnecessary one (e.g. George might bring in natura naturans here)?

As it is, Malebranche seems not so easy to dismiss, for example, when reading something like Freeman Dyson's Templeton lecture.

If this need take the form of another thread, in any case, I'd be glad to hear some views on this.

Regards, G.

--- On Thu, 10/30/08, George Murphy <GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com> wrote:

From: George Murphy <GMURPHY10@neo.rr.com>
Subject: Re: Malebranche (Was Re: [asa] Advice for conversing with YECs (miracle timing))
To: asa@calvin.edu
Received: Thursday, October 30, 2008, 10:36 PM

Moorad -

I'm no expert at all on Malebranche & will gladly yield to Dave S concerning what his detailed position was. On the broader question thought, I agree that God is the First Cause who cooperates with 2d causes, & that the latter is what science studies. I would emphasize that 2d causes are real causes so that, inter alia, humans are real agents.

The traditional view of providence is that God preserves creatures, cooperates with them in their actions, and governs creation toward God's desired ends. If we think of creatures as having static natures then we'll picture providence as God keeping those natures in existence & then concurring in their motions. The similarity of this view with the Newtonian picture that I sketched earlier is significant, though it's originally Aristotelian. But things in the world aren't inert. They are "composed" of the same interactions that are involved in their motions. It seems to me then that we ought to understand God's cooperation with creatures as fundamental, and to say that God preserves creatures precisely by cooperating with them.

I discussed divine action in http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2001/PSCF3-01Murphy.html & in greater detail in Chapter 6 of The Cosmos in the Light of the Cross.

Shalom
George
http://home.neo.rr.com/scitheologyglm

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Received on Mon Nov 3 11:46:44 2008