Evolutionary ethics (was Re: Fwd: [asa] Is you doctor an evolutionist - if so, what then?)

Hi David,

Quite a helpful contribution, I thought, and I have little to add either
way.

That said, however... :)

<speculative waffling mode ON>

I do have a strong suspicion - although I've never really pursued any
deep reflection on the issue - that talk of "ethics" from a perspective
such as that propounded by Dawkins' is actually quite vacuous - or at
least it means something very different from what is traditionally meant.

I'm aware, it should be said, that atheists make the same criticism of
Christians - for example, the claim that the desire to do God's will is
essentially about avoiding punishment and therefore a pragmatic exercise
in self-preservation rather than a real regard for "the good". There are
also debates about whether - from God's perspective - "the good" isn't
merely a matter of arbitrary selection and therefore not really an
ethical issue, but a matter of mere power to extend or withhold punishment.

As I reflect upon such critiques of Christian ethics - which strike me
as reasonably substantial - I have come to think (with a degree of
uncertainty) that "the good" should perhaps be thought of in terms of
purpose - i.e. a "good" person is the one who lives in a manner
consistent with the divine purpose for which human beings were made.

In one sense, this leaves to one side the question of whether God's
notion of "good" and "evil" is rationaly defensible - but this is not
too problematic as we are after all talking about what is good for
humans - which I personally take to be a different issue than the
question of what is "good" for God just as what is "good" for five-year
olds - not crossing the road, not playing with scissors, etc - doesn't
necessitate a restriction on the activities of adults.

Anyway, at the end of the day, my suspicion is that ethics has to be in
essence teleological - has to say something about meeting an intended
purpose. And as teleological thinking is ruled out of court by Dawkins'
notion of evolution, I think he can't really introduce "ethics" as a
legitimate category - not, at least, without replacing the notion of
"good" with something like "what promotes maximal happiness" or "what
increases the probability of human survival" or something which is a
"good" in purely humanistic or purely evolutionary terms. The "purpose"
in Dawkins' ethic is, I think, going to be very different from the
"purpose" in a Christian ethic.

<speculative waffling mode OFF>

Anyway, thanks for the contribution - it will give me something to muse
upon for a day or two.

Blessings,
Murray Hogg
Pastor, East Camberwell Baptist Church, Victoria, Australia
Post-Grad Student (MTh), Australian College of Theology

David Campbell wrote:
>>> (3) when one is a thoroughgoing evolutionist of the sort Dawkins is, then
>>> one's only option IS to base ethics in evolutionary theory - either directly
>>> or indirectly. To do otherwise is to smuggle in assumptions which aren't
>>> justified on the basis of one's original starting point.
>
> But to base ethics in evolutionary theory is also to smuggle in
> assumptions that aren't justified on the basis of the original
> starting point.
>
> Any "scientific" ethics must first of all make the philosophical
> assumption that science supplies ethical guidance. As a philosophical
> assumption, it is outside the scope of science. Secondly, science
> tells us "if x, then y". It doesn't tell us whether y is morally
> good, bad, or neutral. We must impose some sort of moral values,
> again resorting to philosophy rather than science, in order to decide
> which outcomes are good. Although there are various trends evident in
> evolution, there's no reason to hold that something that is more
> advanced in a particular feature is morally superior. As Bob Thaves
> pointed out in a Frank and Ernest cartoon, the Peter Principle has
> important implications for trying to equate evolution with progress.
> Finally, actual scientific patterns rarely line up exactly with the
> morals that people want to justify by invoking science.
>
> Thus, Dawkins is partially correct when he claims that evolution, etc.
> leads to the conclusion that there are no ultimate moral standards.
> Evolution and other science indeed do not give us any moral standards.
> However, Dawkins is assuming that science is all that there is, a
> naive, self-contradictory philosophical premise (because it itself is
> not science and because science depends on philosophical assumptions).
> If you believe that something besides science exists, you may have a
> basis for ultimate moral standards.
>
> Dawkins then contradicts this a-moral conclusion by claiming that
> atheism and what atheists do is good, whereas religion and what
> religious people do is bad. (Conveniently, people with vague
> religious beliefs are regarded by Dawkins as atheists if they do good
> things and as religious if they do bad things.) He is imposing a
> particular set of ethical standards, apparently more or less that of
> average contemporary Western culture.
>
> Dawkins thinks that long-term survival of humanity is a good thing.
> As Ogden Nash pointed out, this opinion is probably held by few
> species other than Homo sapiens (and our obligate parasites or other
> symbionts). It is true that biological evolution, along with abundant
> empirical evidence, suggests that we have an innate impetus to try to
> promote our own genes, a goal that involves long-term survival of at
> least part of humanity. However, why should I view a genetic impetus
> as a moral mandate? Besides, extinction is the usual fate of species
> over geologic time. Why should survival rather than extinction be
> selected as the goal to aim for?
>
> The various forms of eugenics claim to be seeking to improve the human
> race. However, biology does not tell us that particular traits are
> morally better, and most traits are advantageous under some scenarios
> and not under others, so even promoting long-term evolutionary success
> of humanity gives us little practical guidance. Furthermore, I have
> no evolutionary interest in the good of the human race, except insofar
> as my relatives benefit as a part of it. Cooperation or competition
> might be successful strategies. If I choose to try to compete by
> seeking to disadvantage people who don't look like me, biology gives
> equal justification for them to treat me the same way.
> Correspondingly, in practice eugenics actually claims "everyone should
> promote my evolutionary success, regardless of whether it's in your
> evolutionary interest to do so."
>

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Received on Tue Jun 3 19:51:51 2008