Re: [asa] Education, Medicine, and Evolution

On Mon, Jun 2, 2008 at 7:59 PM, Collin R Brendemuehl
<collinb@brendemuehl.net> wrote:
> At 09:23 PM 6/2/2008, you wrote:

> So what do you believe Mayr says because so far nothing Mayr said
> contradicts my interpretation. In fact, it also matches Mayr's
> interpretation. Chance versus determinism is not a paradox of
> contradiction, it may be confusing to use them at the same time but
> they are not exclusive. Mayr points out that evolution consists of, at
> least in case of Darwinism, two processes: one is variation which is
> inherently probabilistic in nature (the term random is often used but
> this may lead to unnecessary confusion), and selection which is
> inherently 'law like'. Combine the two processes and you get something
> which is stochastic in nature but there is hardly a contradiction or
> paradox of contradiction here.
>
> Perhaps I am failing to understand your argument but let me state
> clearly that nothing what Mayr stated in the paragraph you quoted is
> an insurmountable problem for evolutionary theory, even though some,
> as Mayr suggests, have trouble appreciating that the process is both
> law like and chance like..
>
> I still encourage you to clarify your claims, since the examples you
> provided show no problems for naturalism.
>
> What am I missing here?

Colin:
> What I believe Mayr says? Is the text so obscure? Not at all.
> He specifically uses contingency and necessity in their respective
> philosophical senses.
> There is nothing at all confusing.

Except that you seem to interpret them in a manner inconsistent with
how science uses these terminologies. In fact Mayr explains how he
uses these terms: determinism refers to the law-like nature of
selection and contingency to the chance like behavior of variation.
The scientific literature has some good examples of how these
scientists use these terms and if you wish to interpret them in a
manner inconsistent with their usage then you have a problem

> Just because Mayr asserts that Darwinism is the automatic resolution of the
> issue does not solve anything.
> He lets his contradiction remain. He treats it as some sort of special
> "power".

Not at all, although I appreciate why you may reach such a conclusion.
In fact, Mayr does give us the resolution and points out, somewhat
ironically, that there are some who have a hard time dealing with the
concept of contingency and determinism.

Colin:
> You got the quote right, but you're missing something really simple:
> If I were misrepresenting Mayr he would not have resorted to that sort of
> Wonder and Awe "power" statement.
> But he did. My case rests.
> And problem #1 for naturalism remains.

Not really, you argument relies on a subjective interpretation of
wonder and awe when in fact, Mayr understands and points out that the
combination of determinism and chance form a powerful mechanism for
evolution. So I have to reject your claim that problem #1 even exists
for naturalism, in fact, I have explained how science deals with these
concepts, so even if you were right in your portrayal of Mayr, you are
wrong to claim that a problem remains. In fact, you have not even
identified a problem other than by claiming that there is a paradox
when Mayr points out that this is a _seemingly contradiction_. Mayr's
own claims disagree with your interpretation.

As I stated before, it's important to understand how the scientist
uses these terms, for instance De Duve

<quote>De Duve writes: "Mutations are chance events, which fact it is
often claimed, implies a view of evolution as being ruled by chance.
While not denying the role of contingency in evolution, I point out
that chance operates within constraints—physical, chemical,
biological, environmental—that limit its free play."</quote>

These constraints form teleological components as the constrain the
solution, often towards converging solutions.

In fact Mayr explains his position most clearly (in disagreement with
your interpretation)

<quote>Fourth, Darwin does away with determinism. Laplace notoriously
boasted that a complete knowledge of the current world and all its
processes would enable him to predict the future to infinity. Darwin,
by comparison, accepted the universality of randomness and chance
throughout the process of natural selection. (Astronomer and
philosopher John Herschel referred to natural selection contemptuously
as "the law of the higgledy-piggledy.") That chance should play an
important role in natural processes has been an unpalatable thought
for many physicists. Einstein expressed this distaste in his
statement, "God does not play dice." Of course, as previously
mentioned, only the first step in natural selection, the production of
variation, is a matter of chance. The character of the second step,
the actual selection, is to be directional.

Despite the initial resistance by physicists and philosophers, the
role of contingency and chance in natural processes is now almost
universally acknowledged. Many biologists and philosophers deny the
existence of universal laws in biology and suggest that all
regularities be stated in probabilistic terms, as nearly all so-called
biological laws have exceptions. Philosopher of science Karl Popper's
famous test of falsification therefore cannot be applied in these
cases. </quote>

Darwin's Influence on Modern Thought by Ernst Mayr September 23, 1999,
lecture thadelivered in Stockholm on receiving the Crafoord Prize from
the Royal Swedish Academy of Science.

Or in "This Is Biology" Mayr writes p188

<quote>
Darwinian natural selection is today almost universally accepted by
biologists as the mechanism responsible for evolutionary change. It is
best visualized as a two step process: variation and selection proper
</quote>

Clearly identifying as I did that evolution is a two step process

<quote>
The first step is the production of massive genetic variation in every
generation owing to genetic recombination, chance factors and
mutation. Variation, clear, was the weakest point in Darwin's
thinking. In spite fo a great deal of study and hypothesizing he never
understood what the source of variation was.</quote>

<quote>During this process of recombination as well as in mutation
chance reigns supreme. There is a whole series of consecutive steps
during meiosis where the assortment of genes is largely random and
contributes a huge chance component to the process of natural
selection.</quote>

Well undeniably Mayr contradicts your interpretation

<quote>
The second step in natural selection is selection proper. This means
the differential survival and reproduction of the newly formed
individuals (zygotes). </qutoe>

p.189

Chance or necessity?

<quote>From the Greeks to the nineteenth century there was a great
controversy over the question whether changes in the world are due to
chance or necessity. It was Darwin who found a brillinat solution to
this old conundrum: they are due to both.
</quote>

Case #1 dismissed.

> Mayr:
>
> One can conclude from these observations that evolution is neither
> merely a series of accidents nor a deterministic movement towards even
> more perfect adaptation. To be sure, evolution is in part an adaptive
> process because natural selection operates in every generation. The
> principle of adaptionism has been adopted so widely by Darwinists
> because it is such a heuristic methodology. To question what the
> adaptive properties might be for every attribute of an organism leads
> almost inevitable to a deeper understanding. However, every attribute
> is ultimately the product of variation and this variation is large a
> product of chance. Many authors seem to have a problem in
> comprehending the virtually simultaneous actions of two seemingly
> opposing causations, chance and necessity. But this is precisely the
> power of the Darwinian process.
>
> note the _seemingly opposing_ . Mayr is stating, as I stated, that
> evolutionary processes have two components: one of mostly necessity
> called selection and one mostly of a chance nature: variation.
>
>
> Now remember what I stated
>
>> Excellent but now combine this with variation and you have a lawlike
>> process with chance variations.
>
> To which you responded: No. A lawlike process. Variation does not
> demand contingency.
>
> As I and Mayr point out Variation is a probabilistic process of mostly
> chance.
>
> I continued
>
>> Just like Mayr argued, selection is deterministic in nature, variation
>> is probabilistic in nature, the combine process is stochastic.
>
> To which you responded partially: And you don't see the problem? THis
> is why there are
>
> It would be nice to hear the rest of the argument as well as why you
> believe Mayr and Rosenhouse show a problem for naturalism. What am I
> missing?
>
> So you claim the debate is law-like, to which I answer that neither
> Mayr nor Rosenhouse claimed that variation is lawlike but rather that
> the process of selection is law-like. Combine this with the chance
> processes involved in variation and you may appreciate why the process
> can be both contingent and deterministic. I referred to stochastic
> processes as an example
>
> I hope that this contributes to a better understanding of what Mayr is
> telling us.
>
> Colin: Oh, I understand it.
> Rosenhouse may have the same contradiction problem as Mayr: (I've not
> considered it fully.)
> There is no contingency in a determined system.

There is contingency in a system which contains a deterministic and a
probabilistic component. Science calls these processes stochastic as
they combine a deterministic system with 'noise'.

> The "lawlike" necessity that frames his mathematical model presumes
> directionality much as Gould does.

Yes, in fact there is a level of directionality as these deterministic
processes maximize or minimize properties. For instance in selection,
the property maximized is fitness, but even though that is the
ultimate direction, the species can still go extinct or drift into a
sub-optimal solution, depending on the population sizes. Similarly in
physical processes most often energy states are minimized, hence we
find soap bubbles and protein folds. However, due to the contingent
nature of variation, the overall process is neither fully
deterministic nor fully contingent. Of course, even random processes
like the drunkards walk can have directionality as Gould pointed out.
When there exists a 'wall' of minimal complexity (single cellular)
then random walk will inevitably diffuse away from the origin.

> If there is directionality (for Rosenhouse that is a calculable conclusion
> that, because of a lawlike process,
> cannot be avoided) then there is determinism and no contingency. They are
> exclusive.
> Problem #2 for naturalism remains.

Because of a lawlike process, part of the mechanism is deterministic,
however due to the chance processes part of the mechanism is
contingent. The result is neither contingent nor deterministic.

>
>>> I have to simply reject that claim. There is nothing religious about
>>> the workable premise of science that it has to deal in falsifiable
>>> presumptions. Otherwise, it is not science. If your argument is that
>>> the _effect_ of this presumption is that it eliminates the
>>> supernatural as an explanation then this is not an a priori assumption
>>> but a constraint on the supernatural which lacks falsifiability since
>>> it predicts anything and thus nothing.
>
>> Whoa! At this point you've rejected a great deal of science
>
> By rejecting the supernatural? Too bad but that's just not part of science.
>
> No, by rejecting the metaphysical.
> Back to my posting -- if you allow one metaphysical explanation there is not
> reason to disallow another.

That depends whether or not the other metaphysical explanation carries
its weight. In science, the success of methodological naturalism has
shown that it indeed does carry its own weight. At best, the
metaphysical position of the supernatural is scientifically without
content and adds nothing, and in some cases it subtracts from science
as it insists on being inconsistent with scientific knowledge.

I am somewhat surprised that you insist that just because evolution
includes a deterministic process, it should thus be fully
deterministic, when in fact both Rosenhouse and Mayr are clear that
the variation component is fully or mostly contingent.

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Received on Mon Jun 2 23:58:01 2008