Re: [asa] Education, Medicine, and Evolution

On Mon, Jun 2, 2008 at 10:26 AM, Collin R Brendemuehl
<collinb@brendemuehl.net> wrote:
> Falsifiability is religious in the sense that it introduces a metaphysical
> component.

That's a meaningless assertion. Could I invite you to present a more
reasoned argument?

> At 12:38 PM 6/2/2008, you wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 2, 2008 at 4:48 AM, Collin R Brendemuehl
> <collinb@brendemuehl.net> wrote:

>> Naturalism's philosophical failures are many.
> Any in particular?

> Any in particular? Really? I named two.

Then I have to reject them as strawmen since none of them showed a
problem with naturalism per se. In fact, none of them are relevant to
naturalism.

>> Mayr's toleration of a paradox as something to be appreciated is one of my
>> favorites:
>> * Many authors seem to have a problem in comprehending the virtually
>> simultaneous
>> * actions of two seemingly opposing causations, chance and necessity.
>> * But this is precisely the power of the Darwinian process.
>
> Perhaps the simple answer is that it is at best a strawman. Where does
> Mayr makes his claims and what does he say. Vague assertions without
> detail do not further the conversation. I have asked you for
> references before and all I got was a book. Perhaps you could outline
> what exactly Mayr claims? As to the simultaneous actions of two
> seemingly opposing causations of chance and necessity, this may cause
> some confusion to some authors however they are neither opposing nor
> problematic. The 'power' of the Darwinian process are the combination
> of two processes namely variation (which is observed and quite well
> understood) and selection (which is observed and reasonably well
> understood). The two forces are not opposing but combining. Thing of
> course are far from that simple and when adding additional components
> and factors such as neutrality, one comes to understand why evolution
> has been so successful.
>
> Straw man? Hardly. Mayr's devotes a section to discussing the subject of
> chance and necessity.
> You can say what you want, but facts are facts.

Yes, and you confuse this to be a paradox when in fact as I explained
your interpretation of Mayr is flawed. Just because Mayr believes that
evolution presents some problems to the understanding by some does not
mean that evolution and evolutionary theory has any problems, in fact.
As I explained the facts are simple that regularity and chance
processes are quite well understood. So let me see if I can give you
an example or two to clarify as you seem to be struggling with the
concept of necessity versus probability.

First example: Given a set of initial conditions, distributed with
some unnamed probability distribution function, calculate how they
'evolve' under the process of a regular process. Chaos theory shows
that often, especially in case of non-linearities, the solutions
quickly diverge. So in other words, despite the regularity involved,
the solutions become some distribution.

Second Example: Given a probability distribution and a regularity,
such a a selective force, you can calculate for various cases their
outcome and obtain a distribution function for the expected outcome.
Even though the mechanism is regular and repeatable, the outcome
depends on chance variations and thus in some cases, the advantageous
allele can still be lost due to chance, especially in small
populations.

> You say it's "vague" after I've provided a quote? That's disingenuous.
> But again, from What Evolution Is, 2002, Perseus Publishing, p 229
> Many authors seem to have a problem in comprehending the virtually
> simultaneous actions of two seemingly opposing causations, chance and

Aha, I noticed now your quote, and page. I assumed that 229 was a page
count, and I apologize. Yes, Mayr discusses in a short paragraph that
evolution is neither random nor regular. You seem to conclude,
erroneously, that this causes a problem for darwinian theory by
calling it a paradox, when in fact it isn't.

>> Rosenhouse's "lawlike" certainty is another favorite.

> Again, you present a statement but lack an argument. Rosenhouse
> exposes the mathematical problems in the Intelligent Design claims and
> provide a much needed introduction to Hardy Weinberg's theorem and
> Natural Selection. Of course these are theoretical concepts based on
> logic, reason and found to be quite useful in understanding how
> variation spreads through the population under selection. Such is the
> power of reason and logic and the combination of probability
> distributions and selection.

> Rosenhouse's conclusion is that the process must work in a certain manner.

Hence the name "process"

> As a premise behind his mathematical argument against BAI he stated clearly
> Natural selection is a lawlike process."

Excellent but now combine this with variation and you have a lawlike
process with chance variations.

> Your point is specious. Of course he was making that argument. I'm talking
> about *how* he arrived at his point.
> The "lawlike" assumption is weak. It's a type of determinism.

Just like Mayr argued, selection is deterministic in nature, variation
is probabilistic in nature, the combine process is stochastic.

>> And I pointed out two of the similar problems in Chrisitian theology.

>> A good return question is: What is "science"? Hence my early post.
>> If you include the Received View along with falsifiability then you add a
>> great deal of metaphysical baggage -- as much as any religious view.
>
> How is falsifiability a religious view?

> I'm using "religious" in the manner that Clouser establishes in "The Myth of
> Religious Neutrality".
> When a principle because a metaphysical assumption it takes the same place
> as does any deity.

I have to simply reject that claim. There is nothing religious about
the workable premise of science that it has to deal in falsifiable
presumptions. Otherwise, it is not science. If your argument is that
the _effect_ of this presumption is that it eliminates the
supernatural as an explanation then this is not an a priori assumption
but a constraint on the supernatural which lacks falsifiability since
it predicts anything and thus nothing.

> Hence it is "religious" though it may not be in any sense ecclesiastical.

The term is at best confusing and in fact, it lacks any relevance
other than it being an assertion.

>> Does that make it "non-science" because it is no longer physicalism?
>
> Nope, remember that physicalism is a metaphysical application of
> science rather than a methodological application of science.
>
> Physicalism, according to Suppe, is the attempt to remove the metaphysical
> and test only the physical.
> I'm using the term correctly.
> See "The Structure of Scientific Theories". (I don't have a page # at the
> moment.)

Nope, you are confusing science and physicalism. Let me see if I can
help you understand. Physicalism is the metaphysical assumption that
science is all there is while science is the methodological process
which remains silent on the issue of the existence of other
metaphysical factors.

>
>> It raises some serious questions. Or if you want to include the
>> theoretical sciences, even within natural studies, you've got a great
>> deal of non-physical testing and reporting going on, and much of it
>> merely mathematical (e.g., tachyons and quantum theory) and not
>> at all physical-world testable.

> Science does start with a lot of speculations and hypotheses that
> follow from said speculations which can then be tested. When it comes
> to ID, they somehow refuse to follow a similar path and develop a
> positive hypothesis of design, and instead focus on disproving
> Darwinism under the flawed concept that this somehow should present us
> evidence in favor of ID.

>> What is "science" at this point should not reject external causality.
>
> Of course not, it's just that science may never be able to prove or
> disprove the kind of external causality imagined by IDers

> Ok. So it's acceptable to assume other external (and impersonal)
> causalities?

What is an impersonal causality? Remember science deals in practical matters.

>
>> If it does, then to be consistent it must return to the old physicalism.

> Not at all. Science does not reject the magical, the supernatural, nor
> does it accept it, because it adds nothing to our scientific
> understanding. Science in other words is consistent with Naturalism,
> Physicalism and Religion as it remains neutral on these matters.

> Can't grant that.
> If science is free to find some sort of compatibalism within quantum theory,
> then the door is open.

The door is open to what? Science has to incorporate quantum theory as
it is part of the reality of science.

Somehow I am confused about what you are really trying to argue here
although it seems like you are confusing physicalism and science, or
philisophical naturalism and methodological naturalism

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Received on Mon Jun 2 18:37:29 2008