Re: [asa] public response

This would be a good question for the historians of science on this list. My impression is that natural philosophers have never been all that reluctant to comment on the metaphysical implications of their work. I don't know if there's a good way to quantify whether it is now "more murky" than in the past. There have often been theories that were considered untestable at the time they were presented but became testable many decades later. One must of course distinguish between untestable in principle or untestable in practice. To answer your questions more specifically, I tend to think that other parameters are more prevalent in diminishing the public perception of th efficacy of science. For example, the understandable tendency of the media to highlight dramatic and early, often non-confirmed, publications which are later rejected is a big factor in generating distrust of science. This often happens in drug effectiveness, for instance. On the other hand, people are often attracted to far-out ideas like parallel universe theories. It's fun to speculate and, yes, often to scoff at those crazy scientists. But I'm not sure it is a big factor in determining how people view either science or ID.

I'm not sure that a new term is needed as much as better education of and appreciation by the public of how the term "theory" is used by practitioners of science. The latter don't seem to be all that confused.

Randy
  ----- Original Message -----
  From: George Cooper
  To: asa@calvin.edu
  Sent: Wednesday, May 21, 2008 11:50 AM
  Subject: RE: [asa] public response

  I am curious as to the opinion of folks here regarding whether or not the efficacy of science suffers diminishment in public perception given the amount of metaphysical "theories" that are thrown upon the public? For instance, does ID become more palatable if "theories" such as the unobservable and untestable "Parallel Universe Theory" - presented by the respected cosmologist, Max Tegmark -- is seen as legitimized by science? Or am I overstating the case with my suggestion that the waters of science today are made more murky by metaphysics?

  Also, is there not a need for a new term for comprehensive theory-like postulations that would minimize the abuse of the term "theory", given the apparent reluctance of theorists to call their baby a mere conjecture or hypothesis?

  George Cooper

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Received on Wed May 21 12:16:14 2008