Terry said: *I will
gladly admit (as do all Reformed theologians) that there is some
mystery here, but we seek to let scripture determine how to think
about this rather than unrestrained human philosophizing.*
But in fairness to Pinnock and Sanders (open theists), they argue that their
position is thoroughly scriptural and that it is the compatibilists who are
picking and choosing. I tend to agree that the balance is more as Terry has
said, but something makes me uneasy about trying to squeeze scripture too
tightly into a systematic theology box here.
From a Reformed perspective, how do you answer the ontological argument of
the open theists? If the future hasn't yet happened, and therefore doesn't
"exist," how can it be determined?
I suppose one answer could that if God is outside time, every moment
"exists" for Him. A problem here is that if this is true, Christ is somehow
continually dying on the cross.
If I'm not mistaken, the classical Calvinist answer is that God has decreed
everything that will be, such that the future cannot be otherwise than what
God has decreed. But is this just another way of saying that the future
actually does already exist for God?
On Feb 15, 2008 7:58 PM, Terry M. Gray <grayt@lamar.colostate.edu> wrote:
> Christine,
>
> In discussions of free will there is what is called libertarian free
> will and what is called compatibilist free will.
>
> In the former there can be no decree or foreordination that
> predetermines the outcome; this is what most people in casual
> discussions seem to mean by "free will". In open theism, free choices
> of this sort can't even be foreknown by God because if they were
> foreknown there would have to be some "deterministic" mechanism such
> that what was foreknown actually came to pass. Once it's foreknown it
> can't be free choice in this sense any more. (Open theists are
> consistent in their advocacy of libertarian free will, in my opinion.)
>
> Compatibilist free will is compatible with God's decree or
> foreordination or in a general sense with some sort of determinism.
> Here free will simply means that the agent is not coerced in his or
> her choice; no outside factor is determining what he or she does--it
> comes from within--some say it is an expression of the agent's
> desires. But it doesn't mean that the outcome can't be determined or
> known ahead of time.
>
> Some critics of compatibilist free will argue (as you seem to below)
> that this is no free will at all.
>
> Of course this is very simplified summary of a debate among
> philosophers and theologians that has taken pages and pages.
>
> As for me--this is where I see scripture pointing. God is totally
> sovereign--purposing everything that happens--even evil. (You can find
> lots of Biblical proof-texts in one of the footnotes of the paper to
> which I referred. His plan to show his love in the death of Christ is
> the pre-eminent example. All sort of evil intentions of men "caused"
> Christ's death and they will be held accountable for their evil; yet
> it was God's plan all along--from all eternity, I think we can even
> say.) At the same time, human beings are responsible agents, we are
> not coerced in our actions--we make choices that we are accountable
> for. Reformed/Calvinist theology maintains both simultaneously. Other
> understandings of scripture force a choice between those two strands
> usually giving God reduced sovereignty (redefining the word
> variously!) and giving human beings libertarian free will. I will
> gladly admit (as do all Reformed theologians) that there is some
> mystery here, but we seek to let scripture determine how to think
> about this rather than unrestrained human philosophizing.
>
> TG
>
> On Feb 15, 2008, at 12:07 PM, Christine Smith wrote:
>
> > Hi all,
> >
> > I must say, I'm enjoying this thread thoroughly. Ted's
> > and John's answers in particular I found to be quite
> > insightful and eloquent :)
> >
> > Terry--a question to you...you write here that: "From
> > God's point of view nothing is random, it's all
> > decreed and ordained. (And that goes also for the free
> > choices of free agents!)" We're coming from different
> > theological backgrounds/frameworks here, so maybe you
> > can help me understand--I just don't follow how this
> > can be a logical conclusion--if God decrees that
> > something will be a certain way--say, a (sinful)
> > choice I make, then how can I be truly "free" in any
> > sense of the word, and how can God not be the author
> > of evil? Doesn't it make more sense, logically and
> > theologically, to understand that though God is
> > all-knowing and all-powerful, He is also
> > self-limiting, and that He has chosen to limit His
> > powers by intentionally creating a universe that
> > contains elements of randomness and free will which He
> > interacts with, rather than "predicts" or "decrees" as
> > it were?
> >
> > Thanks everyone for good food for thought!
> > In Christ,
> > Christine (ASA member)
> >
> >
> > --- "Terry M. Gray" <grayt@lamar.colostate.edu> wrote:
> >
> >> Randy,
> >>
> >> I think you have understood him correctly.
> >>
> >> Personally, I think the only way out of this
> >> "problem" is to have God
> >> involved in some way in every single thing (even the
> >> most minute and
> >> the most fleeting) that happens. The Reformed
> >> theologians (and others)
> >> have called this concurrence and it is a
> >> sub-category of the doctrine
> >> of Providence.
> >>
> >> Westminster Confession of Faith:
> >>
> >> III, 1
> >> God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and
> >> holy counsel of his
> >> own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever
> >> comes to pass:
> >> yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin,
> >> nor is violence
> >> offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the
> >> liberty or
> >> contingency of second causes taken away, but rather
> >> established.
> >>
> >> IV, 2
> >> Although, in relation to the foreknowledge and
> >> decree of God, the
> >> first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and
> >> infallibly; yet,
> >> by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall
> >> out, according to the
> >> nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely,
> >> or contingently.
> >>
> >> Random events are in the category of contingency.
> >> Thus, according to
> >> this historic Presbyterian and Reformed way of
> >> understanding
> >> scripture, even chance events are ordained by God.
> >>
> >> Logan Gage is mistaken to think that there is no
> >> difference between
> >> physical and metaphysical randomness. God "orders"
> >> some of his
> >> "decree" to "fall out" by chance events. Such events
> >> look entirely
> >> like chance events to us the human observer, even
> >> though they are
> >> completely ordered by God. Even Calvin talks about
> >> the ill-fortune
> >> (bad luck) of the fellow killed in the forest when a
> >> branch fell on
> >> him while passing by. But, no doubt, for Calvin it
> >> was part of God's
> >> plan and decree. I suppose it's semantics of sorts.
> >> I'm happy to call
> >> things that look like random events in terms of
> >> statistical analysis,
> >> random, even though I know that from God's
> >> perspective and purpose
> >> they are not at all random. From God's point of view
> >> nothing is
> >> random, it's all decreed and ordained. (And that
> >> goes also for the
> >> free choices of free agents!)
> >>
> >> Some discussion of all this applied to process
> >> theology, open theism,
> >> and intelligent design can be found in my paper
> >> "Give Me Some of That
> >> Old-Time Theology: A Reflection on Charles Hodge's
> >> Discussion of
> >> Concursus in Light of Recent Discussions of Divine
> >> Action in Nature"
> >> found on-line at
> >> http://www.asa3.org/gray/GrayASA2003OnHodge.html
> >>
> >> TG
> >>
> >> On Feb 14, 2008, at 8:16 PM, Randy Isaac wrote:
> >>
> >>> Jack Haas just drew my attention to Logan Gage's
> >> response to my
> >>> letter in the Jan 2008 issue of CT. I would
> >> greatly appreciate your
> >>> views on the last two paragraphs of his article.
> >> We have touched on
> >>> randomness several times in this forum and I
> >> believe it continues to
> >>> be one of the fundamental questions. Logan seems
> >> to believe that if
> >>> there is divine guidance there will necessarily be
> >> evidence of non-
> >>> randomness. Or have I misunderstood him?
> >>>
> >>> Randy
> >>>
> >>
> >> ________________
> >> Terry M. Gray, Ph.D.
> >> Computer Support Scientist
> >> Chemistry Department
> >> Colorado State University
> >> Fort Collins, CO 80523
> >> (o) 970-491-7003 (f) 970-491-1801
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> To unsubscribe, send a message to
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> >> message.
> >>
> >
> >
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>
> ________________
> Terry M. Gray, Ph.D.
> Computer Support Scientist
> Chemistry Department
> Colorado State University
> Fort Collins, CO 80523
> (o) 970-491-7003 (f) 970-491-1801
>
>
>
>
> To unsubscribe, send a message to majordomo@calvin.edu with
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>
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Received on Fri, 15 Feb 2008 21:19:08 -0800
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