Re: [asa] Natural Selection and Reliable Beliefs

I think I'm saying something similar -- the proof seems to me like a
language game that depends on a particular usage of "tree" that seems to
bear no relation to the properties of a "tree" (whether the "tree" is also a
"witch" or not) in the real world.

On Feb 10, 2008 6:55 PM, D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com> wrote:

> Of course every word can be defined. In the empirical scheme one now
> eventually gets to ostension. But there is a proof that one cannot do
> science merely with observation terms, which was a claim of logical
> positivism. However, it has been noted that science depends on descriptions
> rather than definitions. There was an ancient dictum that definition had to
> be by genus and differentia, with the differentia required to be a term and
> its negation. Eventually one gets from the summum genus to the infima
> species, which may be further subdivided by accidents. Thus "man" as infima
> species was defined as the "rational mortal animal," two differentia because
> there is no single term for "rational animal" or "mortal animal". But human
> beings can be differentiated by nationality, appearance, occupation, etc.
> Dave (ASA)
>
> On Sun, 10 Feb 2008 12:46:23 -0500 "David Opderbeck" <dopderbeck@gmail.com>
> writes:
>
> Right -- but doesn't "appletree" imply certain properties, including
> things like fixity and hardness?
>
> On Feb 9, 2008 10:35 PM, D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com> wrote:
>
> > You've put in a lot of extra things. Plantinga's statement can be
> > presented as:
> > (Ex)[appletree(x) & witch(x) & blooming(x)]
> > which indicates that there exists at least one entity, x, with the three
> > characteristics. "And" has the logical requirement to be true only when all
> > the propositions joined are true. So all it takes in the claim that it is a
> > witch to make the whole false, even though the other conjuncts are true.
> >
> > I don't wonder that you have a problem with some of Plantinga's
> > arguments. I've run across his views repeatedly, and now usually don't
> > bother with them. The fact is that all philosophers have to assume some
> > things to get started, but Plantinga seems to swallow whales. My impression
> > is that he is a good friend to ID, which I hold to be grossly in error.
> > Dave (ASA)
> >
> > On Sat, 9 Feb 2008 20:07:39 -0500 "David Opderbeck" <
> > dopderbeck@gmail.com> writes:
> >
> > On the philosophy of religion blog Prosblogion (
> > http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2008/02/naturalism-evol.html),
> > I've been going back and forth with someone about Plantinga's argument
> > against natural selection producing reliable beliefs. I happen to like
> > Plantinga and reformed epistemology generally, but I don't understand the
> > force of this particular argument.
> >
> > Right now the discussion turns on a hypothetical creature, in a
> > hypothetical world in which naturalism is true, that believes trees are
> > witches. The creature has the belief "appletree witch is blooming." That
> > the creature could hold this belief supposedly demonstrates that natural
> > selection can result in unreliable beliefs, which supposedly leads to the
> > conclusion that there is no reason to accept an epistemology rooted in
> > natural selection / naturalism.
> >
> > I understand that by the rules of formal logic, a proposition can't be
> > partly true. However, it seems silly to me to claim that "appletree witch
> > is blooming" is really a single proposition that must be either true or
> > false. Below is what seems to make sense to me. Logicians, am I just
> > getting the rules of logic wrong here?
> >
> > If "appletree witch is blooming" has to be analyzed only as single
> > proposition, this just seems like an unrealistic language game to me.
> > People / organisms simply don't form beliefs like this all at once.
> >
> > "Appletree witch is blooming" includes at least the following beliefs
> > that realistically would develop separately because they each have survival
> > value in diffent contexts. They can be stated as separate propositions:
> >
> > p1 there is an appletree
> > p1(a) appletrees have the proprty of hardness
> > p1(b) appletrees have the property of fixity
> > p1(c) if I crash into the appletree it will hurt me
> >
> > p2 appletree is a witch
> > p2(a) witches have the property of protecting or cursing the clan
> > p2(b) witches ought to be venerated so that the clan is protected
> > p2(c) the clan needs a shaman to communicate with the witches
> >
> > p3 appletree is blooming
> > p3(a) blooms have the property of emitting fragrance
> > p3(b) blooms lead to buds and fruit
> > p3(c) blooms have magical properties that the shaman can use to appease
> > witches
> >
> > So fine, "appletree witch is blooming," standing alone as a single
> > proposition, technically is false. But who cares aside from the guy who
> > wrote the logic textbook? p1 that I stated above confers survival value
> > based on properties of the external universe and is reliable.
> >
> > I'd suggest that Plantinga's argument here works only if *all *of the
> > beliefs subsidiary to the challenged proposition are also unreliable.
> > Otherwise, the best you can say is that natural selection will produce some
> > reliable beliefs because all organisms encounter the same physical universe,
> > even while natural selection might also result in some unreliable beliefs.
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>

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Received on Sun Feb 10 20:46:05 2008