Re: [asa] Easter Island WAS Does the flagellum prove Genesis?

From: PvM <pvm.pandas@gmail.com>
Date: Mon Dec 10 2007 - 11:10:31 EST

So in the end it all comes down to faith and there is no science or
objective logic involved after all which is why people can disagree on
the interpretation of the fine tuning. Which is why the design
inference is so useless when it comes to these rarefied designs.

On Dec 10, 2007 5:10 AM, John Walley <john_walley@yahoo.com> wrote:

> I think you are missing my point but I think I see where we are
> disconnecting. I never said this was a scientific deduction. In fact I
> purposely avoided saying that and said instead that it is a rational and
> logical deduction. which in my opinion is more aligned with the spiritual
> instinct that God would have us use to discern truth. We agree that it
> comes down to a faith position and science is unable to describe the
> supernatural. But you can't say that this deduction from a supernatural
> presupposition is not valid or not true, just not scientific.
>
>
>
> Of course, the a priori probabilities of any supernatural event are zero,
> until they happen. And that is probably why we see God using that pattern to
> establish His witness through supernatural signs and wonders. The point is
> that putting a scientific constraint on deduction misses the truth, as in
> the case of the design inference of the just right universe.
>
>
>
> Thanks
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On
> Behalf Of Iain Strachan
>
> Sent: Monday, December 10, 2007 4:08 AM
> To: John Walley
> Cc: Randy Isaac; asa@calvin.edu
> Subject: Re: [asa] Easter Island WAS Does the flagellum prove Genesis?
>
>
>
>
>
> I think the last two posters are missing the point here.
>
> Moorad talks about assigning a zero prior probability to the existence of
> God, but I never said anything of the sort.
>
> What I said was that it was impossible to specify a prior probability for
> the existence of God, or indeed of shape-shifting staffs. The value you
> pick is entirely dependent on your own belief. At a questionnaire in the
> theoretical physics department at my work once, people were asked to assign
> probabilities to various events, such as England winning the World Cup
> Football (that's "soccer" to our USA friends). To the "God exists"
> question, one person put down zero and another put down 10^-100. The
> 10^-100 person says to the zero person "now that's what I call faith"! Did
> I put down 1? Well, not exactly, I put down 0.9 recurring, but it brought
> home to me how silly the exercise really was. If I'd put down 1, I wouldn't
> exactly be making a scientific statement, would I? If I'd put down
> signficantly less than 1, I'd be indicating doubts that I didn't have. It
> was the sheer impossibility of making an objective and truthful statement
> that led me to put down the joke answer of 0.9 recurrring.
>
> My view is that there is no way to assign a prior to the existence of God
> in a scientific fashion, so one can't make scientifically valid deductions
> from evidences of design. The design "argument for God" only works if your
> prior probability differs signficantly from zero. But if it's already your
> belief that God exists, then you don't need to make the design argument. By
> contrast, an atheist is not likely to be persuaded by such an argument.
>
> John, you contend that the analogy is close enough. I beg to differ.
> There is a whole world of difference between a prior of close to zero and a
> prior of close to unity. It comes down to your own faith position. You
> accuse me of failing to describe supernatural events. But supernatural
> events are by their very nature unpredictable, and therefore outside the
> realm of scientific exploration. If such events were predictable (for
> example if such things happened as in the world of Harry Potter by saying
> the right spell or by waving a wand in the right manner), then they would be
> natural and not supernatural). But miracles occur by God's grace, not by
> scientific cause and effect.
>
> Iain
>
>
>
>
>
> On Dec 10, 2007 5:25 AM, John Walley <john_walley@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> Agreed the analogy is imperfect but again I contend close enough. ID's
> position may be to prove God but I have never said that and it doesn't
> negate the general design inference, even if it doesn't prove it. It makes
> it a rational and logical deduction though which is more than you can say
> for multiverses.
>
>
>
> Your analysis fails to correctly describe the other supernatural events of
> our faith as well. When Moses threw down his staff and it became a serpent,
> there were no known a priori probabilities of staff shape-shifting until
> Pharaoh's magicians duplicated it and even then Moses trumped them by his
> serpents eating theirs. By your analysis Bayesian theory today would not
> affirm this event and it would deny it but to witness such an event today
> even by a person trained in Bayesian theory, the response would likely not
> be an appeal to not having any a priori probabilities for that event.
>
>
>
> Accepting the supernatural and that it is a hallmark of the God of the Bible
> is a prerequisite of the faith, and once accepted, the design of the
> universe is patently obvious. It is only deniable by not accepting the
> premise that God works through the supernatural.
>
>
>
> Thanks
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On
> Behalf Of Iain Strachan
> Sent: Sunday, December 09, 2007 9:45 AM
> To: John Walley
> Cc: Randy Isaac; asa@calvin.edu
> Subject: Re: [asa] Easter Island WAS Does the flagellum prove Genesis?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Dec 9, 2007 1:46 PM, John Walley <john_walley@yahoo.com > wrote:
>
> Pim,
>
> Granted there may be some technical distinctions between Easter Island and
> the cosmological constants because one can be described through known
> natural designers while the other can't, but I contend this a distinction
> without a difference.
>
>
> I'm afraid that from my own background in Bayesian probability theory, I
> can't really agree with you there.
>
> The whole point is that your a priori probability of the existence of known
> natural designers is 1. But you can't place an a priori probability on the
> existence of God. Hence it is entirely reasonable to make a design
> inference when you see a watch on the heath because you already know
> watchmakers exist. The design inference is thereby not a proof of the
> existence of watchmakers, because you already have independent evidence of
> the existence of watchmakers. But I think the ID position is that this
> design inference ( e.g. in nature, or in cosmological constants) wants to be
> some proof of the existence of God.
>
> What if you didn't have any clue if watchmakers exist? In Star Trek, when
> confronted by an amorphous pulsating blob, Dr. McCoy would exclaim with
> reverence "It's life, Jim, but not as we know it!". Suppose that such alien
> life forms came to the earth, and saw a watch mechanism in the middle of the
> desert, and that this mechanism was as alien to them as they are to us.
> Would such an alien then be justified in making a design inference, as
> opposed to thinking it might have come about by natural processes. Might
> not such an alien say "It's life, Jim, but not as we know it?".
>
> So I believe there is a clear difference in the analogy - the difference
> being you have independent evidence of the existence of the "natural
> designers" - you are not using the inference to prove the existence of those
> natural designers.
>
> Iain
>
>
>
>
> --
> -----------
> After the game, the King and the pawn go back in the same box.
>
> - Italian Proverb
> -----------

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Received on Mon Dec 10 11:11:24 2007

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