Re: [asa] Anthropic Principle, "proof," and "explanations"

From: David Heddle <heddle@gmail.com>
Date: Fri Dec 07 2007 - 15:38:44 EST

But keep in mind that the sensitivity of life to the values of the constants
is generally not disputed. For example, the atheist Susskind presents one of
the clearest discussions of this sensitivity in *The Cosmic Landscape*.

So consider the case where we agree, across the board, that constant
*C*must be, say, within 1 part in a hundred thousand of its measured
value for
life to exist. Now imagine two scenarios:

1) No funadamental theory, and the naturalistic explanation is that it was
(essentially) a random draw given a nearly infinite number of universes.
(Probability: small)

2) A fundamental theory that spits out that necessary value. (Probability:
1)

It seems obvious to me that it is much harder for the atheist to explain
scenario number 2. And it seems the design argument, which shifts from "God
picked the constants" to "God inacted the correct laws" is much more
satisfying.

David Heddle
Associate Professor of Physics &
The Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility
On Dec 7, 2007 3:07 PM, Jon Tandy <tandyland@earthlink.net> wrote:

> This is an interesting argument. If the "low probability" event is to
> have any power to prove God according to ID or anthropic principle, it must
> equal a "no probability event". Otherwise, naturalism can always claim a
> purely naturalistic explanation. Doesn't evolution not only accept, but
> possibly even predict low probability events? If not, we might observe
> evolution happening on a much more rapid rate.
>
> But what you also seem to be saying is that a fundamental theory which
> explains all the constants would be on the other end of the scale and would
> constitute better evidence of design. I'm not sure why this would be
> (although I agree with the conclusion). When well-defined mathematical
> formulas are derived to explain the action of gravity or other things,
> naturalists don't seem to be convinced that a supernatural force is more
> likely. It seems to be the other way around, that mathematical explanations
> seem to indicate natural causes rather than supernatural design.
>
> So low probability events are taken by naturalists as indicative of
> semi-random, unguided natural processes; and fundamental theories are also
> taken to indicate a naturalistic operation of the physical world. Isn't
> this the core of the problem? Atheists are going to see _both_ as evidences
> of no supernatural intervention, and theists are going to see the action of
> God as either intervention, good design, or both. At heart, it comes down
> to theological and philosophical predisposition, which I'm not sure is going
> to be solved by science, even if we could do away with the warfare model.
> Or should I say, the warfare model isn't likely to go away because of the
> philosophical divide?
>
>
> Jon Tandy
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] *On
> Behalf Of *David Heddle
> *Sent:* Friday, December 07, 2007 1:19 PM
> *Cc:* David Opderbeck; PvM; asa@calvin.edu; George Cooper; John Walley
> *Subject:* Re: [asa] Anthropic Principle, "proof," and "explanations"
>
> I'll just add, once again an argument that nobody seems to agree with. At
> the moment, the constants are considered low probability--that is they seem
> to have been taken from a random draw. In that sense, they would seem to
> favor the multiverse view which predicts exactly that--an effectively random
> draw. However, if a fundamental theory is uncovered that explains the values
> of the constants, that would be a big win (but not proof) for design. So, to
> beat the drum one more time, it is not the low probability universe (as we
> now understand it to be) that is most favorable to design, but the unit
> probability/inevitable universe with a fundamental theory. It cannot be more
> elegant than the constants having their life-sensitive values built into the
> fabric of spacetime. The IDists are always, in my opinion, setting up their
> tent on the wrong end of the probability range.
>
> David Heddle
> Associate Professor of Physics &
> The Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility
>
>

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Received on Fri Dec 7 15:39:49 2007

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