[asa] Re: Truth & delusion (was Greetings...)

Merv, I think you're outlining some broad contours of epistemology and
apologetics, which are touched on (I think quite nicely) in Lewis' essay.

The epistemological point: the ground for many knowledge claims is
relational, not merely rational. Here Lewis is undercutting the Cartesian
dualism that the materialists of his day -- as of our day -- were
promoting. Given that we Christians have a relationship with the living
God, I think it is proper for us to ground our epistemology in that
relationship. There is a very real sense, I believe, in which the way in
which we "know" is simply inacessible to unbelievers.

Now, that isn't to say that there is *zero* common ground between us and
unbelievers. But, I don't think that common ground is unadulterated reason,
because there is no such thing. Rather, the common ground is something of
the image of God left over after the fall; it includes reason, but it is
reason of a particular sort, with a foundation in something deeper than
reason itself. Lewis in other work grounds that shared knowledge in natural
law (or the "tao" as he puts it in "Abolition of Man"). We could of course
have a vigorous debate about how much of "natural law" survives the fall --
from a Barthian "none" to a Thomist "lots."

The apologetic point: you're outlining, I think, the never-ending debate
between evidentialist and presuppositional apologetics. Lewis certainly was
in the evidentialist camp, though I'm not sure his approach was quite so
rationalistic as some evidentialists are today. Personally, I lean more
towards the presuppositional camp. I'm not really sure there's enough
common ground to truly "speak their language" when it comes to what properly
grounds a truth claim -- how can there be, when they reject the very ground
of Truth (God)? I'm also concerned that efforts to "speak their language"
-- such as the strong ID program -- end up giving away epistemic ground that
shouldn't be surrendered. OTOH, I'm not sure I'm a complete Barthian when
it comes to natural law. I tend to agree with Lewis that there are some
snatches of common ground in certain things that nearly everyone
intiuitively as well as rationally knows are good and true (and bad and
wrong), deep down. Actually, Lewis probably offers a good lesson to all of
us evangelicals especially in how to balance the evidential and
presuppositional aspects of apologetics together.

On 4/14/07, Merv <mrb22667@kansas.net> wrote:
>
> I agree that relationship & personal experience rank as evidence to us
> in a way that outsiders don't have access to, but I still have trouble
> with the conclusion that "if this is a delusion, then nothing is real
> and true...". As a matter of principle, I don't think we can/should say
> that. I'm not sure if I can defend this entirely, and our conversation
> is helping me think this through. But it seems to me that this
> statement puts God above truth. I know we aren't "removed" judges that
> we could see God and truth as separate things to judge them with each
> other, but we (before making the assent) are forced to play the part as
> best we can. As a Christian, I have faith that the two are inseparably
> the same, and one can't be "above" the other. When speaking with others
> outside the faith, though, they do not hold God and truth to be
> identical concepts. They may quite likely hold (or claim to hold) the
> concept of truth in high esteem, but not God. Christian's interacting
> with God and with each other can speak a language of trust where God is
> our source of all truth (through all sorts of vehicles including
> science), and our faith is or should be rightly placed in Him. But if
> we are hoping to witness to and reach outsiders, then we enter into
> their language and grasp handles they have. If we leave the impression
> that we are going to believe in God or nothing at all (e.g. If I can't
> have God then I refuse to believe anything), then we communicate to them
> a disregard for the handle that they may still have: truth. Lewis (to
> my thinking) acknowledges that we all started with those as separate
> entities: truth, and God. And our evidence is open to scrutiny by
> everyone on how well God matches truth. After the assent, we may
> hopefully move into the realm of trust and relationship, but I it
> dangerous to leave behind the language of truth ***in its own
> reckoning.*** Because reflective people can't help but notice the
> danger in that stance, and surely it depreciates credibility to
> reflective outsiders. To attempt to remove God from this hostile
> critique smacks of protecting something that is weak. Critique me on
> this because I'm not entirely sure of myself and may be just trying to
> justify an oft times faltering faith. In any case, Lewis' choice of
> words are lightning-accurate to me: "... on what our assurance feeds,
> and how it revives and is always rising from its ashes."
>
> Thanks for reminding me of that bit of Lewis' work.
>
> --Merv
>
> David Opderbeck wrote:
> > I don't think he's saying it would still be of value if it's all a
> > delusion. I think he's saying that its surpassing value demonstrates
> > to us that it ultimately is /not/ a delusion, even though there are
> > times when it can seem delusional to outsiders. For those who know
> > God, if /this/ is a delusion, then /nothing /is real and true at all,
> > not even the reasons that supposedly make it seem "delusional." At
> > the end of the day, those "reasons" pale against the reality of the
> > relationship we've entered into -- even if the relationship is always
> > in some ways a mystery. That's what I take from the essay anyway.
> >
> > On 4/14/07, *Merv* <mrb22667@kansas.net <mailto:mrb22667@kansas.net>>
> > wrote:
> >
> > I love that essay (and the snippet you give -- the Spirit it is
> > written
> > in), but as big a Lewis fan as I am, I would dispute with one of the
> > directions some people would take this (unintended by Lewis, I'm
> > sure).
> > I.e. that /even if/ it were a delusion, it would still be of
> > surpassing
> > value. This may be an affluent cultural deviation of a
> > post-Constantinian Christianity gone comfortable and culturally
> > dominant, but it doesn't square with the Christianity of
> > persecution and
> > enmity with the world. It doesn't square with the Apostle Paul's
> > conclusion that we would be the "most pitiable" of men if Christ
> > is not
> > really risen. We/they would merely (tragically) found to be false
> > witnesses. And Lewis would agree, I am sure. He has echoes of
> > this in
> > "The Silver Chair" when the witch is strumming her enchanting
> > melodies
> > and convincing her audience that the sun and world above do not
> really
> > exist. Then Eustace (or was it Puddleglum?) finally blurts out that
> > even if that world didn't exist but in their imagination, it still
> > beats
> > her version of reality. And of course, in the context of that
> story,
> > the sun & world above really do exist, and so finally merit their
> > belief. While I am sure that Lewis, if he were still around, would
> > easily put me in my place, I will still have the cheek (in his
> > absence)
> > of disagreeing on that point, and insisting that if it were a
> > delusion,
> > it would not be of surpassing value, but just a delusion -- and in
> > fact,
> > much worse. But his differentiating between original assent and the
> > later adherence of faith is right on.
> >
> > --Merv
> >
> > David Opderbeck wrote:
> > > I just wanted to add one more very brief but lovely essay to this
> > > list, which I just happened to read this evening: "On Obstinacy
> in
> > > Belief" by C.S. Lewis (I found it in a collection of Lewis' essays
> > > which includes "The World's Last Night." In about fifteen pages,
> > > Lewis answers the same questions Dawkins keeps asking today about
> > > Christian belief. What people like Dawkins miss is that faith is
> > > relational, not merely rational. A snippet from the conclusion:
> > >
> > >
> > > Our opponents, then, have a perfect right to dispute with us
> > about
> > > the grounds of our original assent [to the Christian
> > faith]. But
> > > they must not accuse us of sheer insanity if, after the
> > assent has
> > > been given, our adherence to it is no longer proportioned to
> > every
> > > fluctuation of the apparent evidence. They cannot of course
> be
> > > expected to know on what our assurance feeds, and how it
> > revives
> > > and is always rising from its ashes. They cannot be expected
> to
> > > see how the /quality/ of the object which we think we are
> > > beginning to know by acquaintance drives us to the view that
> if
> > > this were a delusion then we should have to say that the
> > universe
> > > had produced no real thing of comparable value and that all
> > > explanations of the delusion seemed somehow less important
> than
> > > the thing explained. That is knowledge we cannot
> > comunicate. But
> > > they can see how the assent, of necessity, moves us from the
> > logic
> > > of speculative thought into what might perhaps be called the
> > logic
> > > of personal relations. What would, up till then, have been
> > > variations simple of opinion become variations of conduct by a
> > > person to a Person. Credere Deum esse turns into Credre in
> > Deum.
> > > And Deum here is this God, the increasingly knowable Lord.
> > >
> >
> >
>
>
>

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Received on Sat Apr 14 12:47:24 2007