>> Nope, that does not really accurately describe Dawkins' argument.
>>
>> <quote>
>> A designer God cannot be used to explain organized complexity because
>> any God capable of designing anything would have to be complex enough
>> to demand the same kind of explanation in his own right. God presents an
>> infinite regress from which he cannot help us to escape. This argument, as
>> I shall show in the next chapter, demonstrates that God, though not
>> technically disprovable, is very very improbable indeed.
>> </quote>
IMO the main fallacy in Dawkins' argument is an equivocation between contingent and necessary beings.
Here is Dawkin's argument:
Major Premiss #1. Every existing entity that shows evidence of design requires a designer superior to itself
Minor Premiss #1. God (as an existing entity) shows evidence of design in himself
Conclusion #1. Hence God requires a designer (another God) superior to himself
Major Premiss #2. Infinite regressions are not possible
Minor Premiss #1 Conclusion #1 implies an infinite regression (an infinite number of Gods)
Conclusion #2. Hence, Conclusion #1 is not possible
Conclusion #3. Hence, Minor Premiss #1 is not possible; God is not an existing entity.
I see at least two ways to dissect this:
A. The equivocation is in "existing entity" between Major Premiss #1 and Minor Premiss #1. The first usage in the Major premiss means "every contingently existing entity", whereas the second usage in the Minor premiss is speaking about "a necessarily existing entity." We usually leave the word "contingent" unstated since it is obvious: there is no reason to assume that a necessary being requires a Designer superior to itself! That's just plain silly! So the equivocation means there is no common middle term in the syllogism, and this syllogism is formally fallacious.
B. Another way to argue this is to allow Dawkins to broaden the definition of "every existing entity" in the Major premiss to include both contingent and necessary beings. That removes the equivocation. But now it is just begging the question. Is it really true that every existing entity, necessary ones included, require a designer superior to themselves? Of course not! That's still silly!
Furthermore, we can point out that conclusion #3 does not formally follow from Conclusion #2. There are three ways that Conclusion #1 could be false: (1) it is an invalid form for a syllogism (this one is not, though, if we broaden the definition of "every existing entity"); or (2) the Major premiss is false; or (3) the Minor premiss is false. Dawkins just assumes that it is the Minor that is false, but he has no reason to assume this. In fact, we have already seen that the Major premiss is false.
Nobody publishing a book should have made such a stinker of a fallacy as this, because the distinction between contingent and necessary has been known for many centuries.
Phil
-----Original Message-----
From: pvm.pandas@gmail.com
To: igd.strachan@gmail.com
Cc: gmurphy@raex.com; asa@calvin.edu
Sent: Sat, 7 Apr 2007 6:31 PM
Subject: Re: [asa] Dawkins and PZ Myers and their 'attitude'
On 4/7/07, Iain Strachan <igd.strachan@gmail.com> wrote:
> I hadn't thought of it that way, but it strikes me that Dawkins's argument
> is pretty silly. I think Dawkins's premise is that God must be more complex
> than us to have created us. I actually think it's a false premise to assume
> that you have to be more complex than what you create in the first place.
Seems your disagreement is with Intelligent Design which arguments
Dawkins skilfully uses against religion.
> We haven't done it yet, but I don't think it's inconceivable that given the
> rise in computer power, that one day someone will write an evolutionary
> simulation in a computer that will give rise to "virtual" entities inside
> the computer that are more complex than us. However, we as "programmers"
> are at a different level of reality than the entities that exist within the
> software simulation. I think Dawkins wants to reduce it all to one level.
> In the radio broadcast, he suggested that a Designer must be more complex
> than us, and so it must also have evolved, and as it's more complex, then it
> is even more unlikely than us.
You are pretty close here. He basically uses ID's arguments against ID
and religion.
> But his premise right at the start is that
> this material world in which things evolve is the only one there is. But he
Not really. After all, God is not ruled out a-priori.
> then wants to use this to "prove" the non-existence of God (or to be more
> precise, to demonstrate the near impossibility of God). But the thing he's
> trying to prove is the premise he's assumed in the first place.
Nope, that does not really accurately describe Dawkins' argument.
<quote>
A designer God cannot be used to explain organized complexity because
any God capable of
designing anything would have to be complex enough to demand the same
kind of explanation in his own right. God presents an infinite regress
from which he cannot help us to escape. This argument, as I shall show
in the next chapter, demonstrates that God, though not technically
disprovable, is very very improbable indeed.</quote>
Dawkins also points out that
<quote>Natural selection not only explains the whole of life; it also
raises our consciousness to the power of science to explain how
organized complexity can emerge from simple beginnings without any
deliberate guidance. </quote>
> I think this argument is wrong for the same reason that the Design argument
> is wrong. When Paley stumbles upon the watch on the heath, the only reason
> he is justified in assuming it had a watchmaker is that he knows that
> watchmakers exist - there is independent empirical evidence of them - one
> has seen a man making a watch. But no-one has seen God zapping a flagellum
> into existence, so the analogy breaks down. The Design argument presumes
> the existence of God from the start. By the same token the Dawkins argument
> for the non-existence of God presumes the non-existence of God. Both sides
> are flawed in assuming what you're trying to prove in the first place. (I
> think there's some name for that logical fallacy, but the name escapes me
> for the moment).
>
> Iain
>
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Received on Sat Apr 7 22:32:11 2007
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