Re: [asa] God as Cause

*Like much ID, Platinga's arguments sound to me as though the conclusions
came first and a less than persuasive attempt at
justifying them was then inserted.*

I think it's much more subtle than that, and this is one thing that
frustrates me about the impasse between TE and ID. Plantinga's basic move
is an epistemological one. As we've seen, if you approach TE from a
theology of the cross, you are making a very similar epistemological move,
but your basis for using MN is grounded in other expectations about the
nature of God's self-revelation. If you don't approach TE from a theology
of the cross, and you want to preserve MN, it seems to me that you're giving
up the epistemic high ground, or at the very least your epistemology is
muddled. It seems that TE/MN without an epistemology grounded in the cross
implies that human reason alone is the proper arbiter of truth claims -- the
"classical foundationalism" that Plantinga deftly critiques. Plantinga's
questions about this posture then seem very trenchant. Of what value or
reliability is a truth claim based on a faulty foundation that
self-consciously excludes basic facts about God and his activity in nature?

The answer to this question usually is the pragmatic one you give below --
we do this all the time and it enables us to navigate life. But do we
really? Am I really just using "natural" methods to find out what you are
saying, for example? Is my mind and consciousness entirely reducible to the
"natural?" I don't think so. Indeed, my belief that you are an autonomous,
rational agent, and that you therefore can make intentional, sensible
statements, is informed directly by my presuppositions about the nature of
human personhood, mind and consciousness as components of an "image of God"
that is not merely reducible to its "natural" or material aspects. (Angus
Menuge, in his book "Agents Under Fire," makes, I think, a compelling
argument that materialism is incoherent to the extent it presumes that there
is any such thing as intentional action by autonomous agents. Belief in
intentional action by autonomous agents requires some sort of meta-natural
presuppositions).

So, I think Plantinga's epistemic critique of TE is a strong one
*unless*you ground your approach in something like George's theology
of the cross,
which includes certain assumptions about how God reveals himself in
scripture and in nature. The question IMHO then becomes how well those
assumptions hold up.

On 1/9/07, David Campbell <pleuronaia@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Like many attempts to redefine science (not only on the part of ID
> advocates), Platinga seems to be falling prey to a touch of scientism.
> If science is seen as merely a category and not something that is
> inherently more important as a source of information than
> alternatives, the definition can be approached more impartially. It
> should also be recognized that science is not very good at addressing
> many types of questions. The restriction to "methodological
> naturalism" is in large part a statement that science can't handle
> more important issues.
>
> There is some justification to the ID complaints in that atheists try
> to misuse the fact that science is largely theologically irrelevant
> (even ID advocates often admit that their evidences for design
> wouldn't do any good on identifying the designer) as evidence that
> theology is irrelevant. However, the standard ID response is to
> accept the claim that secondary causes remove God from the picture.
> Most prominent ID advocates have at various points denied that
> secondary causes remove God, but they also at many points have argued
> in a way that assumes that secondary causes remove God.
>
> The ID complaints about methodological naturalism are also
> hypocritical, for they claim to use methodological naturalism to reach
> their own conclusions. The goal of ID is to arrive at supernatural
> conclusions using natural methods. The arguments about the definition
> of science are also something of a red herring (on both sides). The
> problem with ID is that the conclusions don't follow from the actual
> evidence, not that it wants to allow supernatural conclusions.
>
> Everyday experience also shows that the use of natural methods is
> quite practical for all sorts of things. You are using natural
> methods to find out what I am saying (e.g., reading email rather than
> expecting the Spirit to reveal my thoughts to you), yet you ought to
> evaluate my statements from a thoroughly theistic perspective.
>
> Like much ID, Platinga's arguments sound to me as though the
> conclusions came first and a less than persuasive attempt at
> justifying them was then inserted.
>
> --
> Dr. David Campbell
> 425 Scientific Collections
> University of Alabama
> "I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
>
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David W. Opderbeck
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