Re: [asa] Apologetics Conference

*There are other natural purposive agents as well -- we can identify the
products of animal behavior in the fossil record and distinguish it from
features produced by natural physical processes. Science can identify the
actions of natural intelligent agents. . . . <snip> To point to the
recognition of human action (which is often trivial) does in no way provide
an argument for the scientific detection of supernatural cause.*
**
Keith, I think I have to take issue with you here. First, let's just set
aside the reference to what "science" as a demarcated discipline can do --
we'll agree for purpose of discussion that "science" as a demarcated
discipline deals only with naturalistic explanations. The bigger question
is what human reason generally can do. Here, I think I have a theological
problem with your position, unless I'm misunderstanding it.

Are you suggesting that human agency and will, and human reason, are so
unlike God's agency, will, and reason that humans are utterly incapable of
discerning whether God has acted in history absent specific verbal / written
revelatory confirmation? If so, what theological perspective are you
drawing this from?

I've been studying just a bit Thoms Aquinas' ideas about "analogical"
knowledge of God. In this conception, God is indeed so far above us that He
is unkowable in any direct way, but we *can* know about him by analogy to
our experience. This concept of analogical knowledge is rooted in the *imago
Dei*. And our ability to reason about God's infinite attributes such as
will and reason by analogy to our analogous finite attributes for Thomas
constituted a proof of God (the *via causalitatis). *Thus, although our
knowledge of God through reason is not absolute and is only analogical, it
nevertheless is real knowledge. We can, if act, know that God has willed
and acted, at least to some extent, apart from special revelation. The
concept of natural law as an ethical theory is based on this way of thinking
about the relationship between human and divine knowledge.

Obviously, the Reformed tradition to varying extents eschewed these natural
law concepts. But even in the Reformed tradition, a notion of analogical
knowledge remains, except perhaps in some extremely fideistic circles,
particularly in the Kuyperian "common grace" tradition. There is even a
revival of interest in natural law theory among many in the Reformed camp
today (see an interesting series of blog posts on this here:
http://commonnotions.blogspot.com/index.html)

So, it seems to me that there's a huge amount of theological baggage in your
position that human reason can't discern divine will and action in nature.
It seems to me a highly debateable point, which has many undesireable
consquences for epistemology and ethics, and therefore a difficult point
upon which to hang your hat.
**

**

On 11/17/06, Keith Miller <kbmill@ksu.edu> wrote:
>
>
> Margaret wrote:
>
>
>
> I can see two "extremes" of explanations:
> "Pure" intelligent design, where a genius evil mastermind with extensive
> knowledge of the
> terrain, the laws of physics and the layout of the unfortunate boy's
> house intentionally sets
> the boulder rolling with the express purpose of killing the child.
>
>
> "Random and unguided" Boulder, loosened by natural and
> non-human-related events
> (soil erosion, etc) rolls down hill and kills child.
>
>
> I don't see how Dembski's process is especially useful in distinguishing
> those two
> explantions (which clearly are both incorrect) or in leading to what is
> considered the
> correct explanation: intelligent human activity (strip mining) increased
> the liklihood a
> boulder would roll down the mountain: once the boulder was moving, the
> child's death was
> a random and unplanned consequence.
>
>
>
> The problem in all of this is that the ID advocates create a false
> dichotomy between "Intelligent agency" and "natural cause" (to which they
> attach the labels of chance and natural regularity). They thus remove
> humans as natural agents. But humans are natural intelligent agents. There
> are other natural purposive agents as well -- we can identify the products
> of animal behavior in the fossil record and distinguish it from features
> produced by natural physical processes. Science can identify the actions of
> natural intelligent agents.
>
>
> The real dichotomy is between natural and supernatural agents. The latter
> are not subject to scientific study simply because supernatural agents are
> unconstrained and not limited to natural "law." Human actions are
> constrained and we understand those constraints quite well. To point to the
> recognition of human action (which is often trivial) does in no way provide
> an argument for the scientific detection of supernatural cause.
>
>
> Keith
>
>
>
>
> Keith B. Miller
>
> Research Assistant Professor
>
> Dept of Geology, Kansas State University
>
> Manhattan, KS 66506-3201
>
> 785-532-2250
>
> http://www-personal.ksu.edu/~kbmill/
>
>
>

-- 
David W. Opderbeck
Web:  http://www.davidopderbeck.com
Blog:  http://www.davidopderbeck.com/throughaglass.html
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