Re: [asa] Apologetics Conference

Dave: why should I bear the burden of proof? Prove to me the reverse.
("Here we are, so that proves it" doesn't do it. That explains everything
and therefore nothing.)

It isn't a matter of "proof." I'd agree that anyone who asserts the
anthropic principle "proves" something is overstating the case. It's a
matter of consistency with other assertions, not a matter of proof.

On 11/16/06, D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com> wrote:
>
> David,
> I think your answer is too glib. Prove to me that the universe is as it is
> for the sake of man rather than mankind is what it is because of the way the
> universe is.
> Dave
>
> On Thu, 16 Nov 2006 16:16:04 -0500 "David Opderbeck" <dopderbeck@gmail.com>
> writes:
>
> *Let me turn the anthropic principle on its head: if the constants were
> not as they are, could there be the kind of life we observe (and are) in
> our universe?*
>
> This is the standard non-theistic response to the anthropic principle:
> "well of course the universe is fine tuned for sentient carbon based life,
> because here we are." One problem with this response is that it's not as
> though you could tinker with the various constants and easily come up with,
> say, a universe that would give rise to sentient ammonia-based life or
> something like that. Most fiddling with the constants results in an utterly
> cold and barren universe, to the extent that life based around any sort of
> element seems impossible.
> You can of course speculate that somehow, in some inconceivable way, some
> different kind of life would arise in a cold and barren universe. There
> isn't really any way to respond to that, because the speculation is just
> completely made up.
>
> On 11/16/06, D. F. Siemens, Jr. <dfsiemensjr@juno.com> wrote:
>
> > Let me turn the anthropic principle on its head: if the constants were
> > not as they are, could there be the kind of life we observe (and are) in
> >
> > our universe? Next question: does any one want to calculate the
> > possibility of changes in values compensating each other to make some
> > form of life possible under different circumstances? How about the
> > possibility of universes with different forces? It is simple to say that
> >
> > there are no other universe of different types, but the proof is
> > lacking.
> >
> > I begin with a deity bright enough and powerful enough to design and
> > produce a universe that doesn't require further tinkering apart from
> > spiritual matters. This is an assumption that I cannot prove. I hold
> > that
> > there is evidence for this view in the birth, life, death and
> > resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth and his impact on his immediate
> > followers. As George keeps trying to pound home, our entire outlook on
> > creation needs to center on the Cross.
> >
> > What effect does this approach have on the possibility that there are
> > other worlds in our universe with sentient entities? It looks as though
> > it will be impossible ever to meet them, and difficult ever to contact
> > them, let alone correspond. Other universes are clearly inaccessible.
> > But
> > both are in the hands of God. There could be more than one deity for
> > different universe if we adopt process theology, but I consider that
> > view
> > ridiclueless.
> > Dave
> >
> > On Wed, 15 Nov 2006 23:00:58 -0500 "jack syme" <drsyme@cablespeed.com>
> > writes:
> > > Did you even read the article that I provided?
> > >
> > > From William Lane Craig:
> > >
> > > "Dembski outlines a ten-step Generic Chance Elimination Argument:
> > > 1.. One learns that some event has occurred.
> > >
> > > 2.. Examining the circumstances under which the event occurred,
> > > one finds
> > > that the event could only have been produced by a certain chance
> > > process (or
> > > processes).
> > >
> > > 3.. One identifies a pattern which characterizes the event.
> > >
> > > 4.. One calculates the probability of the event given the chance
> > > hypothesis.
> > >
> > > 5.. One determines what probabilistic resources were available for
> > >
> > > producing the event via the chance hypothesis.
> > >
> > > 6.. On the basis of the probabilistic resources, one calculates
> > > the
> > > probability of the event's occurring by chance once out of all the
> > > available
> > > opportunities to occur.
> > >
> > > 7.. One finds that the above probability is sufficiently small.
> > >
> > > 8.. One identifies a body of information which is independent of
> > > the
> > > event's occurrence.
> > >
> > > 9.. One determines that one can formulate the pattern referred to
> > > in step
> > > (3) on the basis of this body of independent information.
> > >
> > > 10.. One is warranted in inferring that the event did not occur by
> > > chance.
> > >
> > > This is a simplification of Dembski's analysis, which he develops
> > > and
> > > defends with painstaking rigor and detail.
> > >
> > > Dembski's analysis will be of interest to all persons who are
> > > concerned with
> > > detecting design, including forensic scientists, detectives,
> > > insurance fraud
> > > investigators, exposers of scientific data falsification,
> > > cryptographers,
> > > and SETI investigators. Intriguingly, it will also be of interest to
> > > natural
> > > theologians. For in contemporary cosmology the heated debate
> > > surrounding the
> > > fine-tuning of the universe and the so-called Anthropic Principle
> > > will be
> > > greatly clarified by Dembski's Law of Small Probability.
> > >
> > > Consider the application of the above Generic Chance Elimination
> > > Argument to
> > > the fine-tuning of the universe:
> > >
> > > 1.. One learns that the physical constants and quantities given in
> > > the Big
> > > Bang possess certain values.
> > >
> > > 2.. Examining the circumstances under which the Big Bang occurred,
> > > one
> > > finds that there is no Theory of Everything which would render
> > > physically
> > > necessary the values of all the constants and quantities, so they
> > > must be
> > > attributed to sheer accident.
> > >
> > > 3.. One discovers that the values of the constants and quantities
> > > are
> > > incomprehensibly fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent,
> > > carbon-based
> > > life.
> > >
> > > 4.. The probability of each value and of all the values together
> > > occurring
> > > by chance is vanishingly small.
> > >
> > > 5.. There is only one universe; it is illicit in the absence of
> > > evidence
> > > to multiply one's probabilistic resources (i.e., postulate a World
> > > Ensemble
> > > of universes) simply to avert the design inference.
> > >
> > > 6.. Given that the universe has occurred only once, the
> > > probability of the
> > > constants and quantities' all having the values they do remains
> > > vanishingly
> > > small.
> > >
> > > 7.. This probability is well within the bounds needed to eliminate
> > > chance.
> > >
> > > 8.. One has physical information concerning the necessary
> > > conditions for
> > > intelligent, carbon-based life (e.g., certain temperature range,
> > > existence
> > > of certain elements, certain gravitational and electro-magnetic
> > > forces,
> > > etc.).
> > >
> > > 9.. This information about the finely-tuned conditions requisite
> > > for a
> > > life- permitting universe is independent of the pattern discerned in
> > > step
> > > (3).
> > >
> > > 10.. One is warranted in inferring that the physical constants and
> > >
> > > quantities given in the Big Bang are not the result of chance.
> > >
> > > One is thus justified in inferring that the initial conditions of
> > > the
> > > universe are due to design."
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Don Nield" < d.nield@auckland.ac.nz>
> > > To: "jack syme" <drsyme@cablespeed.com>
> > > Cc: "gordon brown" < gbrown@euclid.colorado.edu>;
> > > <dickfischer@verizon.net>;
> > > <asa@calvin.edu>
> > > Sent: Wednesday, November 15, 2006 10:00 PM
> > > Subject: Re: [asa] Apologetics Conference
> > >
> > >
> > > > jack syme wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> But isnt the fine tuning of the physical constants of the
> > > universe, used
> > > >> as an example of specified complexity by the ID folks?
> > > >
> > > > No. Specified complexity is something more specific than fine
> > > tuning.
> > > > Fine tuning (e.g. the anthropic principle) was around well before
> > > Dembski
> > > > introduced the concept of specified complexity. I have no problems
> > > with
> > > > fine tuning. I do have problems with specified complexity in
> > > biological
> > > > systems.
> > > > Don
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > To unsubscribe, send a message to majordomo@calvin.edu with
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> > >
> > >
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> > >
> > >
> >
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> >
>
>
>
> --
> David W. Opderbeck
> Web: http://www.davidopderbeck.com
> Blog: http://www.davidopderbeck.com/throughaglass.html
> MySpace (Music): http://www.myspace.com/davidbecke
>
>

-- 
David W. Opderbeck
Web:  http://www.davidopderbeck.com
Blog:  http://www.davidopderbeck.com/throughaglass.html
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