Re: [asa] An Evolutionary Theory of Right and Wrong

Here is how I see this at this point:

Accepting that evolution significantly influences human moral judgments
(IMHO, a big assumption given the available empirical data and the ongoing
disputes about the nature of mind), we can draw at least a "weak" and a
"strong" conclusion:

1. Weak -- Human evolutionary history has generated biological / emotional
dispositions that relate to moral choices. Evolutionary history, however,
is not determinative of moral choices or descriptive of moral systems.
There may be references for morality external to human evolutionary history.

2. Strong -- Human evolutionary history determines the range and nature of
human evolutionary choices. There are no references for morality external
to human evolutionary history.

My reading of Hauser, Singer et al. is that they tend towards the "Strong"
view. IMHO, that position is fundamentally inconsistent with any sort of
Christian ethics.

The "Weak" view, OTOH, seems consistent with systems of Christian ethics,
and perhaps even complementary to some forms of natural law theory.

To contrast these views in application, consider the perspectives of
different witnesses to a brutal gangland murder. Most of us would be
revolted by the splattering blood and brains. A few, however, including
some of the gangbangers, will delight in seeing their enemy obliterated.
Both reactions are consistent with human evolutionary history -- lots of
murders would decrease survival for a social species, but OTOH competition
with rival groups might sometimes require violence.

In the "Weak" position, we can condemn the murder as immoral even though the
murderer may be acting a hard-wired part. In the "Strong" position, it
seems to me that there's no coherent basis for condemning the murder as
immoral. At best, in the "Strong" position, the majority who are revolted
by the murder can exercise their power to remove the murderer from society
to foster the utility of the majority. This may work for a little while,
but it falls apart when the majority -- say, the white, non-Jewish Germans
living in Germany in the 1930's and 40's -- gain greater utility by acting
equally brutal to a minority group (the Jews who were marched to the death
camps).

On 11/7/06, Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 7, 2006, at 10:45 AM, David Campbell wrote:
>
> > I'm not sure that the definition of morality has been entirely worked
> > out here, and that will affect the assessment of claims about
> > evolutionary explanations.
> >
> > Many moral standards align with factors that could be advantageous to
> > group survival. The ability of humans to transmit information across
> > space and time means that offending another can have extensive and
> > lasting consequences. Thus, there is conceivable selective pressure
> > in favor of development of innate or socially mandated moral
> > standards.
> >
> > On the other hand, figuring out how to get around the standards to
> > one's own advantage might conceivably be successful (on the mere
> > criterion of genetic success) . Thus, there are conceivable
> > evolutionary pressures against this.
> >
>
> Very good point and indeed, that is why the moral grammar merely
> provides us with rules to apply and cultures will find their ways to
> add and subtract from them (Aquinas?). To avoid cheating it is
> important to have both positive and negative rules. Love thy
> neighbor, turn the other cheek as well as an eye for an eye.
> Punishment is as important in morality as rewards.
>
>
> > However, none of this provides any philosophical justification for a
> > particular set of standards.
> >
>
> Very true. Nevertheless, I'd say that these rules provide a similar
> standard as given by the Bible.
>
> > First, one is making a philosophical claim to assert that science
> > provides a useful source of moral guidance. Science cannot assess
> > that type of claim.
>
> No it cannot, and I do not believe that science is taking that
> position. In fact Hauser is clear to argue the contrary.
>
> >
> > Secondly, evolution or other science merely tells us that a given set
> > of physical factors are likely to produce a given result. It does not
> > tell us that one result or method is more desirable or more ethical
> > than another.
>
> Very correct
>
> > Such decisions are again a philosophical premise. Of
> > course, given a premise such as "It is morally imperative for me to do
> > whatever best advances my evolutionary success" or "Physical injury to
> > a person is wrong unless it is necessary to achieve a greater good for
> > that person", one can then use science to help determine things that
> > accord with the initial premise.
> >
> > Such systems also give no particularly compelling reason to adhere to
> > them. Evolution suggests that I am likely to have an interest in my
> > own evolutionary success, but that doesn't morally compel me to do so.
>
> Unless moral systems 'evolve' which enforce and reward kinship
> selection as well as reciprocal altruism.
>
> > Dawkins is right to say that his view does not prevent someone from
> > composing beautiful music, though I can't say it seems very inspiring
> > in that direction. However, it also does not prevent someone from
> > making car bombs, either-it doesn't especially compell any particular
> > activity.
>
> And so we have free will.
>
> >
> > Finally, full-blown acceptance of evolutionary, etc. standards
> > generally doesn't actually match what we want. I bet Dawkins would
> > object if I sought to advance my success by trying to create a vacancy
> > in his job that I could fill (thus providing stable income, etc. for
> > my family). Upon examination, purportedly evolutionary moral systems
> > such as eugenics, Marxism, etc. usually boil down to "everyone ought
> > to seek to advance MY evolutionary success." However, everyone else
> > is equally empowered by evolution to try to get ahead at my expense as
> > well. Alternatively, one could try to achieve evolutionary success by
> > cooperation-evolution does not necessarily entail another's expense,
> > it merely permits it. It's like the calls for moral relativism that
> > really mean "everybody should be able to do what I want." No moral
> > relativist accepts the claim that it is not wrong for someone to mug
> > him.
> >
>
> Moral absolutism versus moral relativism, perhaps we need something
> like moral realism which is neither arguing for an absolute morality
> nor for a morality where anything goes. And this is what the moral
> grammar provides, just like what Jesus calls the most important
> commandment.
>
> > Another consideration in all this is that the moral law as presented
> > in the Bible is not some set of arbitrary hoops God wants us to jump
> > through. Rather, obeying them is in our own interest as well. Thus,
> > the fact that they can potentially receive some evolutionary
> > justification is no surprise.
> >
>
> Indeed. Cause versus effect, very interesting. Was this kind of
> morality a 'predictable' outcome of evolution where part of the
> Creation would reach a level of consciousness?
>
> > --
> > Dr. David Campbell
> > 425 Scientific Collections
> > University of Alabama
> > "I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
> >
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>
>
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Received on Tue Nov 7 16:37:34 2006