Thank you, this is interesting and helpful. I'll admit that now I'm getting
out of my depth and resorted to Googling. So here's how Dembski responds to
the core of Van Til's critique:
But the genes follow the proteins which follow the function, and not vice
versa, so my analysis is the correct one. Even so, since genes map to
proteins, the probabilities assigned to the flagellum's proteins and
assemblage can easily enough be backtracked to the genes themselves (this is
standard probability theory, in which probabilities on the space mapped into
backtrack to probabilities on the space mapped out of).
Why is this wrong?
On 11/4/06, Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Dembski in his NFL book descibes a very similar argument which basically
> shows that proteins cannot organize themselves because of localization,
> origination, configuration
>
> P(orig) = the *origination probability* = the probability that the
> requisite building blocks for the structure in question will originate, by
> chance,
>
> P(local) = the *localization probability *= the chance probability of
> localizing these building blocks in one place once they become available,
> and
>
> P(config) = the *configuration probability* = the chance probability of
> configuring the building blocks into the particular structure once they are
> localized.
>
>
> Amongst many Howard van Till showed how silly (scientifically speaking)
> these arguments really are.
>
> http://www.meta-library.net/id-hvt/isthe1-body.html
>
> According to these calculations, Dembski has effectively argued that every
> time a flagellum forms, there needs to be a design taking place. Imagine
> that, how busy such a designer would be with the billions of flagella that
> arise almost continuously. And that is just flagella. And why would a
> designer be so concerned about the flagella which are found in some pretty
> nasty bacteria?
>
> Or as van Till observes
>
> <quote>But, of course, *no biologist has ever taken the bacterial
> flagellum to be a discrete combinatorial object that self-assembled in the
> manner described by Dembski.*Dembski has not defeated any actual
> biological proposition. He has slain nothing more than an imaginary dragon -
> a fictitious adversary that Dembski himself has fabricated from a stack of
> rhetorical straw.</quote>
>
> This is one of the major worries I have about ID. Their arguments may
> sound clear and convincing to the uninformed but in fact they are often
> equivocating or plain wrong. Imagine the damage that could be done to faith
> for instance when faithful followers of ID suddenly are exposed to the
> scientific vacuity of said argument?
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----
> From: David Opderbeck <dopderbeck@gmail.com>
> To: Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com>
> Cc: David Campbell <pleuronaia@gmail.com>; asa@calvin.edu
> Sent: Saturday, November 4, 2006 12:31:24 PM
> Subject: Re: [asa] Innate design detector?
>
> *Angus seems to be arguing against much of any system arising by chance
> and regularity, even in embryos*
>
> I'm sure he is, and I'm not intending to say here that he's right. What
> I'm asking is specifically whether those availability, synchronization,
> localization, coordination, and interface compability criteria are
> reasonable. Perhaps they are reasonable criteria and chance and regularity
> can meet them. I'm just curious whether the criteria make sense, and if
> not, specifically why not.
>
> **
>
>
>
> On 11/4/06, Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >
> > The argument is that IC is a strawman argument which insists that the
> > original function should be maintained through its evolution. Now that at
> > least in principle there are no scientific objections to IC systems arising,
> > IC like complexity or complex specified information has lost its value as
> > design detectors.
> > Which explains why its proponents are now asking for unreasonable
> > detailed pathways for such systems and presume design when such details
> > remain lacking rather than assume the more scientific position of "we do not
> > have all the answers"
> >
> > As Angus remarked, it seems highly improbable to me that... So once
> > again, our ignorance leads us to design inferences...
> >
> > So remind me again how does Intelligent Design explain the flagellum?
> > And since design does not even necessitate agency, why should a design
> > inference for let's say the flagellum have any significance.
> >
> > <quote>
> >
> > More recently Ryan Nichols pointed out that Dembski has made a
> > significant concession
> >
> > Before I proceed, however, I note that Dembski makes an important
> > concession to his critics. He refuses to make the second assumption noted
> > above. When the EF implies that certain systems are intelligently designed,
> > Dembski does not think it follows that there is some intelligent designer or
> > other. He says that, "even though in practice inferring design is the first
> > step in identifying an intelligent agent, taken by itself design does not
> > require that such an agent be posited. The notion of design that emerges
> > from the design inference must not be confused with intelligent agency"
> > (TDI, 227, my emphasis).
> >
> > Source: Ryan Nichols, The Vacuity of Intelligent Design Theory
> > </quote>
> >
> > All that ID proponents have done so far is downplay evolutionary
> > evidence (especially Darwinian pathways) but they have failed to explain why
> > such is evidence of design?
> >
> > Why do you find Menuge's objections carrying significance?
> >
> > How does it affect scientific explanations as provided by Nicholas *
> > Matzke*, "Evolution in (Brownian) Space: A Model for the Origin of the.
> > Bacterial *Flagellum*.
> >
> > So what are Angus's arguments
> >
> > <quote>
> > Menuge finds five problems that co-optational-based accounts of the
> > origin of irreducible complexity cannot overcome:
> >
> > "For a working flagellum to be built by exaptation, the five following
> > conditions would all have to be met:
> > "C1: Availability. Among the parts available for recruitment to form the
> > flagellum, there would need to be ones capable of performing the highly
> > specialized tasks of paddle, rotor, and motor, even though all of these
> > items serve some other function or no function.
> > "C2: Synchronization. The availability of these parts would have to be
> > synchronized so that at some point, either individually or in combination,
> > they are all available at the same time.
> > "C3: Localization. The selected parts must all be made available at the
> > same `construction site,' perhaps not simultaneously but certainly at the
> > time they are needed.
> > "C4: Coordination. The parts must be coordinated in just the right way:
> > even if all of the parts of a flagellum are available at the right time, it
> > is clear that the majority of ways of assembling them will be non-functional
> > or irrelevant.
> > "C5: Interface compatibility. The parts must be mutually compatible,
> > that is, `well-matched' and capable of properly `interacting': even if a
> > paddle, rotor, and motor are put together in the right order, they also need
> > to interface correctly." (pg. 104-105)
> > </quote>
> >
> > Angus seems to be arguing against much of any system arising by chance
> > and regularity, even in embryos... Such a position is not dissimilar to
> > Dembski's hilarious strawman of protein evolution.
> >
> >
> > Pim
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message ----
> > From: David Opderbeck < dopderbeck@gmail.com>
> > To: Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com>
> > Cc: David Campbell < pleuronaia@gmail.com>; asa@calvin.edu
> > Sent: Saturday, November 4, 2006 5:34:15 AM
> > Subject: Re: [asa] Innate design detector?
> >
> > *It should be clear by now that neither complexity nor irreducible
> > complexity is really a problem for evolution.*
> >
> > Can you clarify this -- are there now arguments that IC systems can
> > arise more or less intact, or are you referring to the standard responses
> > (cooption)?
> >
> > Concerning cooption, here's something I'd asked a while back about
> > cooption / exaptation from Angus Mengue's book Agents Under Fire.
> > Resurfacing it because it didn't draw any responses:
> >
> >
> > I'll probably oversimplify, but on exaptation, Menuge says that the
> > cooption of parts requires availability, synchronization, localization,
> > coordination, and interface compatability of the system's parts. For a
> > biological-mechanical system like the flagellum, a limited number of
> > protiens are available to do the specialized jobs of the paddle, rotor, and
> > motor, particularly considering interface compatibility. Though we can
> > perhaps identify parts from other systems that theoretically could be
> > coopted to make a flagellum, it seems highly improbable that the further
> > requirements of synchronization, coordination, and interface compatibility
> > could be met with respect to those parts in relation to the whole system.
> >
> > I have seen that Ken Miller and others cite a number of journal
> > articles showing parts that could have been coopted to form the flagellum.
> > Do those articles collectively satisfy all Menuge's requirements, or is a
> > significant amount of "time and chance of the gaps" still required? Or are
> > Menuge's requirments all wet?
> >
> > On 11/4/06, Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > It should be clear by now that neither complexity nor irreducible
> > complexity is really a problem for evolution. This also helps explain why
> > Behe is now asking for mutation by mutation pathways for IC systems. And yet
> > it's sufficient for ID to argue that it looks designed thus it must be...
> > > There appears some imbalance between what is good for the goose and
> > good for the gander.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message ----
> > > From: David Campbell < pleuronaia@gmail.com>
> > > To: asa@calvin.edu
> > > Sent: Friday, November 3, 2006 2:10:03 PM
> > > Subject: Re: [asa] Innate design detector?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Perhaps geology can provide some useful data here. Complex molecules
> > such as clay minerals can be produced by ordinary chemical reactions in the
> > environment, yet they have a large number of components (atoms) arranged
> > into a specific configuration, giving them properties that are not present
> > if the components are reaaranged or partially removed. They thus have
> > specified complexity, yet any design must be attributed to fine tuning in
> > the laws of chemistry and physics rather than to intervention-style direct
> > action.
> > >
> > > --
> > > Dr. David Campbell
> > > 425 Scientific Collections
> > > University of Alabama
> > > "I think of my happy condition, surrounded by acres of clams"
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
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Received on Sat Nov 4 17:47:12 2006
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