Re: [asa] Creation and Incarnation

*Most importantly - the theological issue ought to be dealt with in terms of
"creation" rather than "nature." And whatever your anthropology is, you'd
better have the human mind like the body on the "creature" side of the basic
re-creator divide. Whatever our minds are, they are not part of God. The
theological claim which will ultimately be translated into MN is then that
creation can be understood from within creation, without reference to the
creator (etsi deus non daretur).*

These are very insightful comments, as always, George, and welcome back.
Here's my question about this point: I'm not sure distinguishing intential
human action from "natural" causes is merely a matter of mind/body dualism.
It seems to me also a matter of theology concerning the image of God in
humanity. Can we really refer to the products of conscious human decisions
without reference to the creator if we assert that humans are uniquely
created in the image of God? I'd suggest this is one of the principal
things that distinguishes the products of intentional human actions from
"natural" causes: like God, humans are capable of making conscious
decisions based on moral and other non-physical considerations (though as
you note, of course, are minds are not God or part of God).

Setting aside angels and other "spiritual" beings for the moment, humans are
the only creatures endowed with this level of autonomy, as part of bearing
the image of God. If a monistic view of the mind/body question is tied with
strict determinism, I'd suggest that isn't a legitimate option for a
Christian view of the mind. But for nonreductive physicalists, as you've
allude to it, human choices supervene the physical properties in which
they're grounded (in Nancey Murphy's terms, human beings exert "downward
causation"). It's therefore hard for me to define human choices as strictly
"natural," even if I hold a monistic view of the mind and body. Also, if MN
allows for this kind of supervenient activity by humans exercising the image
of God, it's hard for me to understand why, in principle, it can't allow for
supervenience by God as well.

On 8/22/06, George Murphy <gmurphy@raex.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> I was away for awhile & have been hesitant to jump into the middle of
this thread but it seems to me that it's going in some odd directions. So -
>
> To begin with, while I realize that threads can get away from the
description given in their subject line, it's unfortunate that "Creation and
Incarnation" in being discussed primarily as a matter of philosophy rather
than as theology. Perhaps I've missed the references but I don't see
anything being said about Jesus Christ. & unless Christ - the one born of
Mary & crucified under Pontius Pilate - provides the fundamental criterion,
there's little point in talking about either creation or incarnation.
>
> Then there's the question of what may constitute a legitimate
"methodological naturalism," & one of the points being debated is whether or
not human activities can count as "natural." E.g., when a person is healed
of a disease because a physician has given her a drug developed by a
pharaceutical company, can that healing be said to have taken place by means
of "natural processes"?
>
> I'm going to waive here (unless someone objects) the Aristotelian
distinction between "natural" and "violent" motions. The reason for arguing
that that healing was not entirely "natural" - & thus a phenomenon that can
be understood by MN - seems to be a belief that human minds (of the patient,
doctor, ^ scientist who developed the drug) are themselves not entirely
"natural" - i.e., not themselves describable by a science consistent
with MN. To this I reply -
>
> 1 Mind-body dualism is, IMO, a respectable view but it is not, even among
Christians, the only view. (Cf. proponents of nonreductive physicalism.) &
it seems strange to make our definition of what constitutes legitimate
science depend on a debated anthropological position.
>
> 2) The thought processes, decision making patterns &c of people in
different situations can be studied phenomenologically by psychologists
without any presuppositions about the relationships between the mind and the
physical world.
>
> 3) Most importantly - the theological issue ought to be dealt with in
terms of "creation" rather than "nature." And whatever your anthropology
is, you'd better have the human mind like the body on the "creature" side of
the basic re-creator divide. Whatever our minds are, they are not part of
God. The theological claim which will ultimately be translated into MN is
then that creation can be understood from within creation, without reference
to the creator (etsi deus non daretur). How this gets translated into a
definition of science that is meaningful for non-Christians may be a
difficult matter, but this is where we should start.
>
> 4) Finally, it should be noted that the question of the naturalness of
human agency doesn't come up in situations in which MN is most strongly
challenged - cosmology & biological evolution.
>
> Shalom
> George
> http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/

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Received on Tue Aug 22 15:11:58 2006