I apologize for the KwickXML markup. The same contribution should show
up on Pandasthumb soon as well.
http://www.pandasthumb.org/archives/2006/06/laudan_demarcat.html
Laudan, demarcation and the vacuity of Intelligent design
<url href="http://www.pragmatism.org/library/laudan/laudan.htm">Larry
Laudan</url>, philosopher of science and Senior Investigator at the
Instituto de las Investigaciones Filosóficas, National Autonomous
University of Mexico, is often quoted by ID activists in support of
their claims about the <url
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demarcation_problem">demarcation
problem</url>. The demarcation problem basically is a philosophical
argument about how to define what is and is not science. Larry Laudan
strongly criticized the ruling by Judge Overton in <url
href="http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/mclean-v-arkansas.html">McLean v.
Arkansas Board of Education</url>. Laudan argued that contrary to
Overton's decision creation science is in fact testable, tentative and
falsifiable.
Laudan is also the author of "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem",
printed in Michael Ruse's "But Is It Science?". The Discovery Institute
and its various contributors have made extensive use of Laudan's
position on the demarcation problem. Ironically, it seems that Larry
Laudan holds some very strong opinions in this area. In an article
called <url
href="http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/001072.html">On
Methodological Naturalism and Intelligent Design (or Why Can't Lawrence
VanDyke Leave Well Enough Alone?)</url> Brian Leiter simply went down
the hallway to talk to his colleague Laudan.
<quote>Leiter: I’ve not only perused Beckwith’s book, I’ve read large
parts of it, and it might be said on VanDyke’s behalf that the book is,
in many respects, as misleading as VanDyke’s review (Beckwith is a bit
more careful on certain crucial points than VanDyke, to be sure--but a
competent book reviewer might have noted, rather than parotting,
Beckwith's misleading claims). My colleague Larry Laudan is, needless to
say, well beyond being amazed anymore by the gross misrepresentations of
his views--and of issues in the philosophy of science--in law reviews
and by proponents of ID. (Didn’t it occur to VanDyke that I might walk
down the hall and point out his nonsense to Laudan? He just rolled his
eyes and chuckled.)</quote>
Leiter continues to explain:
<quote author="Leiter">Beckwith invokes Laudan on two main points.
First, Beckwith notes that Laudan, like every other major philosopher of
science now alive, thinks that the “demarcation problem” that exercised
mid-20th-century philosophy of science—how do we demarcate science from
non-science, or genuinely cognitive domains from nonsense—can not be
solved. This now banal piece of philosophical wisdom goes no distance,
obviously, towards showing that ID and creationism aren’t bad science,
with nothing to commend them as research programs--which Laudan clearly
believes, as Beckwith correctly notes. Has VanDyke read Beckwith’s book?
If so, he might have also noted that Beckwith quotes Laudan [at 25]
noting that ID “is inconsistent with methodological naturalism and
ontological materialism...[b]ut that fact has no bearing whatsoever on
the plausbility of the arguments for ID.” Why does Laudan say that?
Because methodological naturalism is an a posteriori doctrine, which
means if ID generated any empirical results incompatible with it—it has
not, of course—then so much the worse for MN. The problem is purely a
posteriori: ID has no research program and no empirical support, so it
presents no challenge at all to the reliance on naturalistical
explanatory mechanisms. Laudan thinks talk of "pseudo-science" is
misleading in the absence of a solution to the demarcation problem;
<b>Laudan has no reservations about talk about "good" and "bad" science
as measured by their results and the evidence on behalf of their claims.</b>
</quote>
Laudan, in other words, may not believe in the demarcation problem but
he surely accepts the notion of good and bad science. So how is the
determination of the quality of science made? Simply by looking at its
contributions to our scientific knowledge, the presence of a research
program, the level of <url
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical">empirical</url> support
and the challenges it makes to the reigning scientific explanations.
In this context it is helpful to remind our readers of the work by Ryan
Nichols who observed that Intelligent Design is vacuous, dealing
directly with Laudan's objections to the demarcation principle by
determining how relevant ID is in generating relevant scientific
contributions which follow directly from its basic principles. Nichols
shows how IDT is without any content either as a scientific theory or
meta-theory.
<quote author="Ryan Nichols">In my argument against Intelligent Design
Theory I will not contend that it is not falsifiable or that it implies
contradictions. I’ll argue that Intelligent Design Theory doesn’t imply
anything at all, i.e. it has no content. By ‘content’ I refer to a body
of determinate principles and propositions entailed by those principles.
By ‘principle’ I refer to a proposition of central importance to the
theory at issue. By ‘determinate principle’ I refer to a proposition of
central importance to the theory at issue in which the extensions of its
terms are clearly defined.
I’ll evaluate the work of William Dembski because he specifies his
methodology in detail, thinks Intelligent Design Theory is contentful
and thinks Intelligent Design Theory (hereafter ‘IDT’) grounds an
empirical research program.1 Later in the paper I assess a recent trend
in which IDT is allegedly found a better home as a metascientific
hypothesis, which serves as a paradigm that catalyzes research. <b>I’ll
conclude that, whether IDT is construed as a scientific or
metascientific hypothesis, IDT lacks content.</b></quote>
Source: Ryan Nichols, <b>Scientific content, testability, and the
vacuity of Intelligent Design theory</b> <i>The American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly</i>, 2003 ,vol. 77 ,no 4 ,pp. 591 - 611
When I raised the concept of scientific vacuity in an earlier posting,
some ID activists were quick to argue that my argument would run afoul
of the demarcation problem, unaware of the fact that I was not claiming
that ID was or was not science but rather that ID was "bad" science in
the sense that it lacks content.
<h>Laudan</h>
Laudan's work is quite extensive and I am merely touching on the top of
the iceberg. Nevertheless, a picture emerges in which Laudan argues for
the fertility of theories and not necessarily the truth level. In
addition, Laudan seems to promote a form of naturalism called 'epistemic
naturalism' in which science and the philosophy of science co-evolve.
Laudan's approach is meant to resolve not only the concept of consensus
finding but also the existence of disagreement. Since the typical
hierarchical model relies on three successive stages, the following
problem can arise:
<quote author="Howard Sankey">For where scientists disagree about the
aims of their enterprise, no appeal can be made to common goals to
resolve lower-level disputes about methodological or factual matters.
Given that scientific disputes are to be resolved at a higher level, the
hierarchical model does not possess the resources to explain resolution
of disputes arising at the top of the hierarchy. </quote>
Laudan proposed a method to avoid these complications:
<quote author="Howard Sankey">To remedy this situation, Laudan proposes
an alternative model on which cognitive aims are also brought within the
range of rational appraisal (ibid., pp. 62-64). Laudan sketches a
reticulated model of scientific rationality, on which aims, methods and
factual beliefs form a network of shifting and interdependent
justificatory relations. On this model, justification runs up and down
the hierarchy, rather than being restricted to descent from top to
bottom. Thus, not only may aims justify methods and theories, but
factual information may be relevant to the appraisal of methods, and
theories provide constraints on appropriate cognitive goals.
Furthermore, considerations about available methods may shape
scientists' views about the attainability of specific cognitive goals.
Given the reticulated nature of justificatory relations, changes that
take place at one or more levels of the hierarchy may be warranted on
the basis of factors obtaining at any other level of the hierarchy</quote>
Howard Sankey <url
href="http://www.hps.unimelb.edu.au/about/staff/howard_sankey/howard/howardpaper5.PDF">Normative
Naturalism and the Challenge of Relativism: Laudan versus Worrall on the
Justification of Methodological Principles</url>
Similarly Freedman in <url
href="http://scistud.umkc.edu/psa98/papers/freedman.pdf">Laudan’s
Naturalistic Axiology</url> describes the evolving nature of epistemic
naturalism
<quote author="Freedman"> Laudan’s reticulated model of scientific
rationality is supposed to reveal an aspect of science that the
traditional model fails to account for:4 rational aim change. The
reticulated model is represented by Laudan as a triad consisting of
theory, methodology, and axiology. On this model, each of these elements
influence one another: justification flows both upward and downward in
the hierarchy.5 The reticulated model, in Laudan’s opinion, better
captures the “complex process of mutual adjustment and mutual
justification going on among
all three levels of scientific commitment”(1984, p.62). Significantly,
with the reticulated model, no one level is more privileged than
another. Aims are no longer construed as inflexible, nor are they the
final court of appeal. Aims are informed by theories and methods, just
as theories and methods are informed by aims. Furthermore, change within
any triad, according to Laudan, is not wholesale (e.g. as Kuhn would
have it), but rather piecemeal (1984, p.65). </quote>
Larry Laudan <b>How about Bust? Factoring Explanatory Power Back into
Theory Evaluation</b> <i>Philosophy of science</i>, Vol. 64, No. 2.
(Jun., 1997), pp. 306-316.
<quote>For the last two decades, I have been arguing that, in the
appraisal of theories and hypotheses, what does (and what should)
principally matter to scientists is not so much whether those hypotheses
are true or probable. <b>What matters, rather, is the ability of
theories to solve empirical problems-a feature that others might call a
theory’s explanatory or predictive power. </b></quote>
Larry Laudan <b>Normative Naturalism</b> <i>Philosophy of science</i>,
Vol. 57, No. 1. (Mar., 1990), pp. 44-59.
<quote>My own favorite flavor of naturalism is the epistemic variety.
Epistemic naturalism is not so much an epistemology per se as it is a
theory about philosophic knowledge: in very brief compass, it holds that
the claims of philosophy are to be adjudicated in the same ways that we
adjudicate claims in other walks of life, such as science, common sense
and the law. More specifically, epistemic naturalism is a
meta-epistemological thesis: it holds that the
theory of knowledge is continuous with other sorts of theories about how
the natural world is constituted. It claims that philosophy is neither
logically prior to these other forms of inquiry nor superior to them as
a mode of knowing. Naturalism thereby denies that the theory of
knowledge is synthetic a priori (as Chisholm would have it), a set of
“useful conventions” (as Popper insisted), a proto-scientific
investigations” (in the Lorenzen sense) or the lackluster alternative to
“edifying conversation” (in Rorty’s phrase).</quote>
In other words, Laudan's position is that one cannot reject something as
being science or non-science a-priori but that such distinctions follow
a-posteriori when good science is separated from bad science.
<quote>Crudely put, the normative naturalist holds that the best methods
for inquiry are those which produce the most impressive results. He thus
uses an ampliative yardstick for judging ampliative rules.</quote>
An <url
href="http://www.google.com/search?q=Laudan+%22intelligent+design%22">incomplete
list of ID activists (Google Search_</url> who refer to Laudan in their
defense of "Intelligent Design"
In another paper titled "Methodology’s Prospects", PSA: Proceedings of
the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol.
1986, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. (1986), pp. 347-354,
Laudan looks at methodology and outlines a general theory of inquiry
<quote>Let us begin with basics. Science is a form of inquiry, not the
only form to be sure, but probably its most impressive. Methodology is
the study of how to conduct inquiry effectively. Methodology is thus
both a form of inquiry and the study of inquiry. There is an obvious
self-reflexivity there, but not of the vicious sort. The methodology of
science is the study of how to conduct scientific inquiry.
Inquiry--whether scientific or otherwise-begins, to but it in the
simplest possible way, by raising questions or posing problems. It
carries on by proposing answers to those questions, or solutions to
those problems. Inquiry terminates, at least pro temporem, by the
provision of satisfactory answers or problem solutions.
</quote>
<quote>This claim of mine about the contingency of methodology appears
to trouble many philosophers. They would like to believe that
methodological rules are derivable purely a priori and that they enjoy
the status of logical necessities. As I have already said, however, the
view that methodological rules can be derived a priori or that they
would be true in all possible worlds is wholly implausible. Inquirers
with sensory capacities different from ours, inquirers with
neurophysiologies different from ours, and inquirers just like us but in
a world constituted differently from the way this one is would all be
well advised to use means for realizing the aims of inquiry other than
those which we find efficacious.
But if the contingency of methodology makes our task more complex, in
that we
need more than our apriori intuitions to do it (see Laudan 1986), that
very contingency
points the direction to solving the problem of the warrant for
methodological rules.
Specifically, I hold that the correctness of a methodological rule (of
the form "if one's
goal is x, one ought to do y") presupposes* the truth of the claim that
"doing y can
realize x, or bring one closer to the realization of x". More than that,
the acceptability
of a methodological rule rests on our having grounds for believing that
"doing y is more
likely to realize x than doing any alternative course of action open to
us". And that
means that the acceptability of a methodological rule depends on our
having in hand
relevant empirical evidence or theoretical arguments concerning the
relative frequency
with which doings of y (and its known alternatives) lead to the
realization of x.</quote>
<list type="1">
<li>Stephen C Meyer in <url
href="http://www.arn.org/docs/meyer/sm_methodological.htm">The
Methodological Equivalence of Design & Descent: Can There Be a
Scientific "Theory of Creation"?</url> Reprinted from The Creation
Hypothesis, ed. by J.P. Moreland (InterVarsity Press, 1994)
<quote author="Meyer">The "demise of the demarcation problem," as Laudan
calls it, implies that the use of positivistic demarcationist arguments
by evolutionists is, at least prima facie, on very slippery ground.
Laudan's analysis suggests that such arguments are not likely to succeed
in distinguishing the scientific status of descent vis-a#2-vis design or
anything else for that matter. As Laudan puts it, "If we could stand up
on the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like 'pseudo-science.'. .
. They do only emotive work for us."
If philosophers of science such as Laudan are correct, a stalemate
exists in our analysis of design and descent. Neither can automatically
qualify as science; neither can be necessarily disqualified either. The
a priori methodological merit of design and descent are
indistinguishable if no agreed criteria exist by which to judge their
merits.</quote> <b>PvM: In fact Laudan considers Methodological
Naturalism an a-posterio concept and there is where Intelligent Design
fails to be fruitful</b></li>
<li>David De Wolf, Stephen Meyer, Mark DeForrest in <url
href="http://www.arn.org/docs/dewolf/guidebook.htm">Intelligent Design
in Public School Science Curricula A Legal Guidebook</url>
<quote>As noted earlier, Laudan's critique suggests that when the
specific demarcation criteria promulgated in McLean are applied rigidly,
they disqualify both Darwinism and various non-materialistic
alternatives. Yet, as his discussion of falsification suggests, if
certain criteria are applied more liberally, then both theories may
qualify as scientific.
More recent studies in the philosophy of science have confirmed and
amplified Laudan's analysis.46 They suggest that philosophically neutral
criteria do not exist that can define science narrowly enough to
disqualify theories of creation or design without also disqualifying
Darwinism and other materialistic evolutionary theories on identical
grounds</quote><b>PvM: Of course the simple observation that ID is
scientifically vacuous should be evidence enough.</b>
<quote>As Laudan and others have argued, the status and merit of
competing origins theories must be decided on the basis of empirical
evidence and argument, not on abstract philosophical or methodological
litmus tests. Yet as we have seen, design theorists in particular make
extensive appeals to such empirical evidence and argument. Moreover,
their arguments are now informed by an empirically based and
mathematically sophisticated theory for detecting design. If design
theory has both theoretical and evidential support, and if it meets
abstract definitional criteria of scientific status equally well as its
main theoretical rivals, then it is natural to ask, On what grounds can
design theory be excluded from the public school science curriculum?</quote>
<b>PvM: ID activists appeal to empirical evidence ONLY to argue against
evolutionary theories. On what grounds can ID be excluded from the
public school curriculum ? Because it is scientifically vacuous and thus
lacks a clear secular motive which combined with its entanglement with
religious motivations and foundations makes it unconstitutional. But I
am not a lawyer so perhaps we should listen to <url
href="http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/kitzmiller/kitzmiller_342.pdf">a
judge</url>.</b></li>
<li>Stephen C Meyer in <url
href="http://www.idthefuture.com/2005/10/the_failure_of_demarcation_arguments.html">Expert
Report Part 3: The Failure of Demarcation Arguments</url> </li>
<li><url
href="http://www.evolutionnews.org/2005/10/will_robert_pennock_become_the_next_mich.html">Will
Robert Pennock Become the Next Michael Ruse?</url> Evolution News &
Views Center for <s>the renewal of</s> science and culture.
<quote>In the Dover trial, Robert Pennock is the Plaintiffs' expert on
the philosophy of science, and Pennock pushed hard for a definition of
science which is essentially "methodological naturalism."</quote><b>PvM:
What is wrong in showing how Methodologial Naturalism leads to good
science a-posteriori? Laudan would have been proud of Pennock.</b>
<quote author="Pennock">Q. How do philosophers of science distinguish
between science and non-science?
A. Philosophers of science focus on what scientists do. If one does
philosophy of art, then one looks at what artists do. So our primary
starting point is the practices, the concepts of science. So we'll look
at the nature of evidence for example, the basic characteristics that we
expect to find that we will start with is that science is a practice
that deals with examining questions about the natural world, giving
explanations about the natural world in terms of natural law, and
offering hypotheses that can be tested against the natural
world.</quote> <url
href="http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/day3am.html#day3am30">Pennock's
testimony during Kitzmiller</url>
During Cross Mr Gillen asked the following question
<quote>Q. Are you familiar with the work of Larry Laudan, L-A-U-D-A-N?
A. Yes, Larry Laudan was a philosopher of science who actually has been
a previous professor at the university where I did my work.
Q. And Larry Laudan said he believes that creationism is science, it's
just bad science, correct?
A. You're referring to a particular article that Laudan wrote that
Michael Ruse included in his anthology on creation science movement in
the early 80's, and in that case Laudan is making arguments that
creation science should be allowed to be science in that he says it's
offering a claim that could be proved, but that is found to be false
such as the age of the earth, because we know that that's not true. So
in that sense he says this is something that is bad science.
If one were to put that forward as though it were science, that would be
wrong, it's bad science. But he said we can allow that as science. Now,
he does that under the assumption that we're judging this under the
kinds of rules that I'm mentioning, to say that we're judging that the
young earth hypothesis, let's say that the earth is ten thousand years
old is false, and that we have disconfirmed that. That disconfirmation
is done by assuming that we can judge it under the rule of
methodological naturalism.
That's to say that we're taking our ordinary notion and not allowing
supernatural intervention. If we were to allow it, then we would not be
able to say that this is something that has been disconfirmed. That's to
say if you take seriously the content that departs from scientific
method and at that part, point, you'd be wrong to say that it's just bad
science. At that point you'd just say it's not science.
So this is always the sort of a subtle point that's important to try to
get across, and let me try to put it this way, right? It's often
complained by creationists that they say oh, you know, you're saying
that we can't be falsified, and yet at the same time you're saying that
we are falsified. Gosh, isn't that a contradiction? And that's just a
misunderstanding, right?
The claim that it can't be falsified is the claim that it can't be
falsified if one is departing from methodological naturalism. That is to
say if you treat this as just an ordinary scientific hypothesis, then
you'd say well, we projected that the earth is ten thousand years old.
But if you depart from it and take seriously the supernatural content,
then you can't say that anymore, because at that point who knows?
Young earth creationists, some of them have said well, the world looks
old, but it looks old because God made it old, that really it is six
thousand years old but he made it so that it appears to be much longer,
did much, much earlier. Well, that's sort of a deceptive view about the
way things were created. But if you take that view that it's possible to
say that the supernatural being is deceiving us in this way, then
there's no way to say that we've disconfirmed that.
For all we know the world may have been created five minutes ago and
we've just been implanted with memories to make us think it that it's
much longer, right? There's no way to disprove that. If you seriously
take the supernatural possibility, then you can't disconfirm it. So
that's the sense in which it's important to say under the assumption of
methodological naturalism, we have disconfirmed it, it's bad science,
that's what Laudan is talking about, but if you were to take seriously
the non-natural part, that's to say rejecting scientific method, then
it's just not science, and we can't say that we have rejected it. So
there's always these two different hypotheses. You've got to keep them
distinct. There's no contradiction.
MR. GILLEN: Thank you, Your Honor. I have no further questions.</quote>
At this point I would like to point to a paper by Bradley Monton titled
<url
href="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002592/01/Methodological_Naturalism_Dover_3.doc">Is
Intelligent Design Science? Dissecting the Dover Decision</url>. Monton
argues that Laudan rejects methodological naturalism as a demarcation
criterion for science, ignoring that Laudan accepts methodological
naturalism a-posteriori as a "good" science. I believe that is also what
Pennock is trying to say here.
<quote author="Pennock">If you seriously take the supernatural
possibility, then you can’t disconfirm it. So that’s the sense in which
it’s important to say under the assumption of methodological naturalism,
we have disconfirmed it, <b>it’s bad science, that’s what Laudan is
talking about</b>, but if you were to take seriously the non-natural
part, that’s to say rejecting scientific method, then it’s just not
science… (Pennock 2005b, 104-5)</quote>
Monton concludes that " Of course, Laudan is not the only philosopher of
science who rejects methodological naturalism." but Laudan does not
reject methodological naturalism, he rejects it as a useful a-priori
demarcation principle.
<quote author="Leiter">Because methodological naturalism is an a
posteriori doctrine, which means if ID generated any empirical results
incompatible with it—it has not, of course—then so much the worse for
MN. The problem is purely a posteriori: ID has no research program and
no empirical support, so it presents no challenge at all to the reliance
on naturalistical explanatory mechanisms. Laudan thinks talk of
"pseudo-science" is misleading in the absence of a solution to the
demarcation problem; Laudan has no reservations about talk about "good"
and "bad" science as measured by their results and the evidence on
behalf of their claims.</quote>
</li>
</list>
<h>Kitzmiller Ruling</h>
Judge Jones' ruling may be of interest since it actually looked at the
scientific nature of Intelligent Design
<quote author="Judge Jones">After a searching review of the record and
applicable caselaw, we find that while ID arguments may be true, a
proposition on which the Court takes no position, ID is not science. We
find that ID fails on three different levels, any one of which is
sufficient to preclude a determination that ID is science. They are: (1)
ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and
permitting supernatural causation; (2) the argument of irreducible
complexity, central to ID, employs the same flawed and illogical
contrived dualism that doomed creation science in the 1980's; and (3)
ID’s negative attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific
community. As we will discuss in more detail below, it is additionally
important to note that ID has failed to gain acceptance in the
scientific community, it has not generated peer-reviewed publications,
nor has it been the
subject of testing and research.</quote>
I will explore the ruling by Judge Jones in a later posting to determine
if indeed Jones relied on demarcation principles or "good" versus "bad"
science to determine the status of Intelligent Design. Needless to say I
will argue that Jones reached the conclusion based on Intelligent
Design's lack of scientific relevance.
<b>Laudan and the demarcation principle</b>
<list type="1">
<li>Keith Abney in <url
href="http://www.asa3.org/ASA/topics/Philosophy/PSCF9-97Abney.html">Naturalism
and Nonteleological Science: A Way to Resolve the Demarcation Problem
Between Science and Nonscience</url> PSCF 49 (September 1997): 162.</li>
<li>Victor Stenger in <url
href="http://www.mukto-mona.com/Special_Event_/Darwin_day/supernatural_science300106.htm">Supernatural
Science</url> Darwin Day (February 12, 2006)<quote>
My university of Hawaii colleague at the time, the eminent philosopher
Larry Laudan, had been one of the strong voices disputing Popperian
falsifiability as a workable demarcation criterion for science. When the
Arkansas decision was announced, Laudan objected strenuously. He pointed
out that creation science is in fact testable, tentative, and
falsifiable. For example, it predicts a young Earth and other geological
facts that have, in fact, been falsified. Falsified science can still be
science, just wrong science. Laudan warned that the Arkansas decision
would come back to haunt science by "perpetuating and canonizing a false
stereotype on what science is and how it works."
Coming up-to-date, we similarly find that ID is testable, tentative, and
falsifiable. For example, William Dembski asserts a “law of conservation
of information” which implies that information cannot be generated by
natural processes. This is provably wrong. Information is negative
entropy and the second law of thermodynamics allows for the entropy of
systems interacting with their environments to decrease and thus
information to increase naturally. Michael Behe's examples of
"irreducible complexity" have similarly been refuted.
I am not quibbling with the ruling that creation science and ID
represent unconstitutional attempts to promote a sectarian view of
creation under the guise of science. And, I also agree that ID is
pseudoscience rather than science. But my reasons are not based on
plugging in some algorithm written by a lawyer that clearly does not
serve as an accurate definition of science. Pseudoscience is like
pornography. You know it when you see it.</quote>
See also Stenger's <url
href="http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Super.pdf">PDF
Presentation</url> for his perspective of science versus pseudo-science</li>
</list>
Received on Sun Jun 11 18:48:12 2006
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