Re: Philosophy of Science / Epistemology -- Larry Laudan

http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/001072.html

<quote>

Beckwith invokes Laudan on two main points.

First, Beckwith notes that Laudan, like every other major philosopher of
science now alive, thinks that the “demarcation problem” that exercised
mid-20th-century philosophy of science—how do we demarcate science from
non-science, or genuinely cognitive domains from nonsense—can not be
solved. This now banal piece of philosophical wisdom goes no distance,
obviously, towards showing that ID and creationism aren’t bad science,
with nothing to commend them as research programs--which Laudan clearly
believes, as Beckwith correctly notes. Has VanDyke read Beckwith’s book?

If so, he might have also noted that Beckwith quotes Laudan [at 25]
noting that ID “is inconsistent with methodological naturalism and
ontological materialism...[b]ut that fact has no bearing whatsoever on
the plausbility of the arguments for ID.” Why does Laudan say that?
Because methodological naturalism is an a posteriori doctrine, which
means if ID generated any empirical results incompatible with it—it has
not, of course—then so much the worse for MN. The problem is purely a
posteriori: ID has no research program and no empirical support, so it
presents no challenge at all to the reliance on naturalistical
explanatory mechanisms. Laudan thinks talk of "pseudo-science" is
misleading in the absence of a solution to the demarcation problem;
Laudan has no reservations about talk about "good" and "bad" science as
measured by their results and the evidence on behalf of their claims.

Second, Beckwith calls attention to Laudan's acknowledgment of “the
existence of a certain degree of dogmatism about core commitments in
scientific research [think Lewontin!]" and of the fact that "such
dogmatism plays a constructive role in promoting the aims of science.”
Now what does this mean? It means that scientists engaged in science
make a lot more progress if they take for granted an awful lot of stuff,
than if they view everything as “up for grabs” all the time. It goes no
distance, whatsoever, to showing that the stuff they “take for granted”
at a particular moment in the history of scientific inquiry is “a
priori”: this Laudan, like everyone else who knows anything about the
subject, denies.

Beckwith obscures this by moving straight from Laudan’s point to one
reading of Kuhn’s views (see 26). Since Beckwith isn’t the least bit
interested in the philosophical issues—his book, rather obviously, is a
brief for a particular position, namely, that teaching ID in the public
schools is constitutional--he nowhere notes that one of the major
critics of Kuhn is none other than...Larry Laudan! (This kind of
opportunistic philosophy of science--invoke Laudan when it suits you,
forget him a moment later when he critiques exactly the point you want
to make--is all-too-typical of this literature.) But an ignorant reader
of Beckwith—of whom VanDyke appears to be one-will be led to believe
that Laudan’s points, noted above, are part of the science-debunking
program of one reading of Kuhn (a reading Kuhn himself rejected).
</quote>

Not suprisingly ID activists
(http://www.arn.org/docs/meyer/sm_methodological.htm) are using Laudan
to argue against the demarcation principle, however as the writer above
clearly notes if a particular 'science' makes claims for which no
empirical results exist then that kind of 'science' is plainly vacuous.

Another writer, responding on Amazon to Beckwith's book writes

<quote>Laudan however, completes the argument that Beckwith does
not-Laudan holds that some ideas are demonstrably scientifically wrong.
Laudan holds that it is possible to determine what those ideas are, and
Intelligent Design is one of them. I don't know why the author did not
refer to Laudan's specific rejection of Intelligent Design.</quote>
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0742514315/

ASA has a good article on Ruse and Laudan
http://www.asa3.org/ASA/topics/Philosophy/PSCF9-97Abney.html

Insofar as our concern is to protect ourselves and our fellows from the
cardinal sin of believing what we wish were so rather than what there is
substantial evidence for and surely that is what most forms of
"quackery" come down to then our focus should be squarely on the
empirical and conceptual credentials for claims about the world. The
"scientific" status of those claims is irrelevant”

Larry Laudan , The Demise of the Demarcation Problem

Sociology & Demarcation
•Paul Thagard’s proposal:
• based on how theory proponents act as a community
•Pseudoscientific (really bad) if:

1.less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time
and face many unsolved problems
2.Community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory
towards solutions of these problems
3.Shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others
4.Is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations

Proposed additional red flag:

5.Community of practitioners do not apply appropriate safeguards against
self deception and known pitfalls of human perception.

• Does not properly emphasize:
• peer review
• blind or double blind studies
• control groups
•and other protections against expectation and confirmation bias

http://physics.csufresno.edu/rhall/tamII_intro.html

 From Laudan's homepage http://larrylaudan.com/

David Opderbeck wrote:

> A colleague of mine who writes on the concept of "reasonable doubt"
> and scientific evidence in criminal trials mentioned that he has an
> affinity with Larry Laudan. I understand that Laudan was a student of
> Popper's and has critiqued and in some ways modified Kuhn and Lakatos.
> Just curious if anyone here has read Laudan or has a sense of how his
> philosophy of science / epistemology might play into the faith/science
> relation.
Received on Sat Jun 10 18:35:57 2006