*To me it means that you would be unable to know if the Bible is true or not
*
Ok, but I don't think that follows. Murphy provides some ways to evaluate
competing truth webs. And of course I'd have to understand what you mean by
"know if the Bible is true." I don't think we can know with indubitable
certainty that the Bible is true. I think we can have good warrant for
believing the Bible is true -- very good warrant, I believe -- but then I
think we need to make a commitment of faith.
*By the way, I am going to note here that you still show me no evidence of
understanding
> the difference between apologetics and epistemology. They are NOT the same
thing*
**
Please -- can we drop the pedantic ad hominems? Please, please? Of course
they're not the same thing, but they are directly related -- right? And
Reformed presuppositional apologetics reflect an epistemic system as well as
an apologetic system. As John Frame said in the Five Views on Apologetics
book I cited, "presuppositionalists too are Reformed epistemologists."
(Five Views, at p. 312).
And there are some significant differences between the Van Til / Frame
presuppositional school and the Reformed epistemology of folks like
Plantinga. I admit I conflated those two a bit too much. However, they're
similar enough that many folks refer to Plantinga et al as
presuppositionalists -- for example, I can't find the cite right now, but
David Snoke draws this paralell in a PSCF article that is critical of
presuppositionalism. Regardless, in referring to reformed epistemology and
presuppositionalism, I'm getting at ways of knowing, not necessarily at ways
of defending or proving, though the two are inseparable IMHO.
I'm not sure why the link to that Contemporary Perspectives on Religious
Epistemology book didn't seem to work -- it's ISBN 0-19-507324-X, Oxford
University Press. I guess you don't believe me, but I really do own it, and
have read parts of it (I admit, not cover to cover). I confess I'm no Ph.D.
in religious epistemology, but it's been strong reading interest of mine for
a couple of years now.
*You haven't paid attention, then. When people on this list keep charging me
with having a
YEC epistemology, I constantly point out that I think more like an atheist
than a YEC.
Thus, I have fully articulated it.*
No, I have paid attention, probably far too much attention. I asked you in
the previous thread for your view on epistemology you said "I don't have a
name for my epistemology" and "clearly, I view observation and verification
as extremely important." That isn't any sort of articulated epistemology at
all. You've suggested I've engaged in question begging, but this is
certainly question begging, because these notions of "observation,"
"verification" and such are exactly what epistemology tries to suss out.
(BTW, I don't think I've engaged in question begging, but you could
criticize reformed epistemology for circularity. But then again,
*every *epistemology
becomes circular at some point.)
So here is what I see as a basic problem with this discussion: you started
by saying the Yak Butter question raised important epistemological issues.
But you didn't really articulate an epistemology, and the elements of an
epistemology that you've referred to in this and other discussions seem to
include a presumption of atheism. Why not just go all the way and declare
yourself an atheist? You've said you haven't done that because of
experiences you've had of God working in and through you. But if that's so,
then perhaps it would make sense to reexamine some of your assumed epistemic
assumptions, because the notion that you could experience God is contrary to
your assumed epistemology. I say this with the utmost respect for you, but
based on the back-and-forth about reformed epistemology and
presuppositionalism, perhaps this is one area where a litte more broad and
deep study would, if nothing else, make discussions like this one a bit less
personal and a little more producting.
Blessings,
David
On 6/3/06, glennmorton@entouch.net <glennmorton@entouch.net> wrote:
> For George Murphy and David Opderbeck,
>
> On Sat Jun 3 11:34 , "George Murphy" sent:
>
> >>
> >This didn't go the 1st time. I'll try again
> >with Glenn's material snipped.
> >
> >
> >Glenn -
> >
> >3 points here:
> >
> >1) You can't get anywhere without
> >presuppositions. Starting in that way is hardly a peculiarity of Reformed
> >Presuppositional Apologetics.You can't get Euclidean geometry
> >without Euclid's postulates (or something equivalent) & you don't get
> >special relativity without Einstein's 2 postulates (or something
> >equivalent). Of course that doesn't mean that those presuppositions are
> >immune from challenges. But the way in which the scientific theories
based
> >on certain assumptions are tested is by seeing how well & how broadly
they
> >explain phenomena.
> >
>
> George, I absolutely agree with you on this. One always has to start with
assumptions of
> some nature, but one doesn't want to start with an assumption which begs
the question
> (let's start with the assumption that I am always right and all others
wrong). One
> doesn't want to start with contradictory assumptions because that is a
situation which
> can be used to prove anything whatsoever
>
>
> >2) The belief
> >that God accomodated the inspiration of scripture to current cultural
views of
> >science, history &c need not (& I think should not) be left just as a
> >brute fact or as a way to avoid embarassment. It should be understood as
> >an expression of the divine kenosis, slef-limitation, that took place in
the
> >Incarnation. I don't know if you were reading the list when I mentioned
my
> >recent article "Couldn't God Get It Right?" It's at
> >http://www.elca.org/faithandscience/covalence/story/default.asp?Copyright=06-03-
> 15&Author=murphy&Pages=1.
> >This is a very brief discussion but I hope gets my point across.
> >
>
> Maybe it shouldn't be left as only a way to avoid embarrassing
conclusions, but for the
> life of me, I can't see any other reason it is used. Why? Because it
isn't applied to
> the existence of the Roman empire. No one goes and talks about how Roman
history was
> accommodated to the poor historical knowledge of the early
Christians. Accommodation is
> only applied when someone doubts that the Bible is telling us historical
or scientific
> fact. Can you name one instance of accommodation being applied to
anything we know is
> historically correct?
>
> >3) You (& others) ask, if God accomodated
> >to current science, why not to current theology? To a certain extent we
do
> >have to recognize that the revelationof God & his will has been
> >progressive, as I noted in an earlier post. (Abraham didn't know about
the
> >Trinity.) But there's a more fundamental point. God didn't need to
> >reveal accurate physics, astronomy, biology, geology &c because we can
> >figure out those things with our own brains and observational abilities.
> >In fact, for God to communicate them directly would have short-circuited
the
> >whole process of human maturation. But we can't understand who God
> >is & God's will for us just from our observations & use of our brains
> >because of the fudamental problem of sin. That's the point that Paul
makes
> >in Romans 1:18-23.
> >
>
> Well, I for one am not asking God to write 7th grade science texts. But I
am asking that
> God, when inspiring men about things which can be observed, that he
inspire the truth.
> And if God had no ability to inspire the truth, it raises fundamental
questions about his
> power, or lack thereof.
>
> For David Opderbeck
>
> David Opderebeck wrote:
>
> >>>>Well, yeah, but the atheist does the same thing. Read Flew's essay in
that
> Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology book, for
example. Flew argues (as
> do most atheists) that we should start from the presumption that there is
no God, and
> that theists therefore bear the burden of proof. But why should this be
so? Glenn,
> you've had a little trouble clearly articulating your own epsitemic stance
in this
> thread -- and I don't mean this in an sort of snarky way, but I see the
stance you've
> been driving at as essentially the same as Flew's. It seems that you're
internalizing an
> atheistic religious epistemology perhaps without fully articulating it.
<<<
>
> You haven't paid attention, then. When people on this list keep charging
me with having a
> YEC epistemology, I constantly point out that I think more like an
atheist than a YEC.
> Thus, I have fully articulated it.
>
>
> >>>>But why is the atheistic epistemic stance more reasonable than
assuming that God
> exists? As Roy Clouser has I think presuasively argued, the presumption
of atheism is
> itself a religious presumption. One of the touchstones of Reformed
presuppositional
> epistemology is this question of which "religious" presupposition is more
reasonable.<<<
>
> No presupposition is correct which assumes that one position is right and
all others are
> wrong. That is a massive logical fallacy called 'begging the
question.' As a lawyer, I
> am amazed that you don't recognize this.
>
>
> >>>The statement in your article that Reformed presuppositional
apologetics disregards
> evidence entirely isn't completely true, then. Van Til's thinking is much
more subtle on
> this point. It's more a question of the worldview glasses one wears when
viewing certain
> kinds of evidence. <<<
>
> But this is saying that there is no real, objective truth. YECs say this,
OEC's say
> this, but it is a path which basically says truth is subjective. And if it
is, then the
> truth for the Tibetan is equivalent to our truth and the truth for the
fanatical
> islamacist who says we must die is equally valid.
>
> >>>Now, some of my Reformed bretheren will disagree with me here, but I
personally would
> grant that Van Til's epistemology, even as sort of modified by
contemporary thinkers like
> John Frame, has a weakness in that it relies too heavily on a concept of
"certainty"
> based on subjective emotional experience. I wrote in some detail about
why this is a
> problem for me recently on my blog (
> http://www.davidopderbeck.com/archives/2006/05/certainty_certi_1.html).
>
> This is one reason, as I mentioned before, that I would characterize my
own epistemic
> stance as a "web-based" one that incorporates aspects of the
presuppositional view. For
> the "web-based" metaphor and religious epistemology, I've found Nancey
Murphy's "Beyond
> Fundamentalism and Liberalism" ( http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1563381761/sr=8-
> 1/qid=1149344944/ref=sr_1_1/102-9712995-3999361?%5Fencoding=UTF8 )
> to be an excellent reasource that makes some compelling arguments. (Last
year I wrote in
> some detail on my blog about my thoughts at that time about this:
> http://www.davidopderbeck.com/archives/2005/02/the_nature_of_t.html) <<<<
>
>
> When you right: In contrast, the web metaphor does not necessarily make
man the final
> measuring stick of truth. Truth claims that are beyond the reach of human
perception and
> reason can help anchor the web."
>
> To me it means that you would be unable to know if the Bible is true or
not. This is a
> classic argument for solipcism as far as I can see.
>
> One thing I hope to do in the future is to explore how Reformed philospher
Herman
> Dooyeweerd's epistemology (see here for summary:
> http://www.isi.salford.ac.uk/dooy/knowing.html#epist ) might tie some of
these different
> strands of my own still-evolving thinking on this together. (If anyone
here is a
> Dooyeweerd maven, I'd love to hear from you).
>
>
> By the way, I am going to note here that you still show me no evidence of
understanding
> the difference between apologetics and epistemology. They are NOT the same
thing.
>
> You can see that they are not the same.
> a•pol•o•get•ics P Pronunciation Key ( -p l -j t ks)
> n. (used with a sing. verb)
> 1. The branch of theology that is concerned with defending or proving
the truth of
> Christian doctrines.
> 2. Formal argumentation in defense of something, such as a position
or system.
> e•pis•te•mol•o•gy P Pronunciation Key ( -p s t -m l -j )
> n.
> The branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, its
presuppositions and
> foundations, and its extent and validity.
> .
> Secondly, that book you linked to is not a book about apologetics. It also
doesn't have
> any plantinga article. I think you got the wrong link. That book has
chapters entitled
> The Presumption of atheism
> The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism
> Atheistic teleological arguments
> Atheological apologetics
> Faith skepticism and religious understanding
> The groundlessness of belief
> Theology atheism and theism
> Does religious skepticism rest on a mistake
>
>
>
>
Received on Sat Jun 3 15:40:48 2006
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