Re: Evolutionary Psychology and Free Will

Loren and Michael have responded on aspects of Miles' paper. There is a
different approach from philosophical requirements, although I suspect
that there is more nonsense on this topic in the literature than reason.
I find that the usual approach involves either strict determinism or
randomness. Neither allows for morality or, for that matter, rational
discussion. If A causes E, then A is either a necessary or sufficient
condition for E. If A is only a necessary condition, then with one or
more other necessary conditions, B and C, say, we have a sufficient
condition (A&B&C) which causes E inexorably. It is possible that we may
not be aware of all the interacting conditions, but the principle is that
when the necessary and sufficient conditions occur, the effect
necessarily follows. This is not the area of morality, for one cannot be
responsible for what he cannot control. But this is what Miles wants to
call on.

Some philosophers have seen this and have swung to indeterminism, to
randomness, in order to allow for choice. But there is no choice in true
randomness, for things just happen. If I throw dice, I can't be blamed
for the numbers shown. I may be blamed for gambling or commended for
playing with the children, as the case may be. But what the dice show is
out of my power, unless I've picked loaded dice, which involves a
different moral decision. So random products are not the basis for
morality, for rational decisions, etc., though some have foolishly tried
to account for human freedom through the randomness of quantum effects.

Free will demands self-determination, the individual's choice making the
difference--causally. The choice may be narrow, even between undesirable
alternatives. In this situation, morality requires choosing so as to
cause the lesser evil. Other times it may be the good over an evil.
Unless there is this possibility, there cannot be moral behavior.

Self-determination is not something that fits into a scientific
framework. A sociologist or anthropologist may report on the behavior of
the group, contrasting it to the professed standard. An obvious example
is the strict monogamy professed and the serial polygamy of practice
common in the West, though marriage is giving way to shacking up and
casual sex. They may measure the effect on the group, but "moral" is not
a proper term within the disciplines, except as describing the professed
standard. In sum, there are matters that do not belong within scientific
disciplines. Trying to wedge them in gets Miles and those he criticizes
into difficulties.
Dave

On Mon, 01 May 2006 13:23:21 -0400 "Ted Davis" <tdavis@messiah.edu>
writes:
> The most recent issue of the Reports of the National Center for
> Science Education (May-Aug 2005) contains an essay by British
> evolutionary theorist James Miles entitled, "The Accidental
> Creationists: Why Evolutionary Psychology is Bad for the Teaching of
> Evolution." Among other things, here is what Dr Miles says:
>
> ***
>
> As Darwin lay dying in March 1882, the last words he wrote to
> zoologist Thomas Huxley, his disciple of 30 years, were: "I wish to
> God there were more automata in the world like you" (Desmond 1997:
> 519). "Darwin's bulldog" as Huxley was known, had fought for Darwin
> in public for a quarter of a century while the reclusive Darwin
> stayed silent. Huxley fought to combat the idea that we were not
> animals, and the idea that we were not biochemical machines, the
> "automata" of nature. Darwinism has no room for free will; it is
> what Darwin called a "delusion" (see Barrett and others 1987: 608),
> wishful thinking akin to the belief that God made the world in 6
> days and the earth is just 6000 years old.
>
> But a century and a quarter after Darwin penned these final words to
> Huxley, evolutionary psychology appears to have resurrected free
> will. Despite professing to be a passionate evolutionist, Cronin is
> careful to delineate the Darwinian kingdom: "we should not look on
> free will and biological 'constraints' as pulling in opposite
> directions" (1991: 377). Vocal evolutionary psychologist Matt Ridley
> is keen to tell us there is nothing inconsistent with free will
> within EP (1994). Free will, says David Barash, is a "useful
> inconsistency" (2003: 222; see also Pinker 1997b). In Miles (2004) I
> described using belief in free will as the litmus test of a true
> Darwinian, as the litmus test to see who will cut and run from the
> implications of evolutionary theory. There is no room for free will
> in a theory which connects us in an unbroken four-billion*year chain
> of evolution. Even Darwin's greatest 19th-century critics, like
> "Soapy Sam" Wilberforce, accepted this truth: "man's free-will!
> * [is] utterly irreconcilable with the degrading notion of the
> brute origin of him who was created in the image of God"
> (Wilberforce 1860: 258).
>
> ***
>
> The entire essay is well written and provocative. I recommend that
> interested parties read it and comment here. Dr Miles is not saying
> anything new or unusual--I know of highly similar statements going
> back to at least the 1920s if not further--but his application to
> the current controversy is illuminating and stimulating. With his
> permission, I have made available a copy of the essay on my webpage:
>
> http://home.messiah.edu/~tdavis/James%20Miles%20Essay.htm
>
> I invite us to discuss it!
>
> Ted
>
>
>
>
Received on Tue May 2 00:35:09 2006