Re: Signs of Scientism

David Opderbeck wrote:

> I'd still very much like the perspectives of Keith and other ASA
> members on why the ability to observe and reasonably believe in a
> "supernatural" event such as the resurrection differs from the ability
> to observe and reasonably believe in "supernatural" creative events in
> natural history.  As I've understood the discussion so far, it's not
> only that there's no evidence for such "supernatural" creative events,
> its that such events are in principle not detectable.  I'm trying to
> understand the "in principle not detectable" part.  Thanks.

This will have to be my final post on this thread. Other
responsibilities are catching up to me.

This is a very multi-faceted question. First we need definitions. As
I have indicated previously, my view is that all reality has a
"supernatural" aspect in that it is continuously upheld by God's being
and action. However, from your previous comments, I think that you are
referring to "miracle." But this word also need definition. My
understanding (the theologians amount us are free to correct me) is
that miracle in the Biblical sense is a "sign" that draws attention to
or confirms some aspect of God's revelation of his character or will.
These signs were given at a particular time and place in a particular
historical context in God's interaction with his people. A miracle in
this sense does not require that the "sign" break natural "law" or
interrupt chains of cause-and-effect. An example that I like to use in
making this point, is Jesus' calming of the sea. What makes this a
sign is that the event occurred in response to Jesus' spoken word.
There are other events in scripture that do seem to "break natural
law," but these are actually surprisingly few.

So, are such "signs" in human history subject to scientific test and
substantiation? Well, yes and no. Firstly, science as a discipline to
understand the natural world did not exist until modern history (I'll
let the historians say when modern science was born). Our scientific
way of thinking and explaining the natural world did not exist in
ancient times. The miraculous signs were received and understood by
those to whom they were given, but there was no scientific process in
existence to be applied. What about claims of the miracles (of the
"law breaking" sort) in modern times? While it might in principle be
possible to devise a scientific test, the events in question cannot be
anticipated or predicted. God is free and not subject to any rules.
(This free action is one of the reasons that studies on the
effectiveness of prayer are flawed. God ends up being treated in an
experimental study as operationally equivalent to a drug. But God
doesn't give us what we ask just because we pray.) In any scientific
investigation God ends up being reduced to a natural cause. On the
other hand, science can be used to debunk false supernatural claims
(again of the "law breaking" sort ) by showing how the event or
phenomena in question can be attributed to known natural processes, or
to be the result of human deception. So, if science fails to debunk a
particular claim, then "law-breaking" miraculous action cannot be ruled
out. However, neither can it be positively demonstrated. It will
simply be a mystery, and that mystery may eventually yield to a
"natural" cause-and-effect explanation.

OK, so what about miraculous ("law-breaking") events in creative
history? There are two parts to my response. Firstly, my
understanding is that such events must be "signs" in the Biblical
sense. But these events would have occurred without observers.
Furthermore they could not have been signs to the people to whom the
scriptures were originally written. Thus their theological
significance is seriously brought into question. Now, the natural
world is certainly pointed to by scripture as a sign of God's existence
and power. But, as George has repeatedly argued on this list, that
"natural revelation" has not resulted in knowledge of God or in
repentance. Furthermore, that revelation is not rooted in some modern
scientific discovery, but in our everyday experience of the created
world (as valid to the ancients as to us). The second part of my
response is that scientific study of the natural world cannot confirm
the existence or action of God. If a series of natural
cause-and-effect processes/events can be shown to plausibly account for
our observations of the natural world, that says nothing about God's
action in an through those processes. If no such plausible series of
natural events are currently known, then that is all that science as a
limited way of knowing can say. It cannot conclude that a particular
event in the history of life, or a particular feature of the natural
world, must be the consequence of a supernatural agent. However, we
are free to make those claims from a theological perspective. But
those claims must be evaluated on their theological merits, and I
believe that tying our arguments for the creative action of God to
failures in scientific description are theologically problematic.
Below is a short passage from a recently-published article of mine that
addresses this issue.

In conclusion, I am not saying that God cannot or does not act outside
the regularities of the natural world. I am saying that science has
little or nothing to say about it.

______________________________________

Many Intelligent Design (ID) advocates argue that MN arbitrarily and
unjustifiably excludes supernatural agency from scientific explanation.
  They believe that this exclusion of God from scientific description
unnecessarily restricts the search for truth. Phillip Johnson has made
this a prominent focus of his arguments.
“We [members of the intelligent design movement] are opposed by persons
who endorse methodological naturalism, a doctrine that insists that
science must explain biological creation only by natural processes,
meaning unintelligent processes. Reference to a creator or designer is
relegated to the realm of religion, and ruled out of bounds in science
regardless of the evidence.”
Note that MN is treated as a doctrine, a philosophical assumption,
rather than a methodological limitation of scientific inquiry. In much
of the ID and traditional creationist literature, MN is falsely
presented as equivalent to philosophical naturalism or materialism.
That is, the practice of science is seen as based on a philosophy that
claims that the material universe is all that there is.

ID advocates believe that the exclusion of God from scientific
description unnecessarily restricts the search for truth. It does
nothing of the sort. If God acted in creation to bring about a
particular structure in a way that broke causal chains, then science
would simply conclude that: "There is presently no known series of
cause-and-effect processes that can adequately account for this
structure, and research will continue to search for such processes."
Any statement beyond that requires the application of a particular
religious worldview. Science cannot conclude "God did it." However,
if God acted through a seamless series of cause-and-effect processes to
bring about that structure, then the continuing search for such
processes stimulated by the tentativeness and methodological naturalism
of science may uncover those processes. Using an ID approach, the
inference to "intelligent design" would be made, and any motivation for
further research would end. Thus, ID runs the risk of making false
conclusions, and prematurely terminating the search for
cause-and-effect descriptions when one wasn’t already at hand.
Furthermore, how would a gap in our knowledge be filled unless there
was a continued effort to search for possible “natural” causes? Thus
even the verification of gaps requires research conducted using MN
assumptions.

(Taken from Miller, K.B., 2005, Countering public misconceptions about
the nature of evolutionary science, Southeastern Biology, v.52,
p.415-427. Simultaneously published in: Georgia Journal of Science,
v.63, p.175-189.)

_________________________________________________________________

Keith

Keith B. Miller
Research Assistant Professor
Dept of Geology, Kansas State University
Manhattan, KS 66506-3201
785-532-2250
http://www-personal.ksu.edu/~kbmill/
Received on Wed Jan 18 21:38:23 2006