Pim,
*Teaching ID as a philosophy while pushing a particular religious
claim surely seems to violate the establishment clause.
One cannot circumvent the establishment clause by merely calling
something philosophy.*
We agree on something! You are right, I think, and this relates to what I
was saying about the Dover case. Under the establishment
clause jurisprudence's focus on legislative intent and public perception, it
doesn't matter what we call something or what field of inquiry it falls
into. Whether it's "science," "philosophy," "literature," or whatever, if
the legislative intent is to promote a particular religious view, there will
be an establishment clause problem. The California court doesn't need to
decide whether ID should be demarcated by philosophers as "philosophy" any
more than the Pennsylvania court needed to decide whether it should be
demarcated by scientists as "science." I think Ted's broader point is
right, if I'm understanding him correctly: there is a serious problem with
how we do public education, and how we apply the establishment clause, if
there's going to be federal litigation sniffing around for "religious
intent" every time metaphysical naturalism is questioned in any sort of high
school class.
On 1/11/06, Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> Ted Davis wrote:
>
> >>>><drsyme@cablespeed.com> 01/10/06 11:59 AM >>>asks:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >
> >
> >What if the Dover school board had wanted to get ID into
> >the public schools, by proposing that ID be taught in
> >philosophy classes instead of science classes? Assuming
> >the motivations otherwise were the same, would ID in
> >philosophy classes violate the establishment clause?
> >
> >***
> >
> >Ted replies:
> >
> >This issue was directly address last spring at a public symposium nearby.
> >The speaker was the lead plaintiff attorney from the ACLU, and his
> opinion
> >is as follows: ID can be discussed in philosophy or religion classes, as
> far
> >as the ACLU is concerned; in those classes, other philosophical and
> >religious perspectives can also be discussed. Thus, the ACLU opposes
> only
> >ID in science classes.
> >
> >This IMO is highly ironic: it's OK to discuss ID in class, as long as it
> >isn't the class whose subject is most closely related to the issues
> >contested by advocates of ID.
> >
> >
>
> Why should one allow a discussion of ID in a class which is about
> science ? And remember even in philosophy classes it must still not
> violate the establishment clause. But at least, unlike in a science
> class, it can be claimed to have a primary secular purpuse which is
> neither a sham nor insincere.
>
> >His opinion is part of the basis for my opinion, namely that ID is a
> >legitimate topic in secular journals and books devoted to philosophy of
> >science; and philosophy of science can be discussed in science classes.
> >This is where Judge Jones went wrong and ruled too broadly, BUT NEITHER
> THE
> >DEFENSE NOR THE PROSECUTION made this point, so he can't be blamed for
> >this.
> >
> >Furthermore, Ed Larson agrees with me--at least he agreed with me as the
> >trial was still on, before Jones' ruling. (I don't know what he thinks
> >right now, after the ruling.) And, which is a great surprise to many no
> >doubt, Eugenie Scott of NCSE also conceded to me one day in the court
> >gallery that a science teacher can discuss ID in class, as long as they
> have
> >a clear secular purpose for doing so. Thus the Dover ruling might go
> beyond
> >even what Eugenie Scott thinks.
> >
> >
> Again, remember that the ruling says 'require'.... In other words, a
> teacher may still discuss ID in a science class, as long as he does not
> violate the establishment clause but the board may not require the
> teacher to do so.
>
> David
>
> > And yet, as Janice just reported, a California school board apparently
> > was just sued by a group of parents backed by Americans United for
> > Separation of Church and State for doing this very thing -- a case
> > that Pim has indicated he and other Panda's Thumbers support. Who
> > knows how that case will turn out, but when you have establishment
> > clause jurisprudence that focuses on mushy things like "intent" and
> > "perception," this is what you get.
>
> When Edwards v Aguillard proposed that it would be ok to teach
> scientific alternatives, the creationists moved quickly to create 'ID'
> to match this description. The judge however saw this as insincere and a
> sham. Teaching ID as a philosophy while pushing a particular religious
> claim surely seems to violate the establishment clause.
> One cannot circumvent the establishment clause by merely calling
> something philosophy. Read the syllabi involved.
>
> >Ted's point:
> >Yes, Pim, *in Dover* the claimed purpose was indeed "a sham," and that's
> a
> >shame b/c ipso facto it's a miserable test case for the legitimate
> >discussion of philosophical aspects of and problems with
> evolution. That's
> >why TDI ran a mile away from the case.
> >
> >
> There are some 'problems' with evolution but few if any that cause
> imminent harm to theory of evolution. The case for common descent is all
> but a fact, the recent work on genetics has all but confirmed
> evolutionary theory. While there surely is a disagreement on mechanisms,
> and their relative importance, evolutionary theory is well founded in
> fact.
>
> >But it would not be a sham, if (e.g.) I were teaching high school physics
> >again (as I did a quarter century ago) and I wanted to talk about the
> "fine
> >tuning" of the universe, in the context of talking about the big bang
> (which
> >some high school teachers do). Nor would it be a sham to discuss the
> issue
> >of Scientific American from a couple of years back, in which they
> proclaimed
> >rather ambitiously and unobjectively on the cover that the multiverse
> >hypothesis was well established--and then to criticise this from the
> design
> >perspective, since many physicists and cosmologists themselves take that
> >view (e.g., George Ellis, John Polkinghorne, Alan Sandage, and ASAers
> >Jennifer Wiseman, Owen Gingerich, Deb Haarsma, and Joan Centrella).
> >
> >
> Criticizing something from a design perspective? Such as 'God would
> never do this'? It's hardly a sham to mention the concept of fine tuning
> but the conclusions that this is 'evidence for design' just misses the
> point.
>
> >That would be a perfectly legitimate secular intellectual enterprise, but
> >since an emphasis on "fine tuning" is part of ID (a part, admittedly,
> that
> >the many creationist supporters of ID want to forget about b/c it
> requires
> >one to assume the general validity of the big bang), Judge Jones says
> that's
> >now out of bounds.
> >
> >
>
> Really?... And you do remember that all Jones ruled is that the board
> cannot require the teaching of ID. I think you are protesting too much
> here because I doubt that your argument passes muster when compared to
> Judge Jones' ruling.
>
> >The trial is just one more piece of evidence, to me, that our current
> >notion of what counts as public education in this nation is part of the
> >problem, not part of the solution.
> >
> The trial shows that local school boards cannot get away with teaching a
> scientifically vacuous idea as a scientific theory.
>
Received on Wed Jan 11 12:55:38 2006
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Jan 11 2006 - 12:55:38 EST