Perhaps my post was not clear enough. If I indicate that I believe in a Creator and such a supposition is pronounced as a religious belief or statement, then the contrary supposition is also a religious belief or statement. It is the opponents of religions that determine what a religious statement is, not necessarily the proponents. I truly believe that those who label as a religion the consideration of intelligence behind the whole of Creation cannot advocate the opposite since that would clearly constitute a religion as well. The negation that there is intelligence behind creation is a religious statement. Of course, one can always consider theories of the physical aspect of the universe without invoking a Creator. Clearly, such theories are descriptive and have no ontological power neither to truly explain that which exists nor answer fundamental questions of origins.
Moorad
From: David Opderbeck
Sent: Mon 1/9/2006 1:14 PM
To: Alexanian, Moorad
Cc: Pim van Meurs; Dawsonzhu@aol.com; asa@calvin.edu
Subject: Re: Judge Jones sided with the Discovery Institute and ruled against the Dove...
Not as the law now views it. Nor, I would suggest, as society, tradition, culture, and traditional religion have viewed it. I also don't think your logic holds. Why does the negation of A=A? A statement about a religion is not necessarily a "religious" statement. If my religion taught that the Earth were only 6,000 years old, and science refuted my religious belief, would the statement that the Earth is billions of years old then be a "religious" statement? Under your logic, since the traditional religions make statements that embrace all of life, every statement made about anything from any perspective would be "religious," rendering the term "religious" meaningless.
On 1/9/06, Alexanian, Moorad <alexanian@uncw.edu> wrote:
If the affirmation of A indicates a religion belief, then certainly the negation of A, viz. not-A, must also be defined as a religion. For instance, if my supposing that there is "meaning of life" indicates my belief in a religion, would not the contrary supposition qualify also as a religion?
Moorad
From: David Opderbeck
Sent: Mon 1/9/2006 12:20 PM
To: Pim van Meurs
Cc: Dawsonzhu@aol.com; asa@calvin.edu
Subject: Re: Judge Jones sided with the Discovery Institute and ruled against the Dove...
I think what we're bumping up against here is the limitations of the establishment clause. The short answer is no, I don't think most courts would not bar the teaching of evolution under the establishment clause even if it could be shown that a school board's motivations were primarily to promote atheism. This isn't because atheism or materialism are "scientific." It's because they don't possess the traditional indicia of a "religion." Here, for example, is how the Third Circuit has defined a "religion" for first amendment purposes, in Judge Adams' influential concurring opinion in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3rd Cir. 1979) (a case, incidentally, that was argued by one of my former partners). Religions:
1) ponder such issues as the meaning of life, the afterlife, or man's place in the universe;
2) are extensive in scope and far-reaching in nature; and
3) are accompanied by the existence of certain formal and outside signs.
Other courts have expanded on these factors. For example, in United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit determined that the defendant, self-described "Reverend of the Curch of Marijuana," could not escape conviction on drug charges under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court mentioned the following factors concerning whether something is a "religion" for first amendment purposes (this is a long section to be quoting, but worth it for our present discussion):
"1. Ultimate Ideas: Religious beliefs often address fundamental questions about life, purpose, and death. As one court has put it, "a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters." Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032. These matters may include existential matters, such as man's sense of being; teleological matters, such as man's purpose in life; and cosmological matters, such as man's place in the universe.
2. Metaphysical Beliefs: Religious beliefs often are "metaphysical," that is, they address a reality which transcends the physical and immediately apparent world. Adherents to many religions believe that there is another dimension, place, mode, or temporality, and they often believe that these places are inhabited by spirits, souls, forces, deities, and other sorts of inchoate or intangible entities.
3. Moral or Ethical System: Religious beliefs often prescribe a particular manner of acting, or way of life, that is "moral" or "ethical." In other words, these beliefs often describe certain acts in normative terms, such as "right and wrong," "good and evil," or "just and unjust." The beliefs then proscribe those acts that are "wrong," "evil," or "unjust." A moral or ethical belief structure also may create duties-duties often imposed by some higher power, force, or spirit-that require the believer to abnegate elemental self-interest.
4. Comprehensiveness of Beliefs: Another hallmark of "religious" ideas is that they are comprehensive. More often than not, such beliefs provide a telos, an overreaching array of beliefs that coalesce to provide the believer with answers to many, if not most, of the problems and concerns that confront humans. In other words, religious beliefs generally are not confined to one question or a single teaching. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1035.
5. Accoutrements of Religion: By analogy to many of the established or recognized religions, the presence of the following external signs may indicate that a particular set of beliefs is "religious":
a. Founder, Prophet, or Teacher: Many religions have been wholly founded or significantly influenced by a deity, teacher, seer, or prophet who is considered to be divine, enlightened, gifted, or blessed.
b. Important Writings: Most religions embrace seminal, elemental, fundamental, or sacred writings. These writing often include creeds, tenets, precepts, parables, commandments, prayers, scriptures, catechisms, chants, rites, or mantras.
c. Gathering Places: Many religions designate particular structures or places as sacred, holy, or significant. These sites often serve as gathering places for believers. They include physical structures, such as churches, mosques, temples, pyramids, synagogues, or shrines; and natural places, such as springs, rivers, forests, plains, or mountains.
d. Keepers of Knowledge: Most religions have clergy, ministers, priests, reverends, monks, shamans, teachers, or sages. By virtue of their enlightenment, experience, education, or training, these people are keepers and purveyors of religious knowledge.
e. Ceremonies and Rituals: Most religions include some form of ceremony, ritual, liturgy, sacrament, or protocol. These acts, statements, and movements are prescribed by the religion and are imbued with transcendent significance.
f. Structure or Organization: Many religions have a congregation or group of believers who are led, supervised, or counseled by a hierarchy of teachers, clergy, sages, priests, etc.
g. Holidays: As is etymologically evident, many religions celebrate, observe, or mark "holy," sacred, or important days, weeks, or months.
h. Diet or Fasting: Religions often prescribe or prohibit the eating of certain foods and the drinking of certain liquids on particular days or during particular times.
i. Appearance and Clothing: Some religions prescribe the manner in which believers should maintain their physical appearance,*1484 and other religions prescribe the type of clothing that believers should wear.
j. Propagation: Most religious groups, thinking that they have something worthwhile or essential to offer non-believers, attempt to propagate their views and persuade others of their correctness. This is sometimes called "mission work," "witnessing," "converting," or proselytizing." Id. at 1483-84 [End of long quotation]
I'd acknowledge (as I did before) that the law is a bit fuzzy at the margins here. The Supreme Court has recognized that the freedom not to believe in a religion is protected under the first amendment, leading some lower courts to conclude that the "practice" of atheism is protected under the first amendment's free exercise clause and cannot be disadvantaged under the establishment clause. Thus, in the Seventh Circuit, prisoners who want to attend atheist society meetings must be given the same accomodation as prisoners who want to attend traditional religious services. However, when the Court applies the establishment clause to prohibit an affirmative practice by a state, it is usually to forbid the promotion of traditional religious beliefs and practices. That said, it is possible that a court could read the Supreme Court precedents to conclude that a science curriculum designed with the specific and demonstrable intent of promoting atheism fails under Lemon's purpose prong. Possible, but not likely in most circuits
One could argue that this understanding of "religion" makes no sense. Why should atheist and secular materialist ideology be favored over religious ideology such as Christianity? That question, in fact, is at the deep core of our social disputes over things like whether ID should be taught in science classrooms. Religious people can point out, taking a cue from Ruse, that some aspects of science often are taught in ways that are not ideology-neutral. Religious people reasonably, I think, ask why it's acceptable to teach foundational assumptions that exclude a creator when those assumptions are as much a matter of faith as the foundational assumption that there is a creator.
The response of most scientists seems to be that anything based on the foundational assumption of a creator is not "science" because "science," by definition, excludes reference to a creator. That may be a valid statement, though personally I don't think it is, unless the definition of "science" is a tautology devoid of historical meaning. But it is not in any event relevant to the establishment clause question given how the establishment clause law has developed.
Under a definition of "science" that excludes the foundational assumption of a creator, iIf something is "science," then, it probably is not "religion," and may safely be taught in public schools, even if the purpose of the teaching is to promote atheism. It does not follow, however, that anything defined as "not science" is "religion," which is the assumption Pim seems to want to make. English literature is not science under this definition. Neither is art, music, history, gym class, or just about any other traditional high school subject other than biology, chemistry, physics and math. None of those subjects are barred under the establishment clause. It follows that defining ID as "not science" fails to advance the ball under any establishment clause test.
Pim will argue that defining ID as "not science" is essential because it shows the board's purported secular purpose -- to enhance science education -- to be a sham. This, however, also does not follow. A school board could include a course in its curriculum, for example, called "Literary and Philosophical Perspectives on Science." The course could include readings from literature warning about overreaching in science -- say, Michael Crichton's "Jurassic Park," or the movie "Blade Runner" -- as well as secular cultural, philosophical and historical perspectives on the epistemological limitations of the scientific method, including some exposure to postmodern views of science. A valid secular purpose of this course could be to enhance the school's science curriculum by exposing science students to these critiques of science. I don't think anyone would call this "Perspectives" course "science." The course as I've described it, however, wouldn't have even the whiff of an establishment clause problem.
What showed the Dover board's purpose to be a sham was not the bucket into which we ultimately dump ID -- "science" or "not science" -- it is the history of the board's actions, which showed a deliberate effort to introduce specific teachings about the doctrine of creation drawn from a recognized religion, Christianity. Maybe this demonstrates that our establishment clause jurisprudence is a mess. Does this have any connection to what the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution meant by the government establishing religion? Are fuzzy concepts like "motive" and "public perception" good tools for deciding such difficult questions? Should atheism be recognized as something like a religion for purposes of the free exercise clause while being skated over under the establishment clause? Mabye not, but the law is what it is.
On 1/8/06, Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Dawsonzhu@aol.com wrote:
>
> > Pim wrote:
> >
> >> So far I have yet to see my hypothetical example addressed such as
> >> teaching evolution as a religion. As the hypothetical examples have
> >> shown, the existence of a legitimate secular purpose is highly relevant.
> >
> >
> >
> > But there are no buildings and no doctrines as such in the traditional
> > sense. That evolution __can be__ a religion, is certainly the argument
> > that Ruse points out, and for __some__ people, it clearly sticks. But
> > that's
> > just it, it is individual people; and I doubt they are present in most
> > any K-12
> > schools where this whole issue is raised. Individuals can be
> > disciplined on
> > other grounds. But I say this with much fear and trembling, because,
> > unfortunately, justice is rarely even handed in this world.
> >
> > by Grace we proceed,
> > Wayne
>
> What if the reasons for teaching evolution is its anti-Christian and
> pro-atheistic character? Would that help? Would this render the secular
> primary purpose of teaching evolution, namely as a science, moot and
> would the court have to rule that the purposes of the board violated the
> establishment clause?
>
> Pim
>
Received on Mon Jan 9 14:04:34 2006
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