Re: Fwd: Judge Jones sided with the Discovery Institute and ruled against the Dove...

I'm having trouble with this hypo, Pim, because I don't see how such an
argument could be raised. Imagine a different hypo: researchers find a
strong link between prayer and performance on standardized tests. The
results of this research are published in a prestigious peer reviewed
journal, and are confirmed by a number of peer reviewed follow-up studies.
Some studies suggest that prayer causes biochemical changes in the brain
that stimulate comprehension and problem-solving acuity. (Remember this is
a hypo -- I doubt such studies actually exist, but then again, who knows.)

A local school board, anxious to improve test scores in the district, adopts
a mandatory prayer policy before the state competency exams are given. The
school board plans to keep careful records of student performance, which
will be made available to researchers who are conducting additional studies
concerning the linkage between prayer and standardized tests.

Several parents object, and sue the school board under the establishment
clause. The school board responds that what it is doing is "science." Does
it matter to the establishment clause analysis that, under Kitzmiller's
criteria for "science," the school board's position that it is doing
"science" is credible? I don't think so. At the end of the day, putting
the policy into the bucket of "science" or "not science" is irrelevant.
What matters under the endorsement test is how the public percieves what the
school board is doing, and whether the school board's motivations were to
endorse a religious viewpoint.

Part of the problem here is that I think you view "science" and "religion"
as opposite poles: if science, then not religion. I don't think it's that
simple under the establishment clause. The establishment clause
jurisprudence asks for assessment of public perception and personal motives,
which can't be boiled down to such a simple proposition.

On 1/3/06, Pim van Meurs <pimvanmeurs@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> David Opderbeck wrote:
>
> > Pim, just because the Judge said it was "essential" doesn't mean it
> > really was "essential" or even that he really thought it was
> > "essential." There are at least two options: (1) he was mistaken; or
> > (2) he was trying to justify doing something that wasn't really
> > necessary to the case. Option (1) is certainly possible, and it
> > happens all the time. No trial judge is infallible; that's why we
> > have multiple layers of appeals courts. But I rather think some
> > aspect of option (2) is operative here as well.
>
> Let's look at the Kitzmiller case and replace ID policy with evolution
> policy. In other words, the board made the same religious statements,
> the only difference is that the policy required evolution to be taught.
> Would the court have rejected the policy merely based on the effect even
> if the primary purpose of teaching evolution is not a sham although it
> may have perceived religious implications?
> That's why I see that ruling on ID being science is essential.
>
Received on Tue Jan 3 16:49:31 2006