David Opderbeck wrote:
> I wish I had more time to write about this today, but here, in a
> nutshell, is why /Daubert/ is a red herring. As Pim correctly notes,
> the /Daubert/ Court adopted some principles that are similar to those
> used by Judge Jones in reviewing whether ID is "science." However,
> the question the /Daubert/ court was addressing was was a pragmatic
> one: in the limited and somewhat artificial context of a court
> proceeding, what sorts of evidence can qualify as "expert" testimony
> under the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE").
And the same rules which guide the judge to rule if a particular expert
testimony would meet the scientific standards would apply equally well
in establishing if a particular thesis, in this case ID, meets the same
scientific standards. In both cases, the judge rules on whether
something is science.
> Under the FRE, expert testimony is not subject to some of the
> restrictions that are imposed on lay fact evidence. Expert testimony,
> for example, can rely on and summarize other information in ways that
> would be considered hearsay for a lay witness. The jurisprudence
> concerning expert testimony also recognizes that expert witnesses
> often are accorded great weight by juries. Therefore, courts
> interpret the FRE carefully to limit the sorts of evidence that can
> qualify as "expert" testimony.
>
There are of course other reasons why expert testimony may be restricted
but Daubert lays the groundwork for 'scientific'.
> Judge Jones was not animated by any of these limited concerns, nor are
> they the concerns of any sort of case under the first amendment.
> /Daubert/ seeks to streamline the judicial process by limiting the
> sorts of evidence that can be presented in a given trial.
By allowing a judge to determine if something is science. What
difference is there between a Daubert hearing and a judge ruling that ID
is not science, other than that ID being science or not was not relevant
in the expert testimony phase as this was actually part of the dispute?
> A decision about the admissibilty of expert evidence after a /Daubert/
> hearing has only a limited impact on broader debate in the public
> square. Generally, a /Daubert/ ruling is limited to a particular trial
> or a particular set of related trials.
As is Judge Jones' decision.
> The result of Judge Jones' decision, or any decision under the
> establishment clause, in contrast, is to restrict what can be
> discussed in the broader public square. In this regard, the Supreme
> Court's recognition that "a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter
> how flexible, inevitably on occasion will preent the jury from
> learning authentic insights and innovations." This may be acceptable
> in a given trial because trials are limited proceedings that have to
> come to an end. It's not acceptable, in my view, in the broader
> context of public debate.
Nothing prevents ID from impressing the scientific community resulting
in a re-evaluation of its claims. But as presently stands, ID is
considered to be scientifically vacuous by the scientific community and
fails to meet the standards of scientific methodology as laid out, in
part, in the Daubert ruling. Yes, the Daubert ruling is more extensive
than just deciding if something is or is not science, it deals with the
impact of expert witness testimony on the jury.
My argument is that in Daubert the SC provides guidelines to determine
if a particular issue is scientific or not. These are exactly the
guidelines Judge Jones followed in ruling that ID is not science. In
other words, the same evidence which would let a judge conclude that
expert witness testimony arguing ID would not be scientific led to the
same conclusion that ID is not scientific.
I know that we disagree on whether or not the Judge had to rule on the
scientific nature of ID but if, as the Judge argues, such a ruling is
essential then applying the same rules which would allow a judge to rule
on whether or not something is scientific under Daubert seem appropriate.
Ironically, John Calvert, lawyer and ID activist argues
/*In Daubert v. Merrill Dow Corporation, Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993) the Supreme Court squarely addressed the question of
what is "science." In Daubert, Merrill Dow was being sued by two
children with serious birth defects alleged to be caused by
Benedectin, a drug marketed by Merrill Dow. Merrill Dow produced
expert testimony based on a review of extensive scientific
literature on the subject that the drug could not have caused the
birth defects. The attorney for the children submitted the testimony
of eight other well-credentialed experts, who based their conclusion
that Benedectin can cause birth defects on animal studies, chemical
structure analyses, and the unpublished "reanalysis" of previously
published human statistical studies. However, the lower court ruled
that the evidence was not admissible because the evidence did not
meet the applicable "general acceptance" standard for the admission
of expert testimony. It then dismissed the case and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, citing Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47,
293 F. 1013, 1014, for the rule that expert opinion based on a
scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is
"generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific
community.* /
*/ The Supreme Court overruled both courts and sent the case back
to the trial court for reconsideration of the evidence presented by
the children. In doing so it provided an extensive analysis of how
courts should determine whether a proposed scientific view is one
that should be heard by a trier of fact. Although Daubert strictly
deals with the evidentiary requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure relating to the admissibility of expert testimony,
the principles it announced are consistent with the issue of whether
inferences of design from data that occurs in nature are "scientific."
/
*
*http://www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org/idISsCIJHC.htm
*
Received on Mon Jan 2 13:14:17 2006
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