Re: impassibility

George,
I grant that you are alert to dealing with infinite time, but it is time,
part of space-time. You are imposing that time, the kind of existence you
can imagine, on the Being who cannot be imagined except at he revealed
himself. Yes, the divine suffered because the divine entered time as a
unity. But I do not believe that the Father entered time or that the
Spirit entered time when the Son became incarnate.

I note that your hermeneutics does not require that the first chapters of
Genesis be understood literally, but that they communicated God's power
in language that the ancients could understand. I apply that same
approach to the passages of divine change which you want to take
literally. If the hermeneutics is acceptable in the one case, it is
equally so in the other. This does not need a change of philosophy. But
you want to restrict my philosophy to what you can imagine, which is time
everywhere.

Yes, one can attempt to develop different notions of time for different
entities, but the result is the same difference, not a different
difference. The problem as I see it is that you cannot imagine the Father
not being affected specifically at the moment of the crucifixion, even
though you argue that the eternal divine purpose involves the pains and
extinctions of evolution. So you argue for the staurocentric long term
but insist that it must be momentary I see timeless stautocentricity
with the Father because he is eternal.
Dave

On Sat, 3 Dec 2005 09:07:42 -0500 "George Murphy" <gmurphy@raex.com>
writes:

Dave - It seems to me that to some extent we're talking past one another
here.

1st, of course Jews & Muslims criticize the idea of divine Incarnation.
While we need to be aware of that in presenting the gospel to them, how
is that relevant to discussion among Christians who believe that the Word
was made flesh?

2d, of course you're right that it's hard for us to get a grip on the
idea of a-temporal (or, I would rather say, trans-temporal) experience.
But for myself I have to add that much of my work in science has been
with relativity, & I'm comfortable working with space-time diagrams which
give one a sense of viewing the world from t = -infinity to t = +infinity
at a glance, and thus provide a analogy to a God's-eye view. In
addition, general relativity help one get an idea of more exotic temporal
phenomena, like closed timelike world lines & space & time "trading
places" in black holes &c. So while I'm still a temporal being I - &
other relatvists - have some hints of the kind of experience you're
talking about. In fact, I could argue that the fact that as a temporal
being I can still view a "world" in that way provides an analogy for
divine temporality.

3d, of course the question of how the trinitarian persons are related is
important but I tried to pose the question as much as possible in
classical terms in which that relation is described, in part, by saying
that they are "individual substances" of a common divine nature. My
argument is this:

    a. If it is correct to say that the person (of the Son) suffers then
we should also say that the nature of which that is an individual
substance suffers. This is what classical theology DOESN'T say because
of its assumption of the impssibility of the divine nature, & is the
point at which you can, if you wish, dissent. But it seems to me that
saying that the suffering of the human nature is communicated to the
divine person but not to the divine nature which that person instantiates
is very strange & reduces the communication to a mode of speaking.

    b. But IF one accepts my claim in a. then the ability of the Father
to suffer follows immediately because the Father and the Son (& Spirit)
have the same nature (are consubstantial).

Of course one can object that "natures" or "substances" are supposed to
be unchanging but that's a limitation of the model. It's precisely the
idea that substantialist metaphysics ought to control the discussion that
gets us into problems.

4th, my view doesn't stem from general principles like divine mercy. The
reason for my view (which again I emphasize is not unique to me, and has
been expressed better & at greater length by others) are, in order of
importance:
    a. The claim that the Son of God suffered & died must be taken with
the fullest seriousness possible.
    b. The overwhelming picture given in scripture is of a God who is
capable of reacting to what happens in the world, being "hurt" by the
world &c, & that the idea that God "eternally reacts" doesn't do justice
to that picture. (E.g., is it really meaningful to talk about "griveing
the Holy Spirit if the Spirit is really grieved unchangingly from before
all time?) & the few biblical passages that speak of God not changing
can be understood quite consistently in terms of the unchanging character
of God, God's faithfulness, &c.
    c. Philosophy has a ministerial & not a magisterial role in
theology. If your philosophy has trouble with the idea that God really
suffered under Pontius Pilate, get a new philosophy.
    d. There is no need to limit the concept of temporality to the time
of the created world.
   
Shalom
George
http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
----- Original Message -----
From: D. F. Siemens, Jr.
To: gmurphy@raex.com
Cc: asa@calvin.edu
Sent: Friday, December 02, 2005 1:56 PM
Subject: Re: impassibility

George,
As I noted earlier, there are those who claim that the Incarnation is
impossible because of the incompatibility of an eternal deity and
temporal humanity. And I am not arguing about algebra, merely noting that
there is a major objection here from both Jew and Muslim.

As for "some temporality appropriate to God," I take the problem to be
that human beings are so totally temporal that they cannot imagine any
existence which is not in some way temporal. But imposing my experience
on the deity is not warranted. Let me suggest an analogy. We anticipate,
thinking of what may happen even though it will not occur. A hunter saves
money to get the license and gun he needs to go hunting months ahead of
time. His dog is essentially restricted to the immediate. There is no
recognition that hunting season opens in 4 days. So how does one restrict
the hunter to the dog's insight? Or make the beast understand the
hunter's anticipation? I submit that there is a far greater distance
between God and man than between man and dog.

You refer to: 'The full statement that I made, which you say you don't
hold, was, "you have the strange result that the divine person suffers
but the divine nature of which that person is one hypostasis doesn't." '
as something I did not respond to. My "I sympathize with your problems,
but I will not give you a resolution until you present a clear
explanation of the communication between the eternal Father and the
incarnate Son, and among the Trinity." is, I believe, the only possible
response. You want an exposition of HOW the Eternal Spirit feels. The
best I can do is deal with what my temporal body feels and the coupled
emotions whose location I cannot prove beyond the fact that neurologists
find associations with brain activity. I can empathize with the
experiences of Jesus while he lived among us, but I can't extrapolate
that to the connection with the experiences of his deity as part of the
hypostatic union. Further, I don't understand the experiences of the
risen Jesus, though I have the promise of being like him. Indeed, Paul
says it's already done despite my lack of experiencing it.

Dealing with theological matters begins with exegesis, on which we can
usually find agreement. But not always. For example, does /anothen/ mean
"again," "from above," or both? Hermeneutics gets us into disagreements
that remain. On top of these are the constructions different persons put
on matters, what seems plausible. I hold that these last have to be
subject to noncontradiction among the consequences wrung out of them.
This last depends in part on the assumptions recognized. I hold that
being Creator and being temporal are contradictory. You hold that not
experiencing the pain of the crucifixion at the time is incompatible with
being a merciful God. I contend that this imposes a human condition on
the entire Trinity which is not totally human. Is this difference logical
or emotional?
Dave

On Fri, 2 Dec 2005 08:40:04 -0500 "George Murphy" <gmurphy@raex.com>
writes:
Dave et al. (belatedly)

1st, what I've been talking about can't realistically be described as "my
problems" as if they were just the personal hangups of George Murphy.
They are issues that have to be faced by anyone who wants to take
seriously that the one who is God Incarnate suffered under Pontius
Pilate.

"A clear explanation of the communication between the eternal Father and
the incarnate Son, and among the Trinity" is of course exactly what
doctrines of the Trinity are supposed to be. Again I would refer to Ted
Peters book for a survey of modern trinitarian theology, & point out that
most attempts to do more than repeat old formulae do recognize that there
is some temporality appropriate to God - a temporality which is not
simply identified with the world's time.

There are difficulties with trinitarian theology connected with the fact
that we're trying to speak of the inner life of God & have only limited
information. But trying to explain how 1 equals 3 isn't a problem. No
serious theologian has ever made such a claim. The doctrine of the
Trinity isn't about algebra.

I don't think you take seriously the possibility - discussed my a number
of the theologians I've referred to - that there is a time appropriate to
God's own life which transcends created time & of which created time is a
subset. I noted, e.g., the possibility of 2 dimensional time, which
would not be simply linear or cyclic. & you don't answer the question I
posed in my 1st paragraph below: Are you talking about some kind of
eternal & timeless suffering of the Father?

Shalom
George
http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
Received on Sat Dec 3 15:23:56 2005