RE: Kansas Closing arguments

From: Alexanian, Moorad <alexanian@uncw.edu>
Date: Thu May 19 2005 - 10:22:37 EDT

We exercise our free will by giving commands to our physical body. I do not believe you can use that sort of "force" to command external, physical objects. You go on and believe in Uri Geller is you like. That is your prerogative. I am not sure what you want me to be brought around to. However, it will take more than the help of Michael to do so. Please do not use you assumptions to refute my assumptions, which mostly likely are on equal footing to yours.

 
Moorad

________________________________

From: D. F. Siemens, Jr. [mailto:dfsiemensjr@juno.com]
Sent: Wed 5/18/2005 2:42 PM
To: Alexanian, Moorad
Cc: kbmill@ksu.edu; asa@calvin.edu
Subject: Re: Kansas Closing arguments

On Wed, 18 May 2005 14:09:14 -0400 "Alexanian, Moorad"
<alexanian@uncw.edu> writes:
> Philosophy of science applies equally to biology and the physical
> sciences. In fact, it is the hope of some to reduce biology to
> physics. I have a qualm with the term "natural causes." Nature is
> made up of physical and nonphysical aspects. For instance, human
> consciousness and rationality are nonphysical. Can the nonphysical
> aspect of nature serve as cause to the physical laws of nature? I do
> not think so.
>
>
>
> Moorad
>
Second sentence is about emergence. I have encountered a defense of this
view both from materialistic and trom theistic sources. I also recall a
denial from a materialist. In other words, it is irrelevant to
establishing a philosophical position.

Your last two sentences apparently represent your dogma. However, I am
not sure how to take the claims. Are you claiming that mental "forces"
cannot cause physical events, or that the mental cannot create the
physical? Ambiguity and over-simplification are great aids to
establishing an "irrefutable" position.

I have to agree with Michael that there is little hope in bringhing you
around. But there is a chance of keeping others from swallowing your
line.
Dave
Received on Thu May 19 10:39:57 2005

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