definition of science

One more offering in this series:

Methodological naturalism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Methodological naturalism (MN) is the philosophical tenet that, within
scientific enquiry, one can only use naturalistic explanation - i.e.
one's
explanations must not presuppose the existence of supernatural forces and

entities. Note that methodological naturalism does not hold that such
entities
or forces do not exist, but merely that one cannot use them in scientific

explanation. Methodological naturalism is often considered to be an
implied
working rule of all scientific research and logically entails neither
philosophical naturalism nor atheism, though some would argue that it
implies
such a connection.

Specifically, the status of methodological naturalism within scientific
enquiry
has been challenged by Phillip E. Johnson, a now-retired professor of law
(at
Boalt Hall at the University of California, Berkeley) who has in a number
of
works (Darwin on Trial, Defeating Darwinism, Objections Sustained, and
The Wedge
of Truth) argued that methodological naturalism is a prop used by the
Darwinian
orthodoxy to ensure the exclusion of evidence for Intelligent Design
Theory on a
priori grounds. Johnson argues that a strong commitment to methodological

naturalism on a priori grounds can blind researchers to the truth just as
easily
as a commitment to a literal reading of Joshua blinded the church to the
evidence for Copernicus's heliocentric theory.

Johnson's position has been rejected by some scholars, like Robert
Pennock who
in his Tower of Babel notes that he often conflates methodological
naturalism
with philosophical naturalism. However, others note that the objection
Pennock
raises ignores the main thrust of Johnson's argument that a
methodological
assumption that excludes the possibility of looking at the evidence for a
theory
inevitably leads to a rejection of that theory.

Though many evolutionary biologists continue to reject Johnson's
argument, it
has been noted that Richard Lewontin who has debated Johnson several
times on
the issue, seems to have adjusted his position to one which is compatible
with
Johnson's view. In a recent review of a book by Carl Sagan, Lewontin
argued that
true science requires a prior commitment to both methodological and
philosophical naturalism:

  Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common
sense is
  the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and
the
  supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of its failure to
fulfill
  many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the
tolerance
  of the scientific community of unsubstantiated just?so stories, because
we
  have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that
the
  methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a
material
  explanation of the phenomenal world, but on the contrary, that we are
forced
  by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of
  investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations,
no
  matter how counterintuitive, no matter how mystifying to the
uninitiated.
  Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine
Foot in
  the door.

In this context it is important to note that Lewontin seems to have
changed his
mind, in order to agree with Johnson's claim that evolutionary theory is
based
on an absolute or philosophical naturalism. However, it is also important
to
note that Lewontin's statement does not amount to a wholesale acceptance
of
Johnson's project, since Johnson is defending the right of the advocates
of
intelligent design theory to have their case evaluated on the merits of
the
current evidence, while Lewontin is claiming that rigorous scientific
methodology requires an absolute commitment to natualism which rules out
such
evidence on a priori grounds. It is also important to note that this
quotation
from Lewontin, which makes its way time and time again into creationist
propaganda, is (1) ambiguous, (2) deliberately inflammatory -- since
Lewontin
was taking issue primarily with what he regarded as Sagan's triumphalism
about
science, and (3) taken from the New York Review of Books, not a
scientific
journal; it is therefore unfair to take it, as it is often taken, as some
kind
of revelation about scientific methodology.

Johnson's attack on MN has wider implications than just for the sciences;
in
Reason in the Balance (199x), he attacked naturalism in law.

Who is a leading defender of MN in the scientific community?

  MN is not usually articulated explicitly; scientists tacitly assume
that
  supernatural forces needn't be taken into account.

Is there any more history to this?

  The term MN itself probably doesn't go much past the 1980s; Johnson
  acknowledges taking it (or "methodological atheism") from Nancey
Murphy, a
  theologian with training in the philosophy of science. Arguably, MN
itself
  goes back to the Ionian pre-Socratic philosophers of the 4th c. BCE;
see,
  e.g., Jonathan Barnes's introduction to Early Greek Philosophy
(Penguin),
  which describes them as subscribing to principles of empirical
investigation
  that strikingly anticipate MN. Benjamin Wiker traces the historical
  development of the modern materialist perspective starting with the
choice of
  the Epicureans to focus exclusively on the natural realm as a necessary
step
  toward their goals; see his book "Moral Darwinism; How We Became
Hedonists".

Burgy
Received on Wed, 4 May 2005 14:51:35 -0600