Re: Whose Burden of Proof?

Steve,

Questions of detailed mechanism aside, what does this actually gain
you? From the point of view of a scientific analysis everything looks
"natural", right?

One of my objections to stating the problem/solution in these terms
is that it suggests that God is only at work in the "quantum
indeterminacies" and in "point mutations". I think that we want to be
saying that it's not that God merely is acting when he wants to
influence things to go in a certain direction. (When you (I) put it
that way it sounds a bit like God-of-the-gaps.) Doesn't the fact that
the creation is utterly dependent on God for it's very being and
properties suggest that there can be no autonomously acting thing or
being. I suppose that one could argue that "quantum indeterminacies"
are nearly ubiquitous so that in everything there is a God action
required. This is much closer to what I want to be saying. But I
still think this gives Creation more autonomy than it should.

Just a reminder to everyone that in such a view of God's action: 1)
God is not the author of sin, 2) Free agents still have free will, 3)
Contingent and necessary causes still operate. And yes, there is some
mystery to how all this works.

TG

>Howard wrote:
>> I'm still baffled by your reference to "natural quantum indeterminacies as
>> the source of intelligent activity."
>
>
>To be clearer, perhaps I should have said "mechanism for" instead of
>"source". The point being that divine action could utilize quantum events
>that fall within the expected range of probabilities but serve some
>intelligent purpose. Robert Russell and others have suggested that point
>mutations could be a place where this occurs. This would be "natural" from
>a methodological naturalism point of view.
>
>
>> I am very familiar with this attempt by Dembski to talk his way out of
>being
>> seen as an advocate of what I call "the hand-like actin of form-imposing
>> intervention." So, does it really make sense to anyone on this list to
>> imagine God sending non-energetic zero-frequency photons into some biotic
>> system to rearrange its base-pairs or proteins?
>
>
>What do you mean by "make sense"?
>
>
>> Unfortunately for ID advocates, it is
>> impossible for them to actually compute the probability whose numerical
>> value is needed to verify whether or not there exist any biotic systems
>that
>> possess the ID-contrived quality named "specified complexity." As I have
>> repeatedly stated, ID has no conclusive scientific case.
>
>
>I think you are right. Whether their premise of intelligent design is right
>or not, I don't see any hope of them making a compelling *scientific* case.
>Beside, as I stated in earlier posts, those who accept the assertion of
>continuous active divine intelligent design should not have the burden of
>proof. Not even considering scripture, the most reasonable inference we
>have comes from our own experience of human designers and that would posit
>that God is also continually active in design. Any rejection of that
>inference would have to address 1) the theological issue why God would let
>chance play such a drastically more prominent role in design than humans do
>and 2) the scientifically intractable issue of ultimate causation.
>
>Your point about <God sending a photon>, however, speaks to the
>reasonableness issue. This is where I think science and theology can work
>together. The metaphysical model that seems to be pervading this issue is a
>dualistic one that puts God "out there" and the world "here" so that God
>must do something like "send a photon". This model, which I think has its
>roots in the early pre-Socratic philosophers, creates a dichotomy between
>matter and God. So much so that Plato had to create a demiurge to deal with
>the material world. This is not, however, the only metaphysical model that
>is amenable to religion in general and Christianity. There seems to be
>today a resurgence of more organic metaphysical models( de Chardin,
>panentheistic emphases in Christianity, feminist theologies, process
>theology, etc) that offer more reasonable options for divine action. I
>think ID's use of the term "unembodied agent" is a big mistake. It buys
>into all the theological and reasonableness problems of a ontological
>dualism. How an organic model might fit better with science is an open
>question. However, with sciences rapidly changing view and description of
>the most fundamental levels of reality, I think it is too early to reject
>carte blanche that there are divine action schemes that are both theology
>sound and fit reasonably within a scientific view.
>
>Steve Petermann

-- 
_________________
Terry M. Gray, Ph.D., Computer Support Scientist
Chemistry Department, Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado  80523
grayt@lamar.colostate.edu  http://www.chm.colostate.edu/~grayt/
phone: 970-491-7003 fax: 970-491-1801