From: Dr. Blake Nelson (bnelson301@yahoo.com)
Date: Sun Oct 19 2003 - 14:31:19 EDT
I think we are mixing up a number of different
concepts here. For brevity, I will hit the high
points:
1) Causation in the law -- proximate cause vs. cause
in fact
Law recognizes differences in types of causation, such
that, policy choices are made about what actions are
culpable depending how far down the causal chain, and
intervening causes that occur.
To simplify there is a difference between proximate
cause -- that is causation that makes one legally
liable -- versus cause in fact (sine qua non) -- the
thing would not have happened but for a particular
action.
Something can be the cause in fact (sine qua non) of
something, but not the *legal* or proximate cause of
something. So, yes, if I invite someone to a park in
the middle of the night to beat them up, and on the
way they are beat up by someone else, I am "but for"
cause of the battery, but not the legal or proximate
cause. This can apply to certain types of killings as
well. So, divine intervention, if you want to call it
that, can result in my being exculpated for something
that I would otherwise by the cause in fact of.
2) Intent and actions.
As I have said before, the same actions coupled with
different intent by the actor have different legal
outcomes. To give one obvious example, depending on
the circumstances of my beating someone to death, I
may be guilty of premeditated murder, non-premeditated
murder, manslaughter or possibly even involuntary
manslaughter depending on my intent when the actions
occurred. Intent is frequently inferred from actions,
but it is not entirely MN in so doing because intent
comes from a variety of data sources and the law
presumes -- except in some circumstances -- that
intention is involved. MN does not presume intention
is involved in natural processes.
3) Stautory law is clearly "designed"
Even in the Anglo-American system where there is a
common law tradition, the vast majority of law that is
applied is designed by legislatures and the content of
the actual law does not necessarily match up well with
ethics or morality, which are different but related
concepts.
So, anytime one wants to know what a law means, one
has to look at, among other things, the intent of the
law as expressed 1) in its language, and if that's
ambiguous, 2) the intent of the people enacting the
law. Of course, one also has to look at how other
courts have viewed the law as well... all these things
are filled with efforts to discern intent in why the
law was passed, what it was intended to do, etc.
This is even more so in code law systems, except
rather than looking at other cases, one looks at
academic treatises on the laws to discern what their
intent is.
4) History of Anglo-American legal concepts
It is hard to talk about anything in modern law as
having evolved in perhaps the moral sense of people
because the Anglo-American system -- and indeed every
modern legal system -- is based on a long-accretion of
historical forces. The law clearly does evolve, but
it evolves due to intentional action based on a
variety of forices -- political, economic, social,
religious, etc. The diversity of non-violent theft
crimes, for example, embezzlement, theft, false
pretenses, came into being due to different economic
forces in society, and the distinctions between them
do not necessarily make sense other than the nature of
property and the need to entrust it to others changed
as economic relationships changed. Now, each of those
crimes are designed. And in some jurisdictions, they
have been amalgamated into one theft crime, again, by
design. So, while the law does evolve, it does so
with some significant degree of intention, albeit
often myopic intention.
--- Cmekve@aol.com wrote:
> In a message dated 10/17/2003 6:47:22 PM Mountain
> Standard Time,
> bnelson301@yahoo.com writes:
>
> > --- Cmekve@aol.com wrote:
> > (SNIP)
> > >It's true that Phil Johnson is not a scientist or
> a
> > >theologian. As we all
> > >know he is a lawyer. It seems to me that the
> > >practice of the law routinely
> > >insists on and uses methodological naturalism
> (MN).
> > >Does the Discovery Institute
> > >have a legal branch that investigates ID in the
> law?
> > > Why not? The answer
> > >seems to be that like most, if not all natural
> > >theologies, they end up creating a
> > >god (Designer) in their own image. Apparently
> > >Feuerbach is alive and living
> > >in Seattle! :-)
> >
> > Ah, but law, unless you are talking about Natural
> Law,
> > which has little role in any actual extant legal
> > system, is thoroughly designed (although it also
> > evolves in a sense), and law studies the designer
> all
> > the time. In Anglo-American legal systems, one
> such
> > study of the designer is referred to as
> legislative
> > intent. ;)
> >
> > The practice of law also goes beyond MN in lots of
> > ways. Lawyers (and judges and juries) infer
> intent
> > from actions all the time. Intent is sort of out
> of
> > the picture in MN, but is integral to many aspects
> of
> > law. The same actions combined with different
> intent
> > can lead to different legal outcomes
>
> I think I see your point, but I'm not sure I
> completely agree. Basic ethical
> positions could well have developed "naturally" as
> part of the evolutionary
> process. I doubt IDers would want to call this
> "designed", as then they would
> have to concede to most of Howard's incisive
> critiques of ID.
>
> Inferring intent is based on evidence and using our
> previous experience, i.e.
> MN. Also, I can't wait to see the results of a
> murder trial in which the
> defense claims that the case is "irreducibly
> complex" and that therefore the
> death is the result of direct divine intervention.
> Therefore the defendent should
> be acquitted.
>
> Karl
> *********************
> Karl V. Evans
> cmekve@aol.com
>
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