From: Ted Davis (tdavis@messiah.edu)
Date: Mon Oct 13 2003 - 19:16:12 EDT
Dick writes:
By your definition, the Piltdown hoax could be an example of an intelligent
intervention in nature. Trying to detect an intelligently produced pattern
is looking for something which is not natural, and that is precisely the
point. Things can come about either through the impersonal acts of nature,
or through the personal acts of an intelligent being. A piece of dried
clay could be the remnant shards of a clay pot, for example. If it has
flowers painted on it we know it didn't happen naturally. But a piece of
dried clay falls into one category or the other. A man produced it, or he
didn't.
Ted: Thus far, we agree.
Dick writes:
We delineate between natural and unnatural or supernatural causes. If we
could detect a specific example where no natural causes will suffice and
only a supernatural intervention could possibly explain something, then we
have verified a miracle. This is not to say that a miracle can or cannot
happen. But if it does happen, it isn't science.
Ted: We partly agree. Genuine science could (IMO) establish the likelihood
that natural causes alone are inadeuquate. Going beyond that would not be
"science" in the modern sense, that is, science as has been practiced since
the mid-19th century. It would have been perfectly good science prior to
that time, and if people want to contest the modern definition of science
(which is after all, simply a convention, not a statement of absolute
truth), that seems fair to me. Truth ought to be the issue, not "science"
per se.
Dick writes: Science involves the search for natural causes. Supernatural
intervention
is simply outside the bounds of science. Dembski wants to create some sort
of hybrid science that permits divine intervention for the things we
haven't been able to explain. If that is his premise, let him call it
something which allows for a little of each.
He could call it "screetch." Natural causes are functioning for awhile
when all of a sudden - screetch - the Creator jumps in and takes a little
coercive action. Between "screetches" we have normal science with only
natural causation. During the "screetch" anything can happen. Then we
could identify "screetchers" without confusing them with normal scientists.
Ted: I don't care what we call it, if an inference to "design" is warranted,
then it's warranted. Again, truth rather than "science" is the issue.
Dick write: And so we counter that with an a priori bias that a mind
sporadically
imposes himself on the progression of life? All religions recognize that a
mind exists. It is only zealous Christians who want to introduce God in
the biology classroom.
Ted: I agree that American Christians seem particularly eager to "introduce
God in the biology classroom," and that we ought strongly to hesitate about
this. But the inference of a mind is not a priori, it's a posteriori.
That's how Newton, Boyle, and many others would have seen it, and rightly so
IMO. It is only when an a priori bias prohibits us from drawing such an
inference, that we are actually prohibited from doing so.
ted
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