From: Steve Petermann (steve@spetermann.org)
Date: Fri Oct 03 2003 - 12:05:03 EDT
Naturalism, What does it Mean?
> > George wrote:
> > >All
> > >that terms like "coercive" or "non-coercive" do is to provide
emotion-laden
> > handles that
> > >are useful for rhetorical purposes. What those who accept MN but
reject ON
> > need to do
> > >is speak about how they believe God does in fact act in the world.
> >
> > I thought terms like "coercive" or "non-coercive" *were* speaking about
<how
> > they believe God does in fact act>. However, while I see your point
about
> > them being emotion-laden I don't see a way around that problem. The
topic of
> > divine action itself is emotion ladened. Personally I prefer the terms
> > "assertive" or "non-assertive". Those aren't quite the same nuance as
the
> > coercive terms but perhaps less emotional.
>
I agree that it isn't possible to choose terms that have no affect, but we
can
still try to find categories that reduce emotional appeal & are more
descriptive.
Besides, "assertive" doesn't say much about how God is supposed to
"assert" - &
similarly for the other terms above.
I have found Barbour's typology of theologies of divine action in _Religion
and
Science_ (and its predecessor _Religion in an Age of Science_) helpful.
The list in the
later edition - classical, deist, neo-Thomist, quantum, Word, kenotic,
linguistic,
embodiment & process provides more detailed statements about how God is or
is not
supposed to act in the world - especially when the brief explanations in
the table on
p.305 are included. (I think it was a mistake for him to drop the
"existentialist"
category from the earlier edition.)
This provides more precise ways of speaking about divine action than words
like
"coercive" &c. E.g., both "kenotic" & process" are in meaningful senses
"non-coercive"
but they are significantly different.
At the same time I think it's a mistake to try to specify "the causal
joint," to
describe in detail how God's action is related to creaturely action. E.g.,
what Barbour
calls the neo-Thomist theology pictures God's action as like that of a
human worker and
a tool. I think that that's a useful model, as far as it goes. But trying
to describe
in detail prcise how God's hand grips the screwdriver, so to speak, is a
category error.
It makes the question of divine action like that of a scientist trying to
work out the
way in which one physical system interacts with another.
Shalom,
George
> > Steve Petermann
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "George Murphy" <gmurphy@raex.com>
> > To: "Steve Petermann" <steve@spetermann.org>
> > Cc: "ASA" <asa@lists.calvin.edu>; "Howard J. Van Till"
> > <hvantill@chartermi.net>
> > Sent: Friday, October 03, 2003 8:32 AM
> > Subject: Re: Naturalism, What does it Mean?
> >
> > > Steve Petermann wrote:
> > > >
> > > > 4) naturalistic theism -- God, yes; coercive supernatural
> > > > > intervention, no.
> > > >
> > > > Seems to me there could also be some distinctions in this one.
> > > >
> > > > Process theology: Divine action is only persuasive(whatever that
means,
> > > > non-assertive?).
> > > >
> > > > Polkinghorne, Peacocke, Russell type divine action that is assertive
but
> > > > embedded in "natural processes."
> > > >
> > > > Anomalous divine action that might not fit within known natural
> > processes
> > > > but is non-violationist because nature is not ontologically
independent
> > with
> > > > intrinsic properties.
> > > >
> > > > BTW, I've read most of Griffins new book _Reenchantment without
> > > > Supernaturalism_ and I still can't find his science based mechanism
for
> > > > concrescence. That is so fundamental for process theology and since
it
> > > > claims to be science friendly, I think it should be make explicit.
Also
> > > > since his approach affirms efficient causation, I don't see how he
can
> > also
> > > > affirm human freedom or divine persuasion unless he also appeals to
> > quantum
> > > > indeterminacies.
> > >
> > > I repeat my earlier point: There is a basic distinction between
belief
> > that
> > > there is or is not a deity who acts in the world (MN & ON [ontological
> > naturalism]), but
> > > little is to be gained by dividing MN into various sub-categories of
> > naturalism. All
> > > that terms like "coercive" or "non-coercive" do is to provide
> > emotion-laden handles that
> > > are useful for rhetorical purposes. What those who accept MN but
reject
> > ON need to do
> > > is speak about how they believe God does in fact act in the world.
> > >
> > > Shalom,
> > > George
> > >
> > > George L. Murphy
> > > gmurphy@raex.com
> > > http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
> > >
>
> --
> George L. Murphy
> gmurphy@raex.com
> http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
>
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