From: George Murphy (gmurphy@raex.com)
Date: Mon Jul 21 2003 - 15:51:57 EDT
Josh Bembenek wrote:
> The problem here with ID is that it doesn't offer
> any mechanism to explain those things &, to the extent that it rejects
> methodological naturalism, _can't_ offer a mechanism. The Intelligent
> Designer is supposed to introduce complex specified information &/or
> irreducible complexity directly, without any mechanism - i.e., without
> secondary causation. A person is, of course, free to make that claim. But
> besides the fact that it violates a /de facto/ guideline of scientific
> procedure, methodological naturalism, it gets one into a rather problematic
> theological position.
>
> -This is dangerously close to rehashing the discussion presented in the June
> 2003 PSCF. I will *humbly : ) * defer to the well written response
> contained on p102-103 by Angus J. L. Menuge. For reference, the preliminary
> summary says “He argues that (1) Intelligent Design makes a premature appeal
> to divine causes and that (2) this appeal is redundant in science. In
> response to his first argument, I argue that Thornson attributes to ID an
> assumption about divine agency which it need not hold.".........................
I don't think we're "in danger" of "rehashing" here because this is an extremely
important part of the debate about ID which deserves considerable intention, and one
which ID proponents continue to treat with less than full candor. When operating in the
secular arena they say that the Designer isn't necessarily supernatural, but when
presenting ID arguments in the context of the whole "wedge" project it's clear that the
Designer _can't_ operate through natural processes.
It's true that ID in the abstract wouldn't have to deny secondary causation in
bringing about design, but the real ID movement does. & if it admits that CSI &c could
have been accomplished through natural process then it's surrendered to methodological
naturalism.
Shalom,
George
George L. Murphy
gmurphy@raex.com
http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
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