From: Jim Armstrong (jarmstro@qwest.net)
Date: Wed Jul 09 2003 - 20:06:04 EDT
I like the general line of thought here. I don't cotton to the MWH in
part because it fails to negotiate Occam's razor.
I think one ought to think real hard about why creation does not consist
of just our Sun, our Earth, and perhaps our moon (or some other larger
or smaller rather minimal ensemble of "components"). If everything is
finely tuned enough, everything we count to be of value - and perhaps
feel to be the end objective of creation - could presumeably have been
created/evolved right here in just this subset of the extant universe.
Do we really need all those other stars, galaxies, and other enigmatic
denizens of the space beyond our solar system if the course of creation
is simply the implementation of a combinatorial recipe?
I am still persuaded that the basic design of creation and its fine
tuning have to do with creating the possibility of something of divine
intent happening over the course of time, and that the size of the
universe has to do multiplying the opportunity sufficiently to ensure
that it will/did happen. It doesn't have to be an infinite multiplier
either because there are forces and rules in play that significantly
shape what happens along the way in a system as complex as ours.
There is a sufficient sense of multiple-ness in this for me. I don't
need more complicated and speculative MWH's and such when our one
universe is as astonishingly pregnant with potential as it appears to be.
Jim Armstrong
Iain Strachan wrote:
>Richard wrote:
>
>
>
>>There is another aspect to consider. Atheists use the many-universes
>>theory to defeat fine-tuning arguments. If every possible
>>configuration is not merely possible but necessary, then there is no
>>need to account for the fine-tuning of our universe that allows for
>>life to exist. Indeed, there is no need to account for anything at
>>all since everything is guaranteed to be found somewhere in one of
>>the many universes. It seems to be an atheist philosophers cosmic
>>dream that would greatly aid them in their attempt to diminish God to
>>absolutely nothing.
>>
>>
>>
>
>Jumping late in on this interesting thread (my physics is a bit rusty to
>comment in detail), it seems to me that the MWI not only diminishes God, but
>also science as well. One should take note how easily it sidesteps the
>entire evolution/creation/ID debate. So what if natural selection isn't a
>powerful enough process to design us? Mutations are (ultimately) down to
>quantum events that have many possible outcomes. If we stick to one
>universe, then the theories we have ought to be a model of the most probable
>of all possible worlds. But if every single alternative universe exists
>that arose from every single possible outcome of every quantum event that
>ever occurred, then it doesn't matter if life is vanishingly unlikely to
>have occurred. Because the right sequence of mutations must have occurred
>in some universe for life to assemble itself without the aid of Natural
>Selection. In one of the many sets of outcomes of quantum events, a complex
>and highly specific protein for performing some useful function can
>accumulate over a vast number of mutation events, without any gradual
>advantage until the end. The "irreducibly complex" object can and will
>assemble itself because all possible outcomes happen in some universe.
>Therefore it might well have happened in ours because (anthropic principle),
>we are here asking the question. So we don't need to evoke Natural
>Selection as the designer; we could simply appeal to the
>Many-Worlds-Interpretation-Of-The-Gaps.
>
>That may be a silly argument to appeal to the MWI to explain the complexity
>of life issue, but I think it's no different than evoking multiverses to
>explain away the fine tuning. What we are saying is that we are born in one
>of the _less_ probable universes; the one in the tails of the distribution
>of the parameters, instead of in the middle where nothing interesting
>happens. But I think most scientists would prefer an elegant explanation
>rather than appealing to a fluke.
>
>But I may be wrong here. What do others think? Maybe you feel it's a great
>privilege being in an incredibly unlikely universe? But then you wouldn't
>"be" at all in a very likely one.
>
>Iain.
>
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