Re: Predeterminism and parallel universes

From: Howard J. Van Till (hvantill@chartermi.net)
Date: Wed Jul 02 2003 - 13:09:53 EDT

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    Glenn,

    Thanks for opening up a topic related to the purpose of the ASA's existence.
    I have not read Max Tegmark's essay, but here are a few brief responses to
    your summary & questions.

     snip, snip,....

    > Thus, if our universe is duplicated, it means that there is another you and
    > another me out there in a galaxy far far away.
    >
    > The universe doesn't have to be infinite for this to occur. It can be quite
    > finite, just extremely large. Thus one doesn't have to grant infinite power
    > or extent to the created universe. And this brings us to the theological
    > issue.
    >
    > How would God be able to predetermine events in a universe based upon
    > quantum [phenomena]?

    I would be most surprised to discover that God (or The Sacred, if you
    prefer) :) would desire this sort of predetermination. If predetermination
    eliminates surprise and the adventure that accompanies it, why would God not
    lose interest in it?

    > As far as one can tell there are no hidden variables i.e. no
    > underlying rules which govern quantum events. They appear to be chance
    > related, unpredictable.
    >
    > But if, the universe was rigged so that every possible permutation occurred,
    > then the universe is entirely predictable. Only the location in the greater
    > universe of a particular Hubble arrangement isn't predictable.

    Question: Does "every possible permutation of matter distribution within a
    Hubble volume" also include "every possible history within that Hubble
    volume"? According to Tegmark, would the history of a particular Hubble
    volume be as determined as the matter distribution within in it at some
    instant?

    > This is something most Christians probably won't like because it is a
    > trivial predeterminism, unless one considers that creating a universe that
    > big can't possibly be trivial. One thing I like about this view is that it
    > doesn't have to depend upon Hugh Everett's many world's hypothesis solution
    > to the collapse wave function.
    >
    > Theologically, the objection, I suspect will be that it diminishes God.
    > Does it?
    >
    Why would it? Are you thinking that the predetermination of all things looks
    too easy, almost unavoidable?

    Howard Van Till

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