Re: Distal vs. proximate

From: Howard J. Van Till (hvantill@novagate.com)
Date: Thu May 10 2001 - 10:34:09 EDT

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    Bob,

    I think we have both made our differing positions clear by now, so I will
    make only a few limited comments and let the discussion come to a congenial
    close.

    > Why do you fail to see that I am advocating a differential analysis approach
    > that seeks to identify, and if possible, quantify the different contribution
    > of various causal variables, in this case, natural selection and intelligent
    > design, to the phenomenon being studied. This is not either/or.

    Perhaps I am failing to follow your presentation, but it appears to me that
    you are still using "natural selection" and "intelligent design" as
    independent variables. As such, they would constitute mutually exclusive
    categories of action. If they are mutually exclusive categories of action,
    then at some level of analysis, one is making an either/or choice.

    Let me try a simple illustration: Suppose that a sample of paint contains a
    mixture of two specific pigments, X and Y. You say that the paint is neither
    purely X-pigment type or purely Y-pigment type, but a combination of the
    two. I suppose I'm looking at the microscopic level and saying that when you
    isolate a specific particle of pigment, you are bound to identify it as
    either X or Y.

    It's the idea of treating divine action and creaturely action as pigments to
    be freely mixed that I find theologically awkward. That's why I said,

    > <<"Theologically this is most awkward; divine action and
    > creaturely action are here placed at the same level and freely mixed. You
    > are free to propose that, but I believe that you would be parting company
    > with some good theologians if you did.">>

    To which you replied:

    > Let me go back to my starting point in the first chapter of Genesis. In it I
    > read of creation as a _process_ in which God goes through the whole nine
    > yards of design. God "created", "said", "made", "called", "blessed"--all
    > action planninf/verbs of intervention, if you will. On the creaturely side
    > are the verbs, "brought forth", "put forth", "swarm", "multiply". I'm not a
    > biblical scholar nor a concordist who tries to match every verb with some
    > naturalistic event. But I do believe that the thrust of the chapter is that
    > "divine action" and "creaturely action" are pretty freely mixed, and that God
    > is pictured as actively involved in the interactive, hands on, process of
    > creation, or design in the active as well as the conceptual stage.
    >
    > I understand that you prefer to interpret the chapter in much broader terms,
    > showing God's power, and that he, not creation, is to be worshipped and some
    > such terms. If you limit the interpretation of the chapter in that way, I
    > think you are arbitrarily ignoring what can be learned from it and what can
    > legitimately influence our thinking.

    Here is where you and I have a substantial difference--one that is likely to
    continue. I truly believe that the agenda of Genesis 1 is entirely
    theological. Its theological contrast to the prevailing polytheism of the
    Ancient Near East is astounding. Its theological contrast to the ontological
    naturalism of modern Western culture is equally astounding, and equally
    relevant. Given its profound theological focus, and given its appropriate
    employment of the ascientific metaphors of its day, I do not believe that
    Genesis 1 should be used as the model for a scientific reconstruction of the
    universe's formational history. You characterize my approach as "limiting"
    the interpretation; I call it being careful not to force the text into
    answering questions far outside of its intended domain. We will have to
    agree to disagree on that particular issue.

    > The idea of design is more complex than you picture it. IDers like Bill
    > Dembski hypothesize that biological design is the product of three steps:
    > 1) _origination_ of the building blocks that make up the biological object or
    > system, 2) _localization_ bringing all the building blocks together the right
    > location, and 3) _configuration_ putting all the building blocks together
    > correctly once they exist and are localized.
    >
    > As I understand it, the filter that Dembski has proposed is that if you rule
    > out these three steps being the result known physical, chemical, or
    > biological processes for which laws have been formulated, and if the
    > probability of these steps occurring is vanishingly low, the remaining causal
    > agent is intelligent design.

    The question is whether the proponents of ID have in fact demonstrated that
    the universe's formational economy is inadequate to the task. Are certain
    formational capabilities actually missing, or are they merely unknown or
    inadequately understood at this time?

    > Intelligent design is used in distinction from
    > "apparent design" and does not necessarily imply divinity.

    If creaturely processes are inadequate for the formation of the bacterial
    flagellum (to pick a popular example), then how is the implication of divine
    action avoided? And who could possibly believe that the desire for this
    implication is not the driving force for the ID movement?

    > This is not
    > argument from ignorance.

    Sorry, but there's no way to avoid it. Note your own reference above to
    "KNOWN physical, chemical, or biological processes." Contrary to numerous
    disclaimers, lack of knowledge is crucial to the ID argument.

    > The same procedure is used in medicine.
    > Alzheimer's disease is not diagnosed positively by brain-scans (MRI), but
    > rather, all other possible causes of the picture of the brain are ruled out,
    > leaving only Alzheimer's disease as the causal agent.

    But we don't say it's caused by "intelligent design" in this case, do we?
    Why not? For good theological reasons, most likely. We rightly choose not to
    blame God for altering the cells in a loved one in such a way as to lead to
    the symptoms of Altzheimer's disease. Neither do we expect God to coerce
    those cells back into their earlier healthy state. We would dearly like that
    to happen, but in that instance we do not picture God as One who pushes
    molecules around or as One who rearranges cell parts. God provides us with
    many means to deal with a difficult situation, but does not overpower His
    creatures at the cellular or molecular level in the manner proposed by most
    proponents of ID.

    Some months ago I faced a similar situation. I was diagnosed with cancer of
    the prostate. I did not blame God for modifying my cells into a malignant
    state. Neither did I expect the Divine Designer to coerce them back to a
    non-malignant state. What I did was to use the resource of surgery to deal
    with the problem at hand. I suspect that a proponent of ID would have done
    the same thing.

    > I am puzzled why you keep pressing for theological discussion of ID when
    > there is so much work to be done just in scientifically studying the
    > phenomenon of design itself. Turn the matter around. Why don't you make
    > greater effort to try to find empirical evidence for your position?

    I have the advantage of having the entire scientific community engaged in
    research to learn more about the formational and functional economies of the
    universe. The more they learn, the more evidence accumulates in favor of the
    "robust formational economy principle."

    _____________________

    This reply has already gotten far lengthier than intended. Enough for now.

    Cordially,

    Howard Van Till



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