Thank you for your nice summary of what has gone on in philosophy and our
culture in the last decades. You might be interested to know that it
seems to be changing again in the fields of "science studies" which
includes philosophy of science, history of science, and sociology of
science. In the philosophy of science from the 1980s on to now, it seems
that whereas there are still many in the scientific anti-realism camp,
that most philosophers of science are holding to a "chastened" realism.
They realize the contributions of people like Kuhn (who was a physicist
and historian of science) which has chipped at away at the naive and
over optimistic stance of the positivists, yet they find plenty of
problems with Kuhn and pretty much seem to repudiate radical relativists
like Feyerabend. In general, I find that contemporary philosophy of
science is tending towards a more balanced view after positivism and the
worldview or paradigm exponents such as Hanson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend.
Most tend to be realists who believe in progress in scientific knowledge
and in objectivity in science, yet recognize the truth in some of the
criticisms of anti-realists like Laudan and Van Frassen. This is the
stance of philosophers like Frederick Suppe and J.P. Moreland. (By the
way, I seem to recall one post on this exploder that said that Moreland
was a relativist -- I know him personally, and nothing could be further
from the truth! Moreland claims to be eclectic in his view towards
science, but he is certainly a realist, believes in the correspondence
theory of truth, and is not a relativist.)
I would like to add that I have found that philosophers in the analytic
tradition tend now to reject relativism and subjectivism. (Relativism is
like the verification principle -- it is self destructive, because one
cannot take the thesis that everything is relative as an absolute
principle to go by.) There are some (European) continental philosophers who
are relativists and subjectivists, like Jurgen Habermas, but they have
only influenced literature, history, and sociology, not philosophy as is
done in the U.S. or those in Europe who are in the analytical camp.
The people who are the radical subjectivists in the 1990s are the
sociologists, people in literature, and some historians. The
philosophers that I have encountered have expressed some revulsion to the
subjective hermenutic (a la Habermas) used in literature today. The
historians have still been heavily inflenced by Kuhn, and have extended
his ideas to a radical relativism in some cases, even though the
philosophers reject this relativism. In the 60s and 70s, the historians
and philosophers of science tended to be very close in thought, but now
they seem to me to be diverging in basic worldview (even though history
is the central source of data for much of the phil. of sci.). The
sociologists such as Bloor, Pickering, and the Edinburogh school have gone
completely off the deep end by saying that all knowledge, even scientific
knowledge, is socially constructed; that is, it is fabricated by social
groups and does not correspond to what is really true of the world.
However, this view also self-destructs in that applying their principle
to their own thesis means that the view that all knowledge is a social
construct and does not correspond to reality is itself a social construct
and does not correspond to reality, so why should we believe it!
To summarize, I sense that philosophers are trying to be balanced and
objective and that the relativism and radicalism that is no longer
fashionable in philosophy (and has been left behind by it) is now alive
and well in history, literature, and sociology. (The liberal theologians are
are still stuck in the positivist era, however!)
Jeff Mullins
Ph.D. Candidate, History and Philosophy of Science, U. of Maryland
ROSAT project, NASA GSFC
On Tue, 27 Feb 1996, Paul Arveson wrote:
> In message <0099E7C8.899EEDE0.74@augustana.ab.ca> writes:
> >
> >
> > I find Paul's examples helpful, and would like to ask whether his
> > comments equally "familiar". I have engaged others in the way Paul
> > suggests, and it seems to me an equally valuable stance to take
> > whether with a professional trained differently, a Christian who takes
> > a divergent theological stance, or an non-Christian who is nonetheless
> > open to dialogue. In different ways and with different priorities, it
> > seems these are all opportunities for giving voice to the faith and life
> > with which Christ has graced us. Reactions?
> >
> Dear Mac (and others):
>
> Thanks for your response. Some of the comments implied that I was somewhat
> naive in approving science and its objectivity. I should say a little about
> 'where I'm coming from' to clarify the philosophical situation, especially for
> those of you who are younger.
>
> My career has spanned the period from the dominance of positivism, up to
> about the late 60's, to the present dominance of relativism in philosophy. So
> now I appear to be bucking the trend, by neglecting to repeat the notions that
> all data are theory-laden, that everyone is a biased advocate, that knowledge is
> a sequence of paradigms based on presuppositions, etc. But you must realize
> that these are all new themes, representing the current Spirit of the Age. They
> ain't necessarily so.
>
> On the other hand, for those of you who did not experience the positivistic
> era, I must tell you a little about it: this was a time when Marxism was the
> world's most admired ideology; even preachers praised the communists for their
> level of commitment. But there was heavy, oppressive, arrogant ridicule of
> Christian faith among writers, journalists, and others in the mass media. They
> were given moral support by famous scientists, such as Linus Pauling, Harlow
> Shapley, Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, Haldane, Huxley, and John Dewey. These
> men had tremendous influence over education, philosophical and political
> thought. The only respected theologians were Tillich, Neibuhr and Bultmann, as
> I recall. This was the era when liberalism reigned supreme. Then came the
> sexual, drug, and countercultural revolutions of the late 60's. It is not a
> coincidence that young-earth creationism also emerged at this time.
>
> In the positivist era, the 'verification principle' was used to intimidate
> and dismiss all kinds of religious views as metaphysical and therefore
> meaningless. On the other hand, science was exalted as the only authority for
> truth, because of its verifiability and objectivity.
>
> Then the verification principle collapsed -- when it was finally realized by
> everyone that the principle itself is not experimentally verifiable. Then
> Thomas Kuhn wrote 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' and the pendulum
> swung completely over to relativism. Now we have nothing but paradigms, and
> your paradigms are as good as mine. Likewise the young-earth creationists now
> say there are two views based on different presuppositions, not evidence....
>
> What I'm trying to say is that both sides -- positivism and relativism --
> are wrong. They are both worldly; one reduces personhood to matter, the other
> exalts personhood to divinity. Without an understanding (or standing-under) of
> the Creator, the world always goes to these extremes.
>
> Michael Polanyi's book Personal Knowledge influenced me, as well as
> Schaeffer and James Houston. As Polanyi put it, 'My purpose is to search for
> the truth, and to report my findings....I'm trying to convince myself.' Truth
> is both objective and subjective, but neither positive nor relative. As I am
> committed to this dialogical view, I always try to fight both extremes,
> whichever one seems strongest at the moment. So I'm always saying 'on the other
> hand', 'neither/nor', etc.
>
> Forgive me for the excessive length of this.
>
>
>
> Paul Arveson, Research Physicist
> 73367.1236@compuserve.com arveson@oasys.dt.navy.mil
> (301) 227-3831 (W) (301) 227-1914 (FAX) (301) 816-9459 (H)
> Code 724, NSWC, Bethesda, MD 20084
>
>