in the first footnote on the application of memory theory to NT studies (by Wilken in 1971) and the formation of the Mapping Memory Consultation of the Society of Biblical Literature, the first significant gathering of scholars working in this emerging field, by Alan Kirk and Tom Thatcher in 2004.

He also provides brief reviews on the work of key figures, including Bart Ehrman, Tuomas Havukainen, James Dunn, Dale Allison, Matthew Levering, and Peter Carnley. A relatively minor quibble, I think the literature review would have benefited from further interaction with Chris Keith, Anthony Le Donne, Alan Kirk, and Tom Thatcher, who have made notable contributions to the field. However, given the focus of a memory approach to the resurrection, and his interaction with their work later in the book, it would be too harsh to say this is a significant limitation.

Part 2 includes historical criticism and exegesis of 1 Corinthians 6:14 and 1 Corinthians 15. This is a great resource for those interested in the debates around exegesis of 1 Corinthians 15 (for example, the nature of the early creed, whether Paul was aware of Jesus's empty tomb, the meaning of ἐγείρω (raised), the nature of the appearance to the 500, and many others).

In Part 3, Graieg discusses memory theory and data with both breadth and depth. For example, he explains the important distinction between semantic (e.g., factual information, general knowledge) and episodic (specific personal experiences) memory. He makes the shrewd observation that the creed in 1 Corinthians 15:3–58 is likely a semantic memory, and therefore, less susceptible to distortion than other types of memory. This is a nice illustration of how historical criticism and memory theory can combine to generate helpful insights not immediately obvious from a standard historical-critical approach.

Flashbulb memories (memories of dramatic events such as 9/11) are also discussed. I was less convinced by his suggestion that the creed would likely result in a flashbulb memory for the Corinthians, but I agree that 1 Corinthians 15:8 most probably reflects a flashbulb memory of the apostle Paul. Graieg also includes interesting discussions on the transience of memory and the potential for memory distortions and bias.

One of the main strengths of this book is its multidisciplinary approach. As a psychology researcher, I am often frustrated with naïve or overly confident applications of psychology to the NT. I am glad to say Graieg avoids these errors. Part 3 interacts with a wide range of literature on the philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology of memory. Each concept is introduced, summarized, and followed by an assessment of how these findings can be applied to memories of Jesus's resurrection. Graieg's multidisciplinary framework is systematic, transparent, and logical. In addition, it is sufficiently flexible to be applied across the ideological spectrum (i.e., secular, liberal, and conservative scholars) and is a useful tool to help minimize potential bias when using a memory approach to the NT.

The book's focus on 1 Corinthians is both a strength and a potential limitation. It is a clear strength that this is the first study to use a memory approach to Jesus's resurrection in this epistle. Although there are many helpful insights, I wonder whether the richer data available in the Gospels and Acts may more clearly demonstrate the promise of Graieg's approach. Nonetheless, this study of 1 Corinthians provides a solid foundation to build upon, and I look forward to seeing applications to a broader set of literature in the NT and early Christianity.

In summary, *Resurrection Remembered* is a timely study applying a memory approach to (primarily) the text of 1 Corinthians 15. This is a reliable, well-written, and concise guide to an influential approach within NT scholarship. I particularly recommend this book for readers interested in the application of psychological approaches to NT studies. For those better acquainted with the psychological literature on memory, of particular interest is Graieg's review of how this literature has been applied to NT studies in a concise and accessible manner (Part 1). Readers with less background in memory studies, but better acquainted with NT studies, will particularly benefit from discussions on a range of tools and theories from other disciplines that can be applied to their field of expertise (Part 3).

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RESURRECTION: Extraordinary Evidence for an Extraordinary Claim by Nick Meader. Eugene, OR: Resource Publications, 2024. 286 pages. Paperback; $29.98. ISBN: 9781666783056.

In *Resurrection,* statistician and health psychologist Nick Meader notes: "Christians and atheists discussing Jesus' resurrection can sometimes resemble young children on a play date. They use the same toys but play *alongside* each other—rather than *with* each other" (p. 11). The brilliance of his book is precisely that it encourages Christians and atheists to come face-to-face. In doing so, Meader plays, and plays well, the role of the rational parent who gets these children to interact directly with each other by providing them with a universal language for conversation: the language of probability.

The primary thesis of the book is that if you apply probability-based statistical modeling (common tools in

my own field of psychology) to atheists' claims that the resurrection of Jesus is not probable, those models show that atheists are wrong. In fact, these probability models reveal that the traditional Christian explanation of the widespread belief that Jesus miraculously rose from the dead is more probable than the other explanations that have been offered over the years as alternatives.

To make this case, the book opens with one of the cleverest applications of probabilistic reasoning to apologetics I have ever seen: Meader uses statistical modeling to evaluate a famous example given by atheist philosopher David Hume. To illustrate the kind of evidence he believed we *ought* to see if something unusual was true, Hume argued that if an eight-day period of darkness had truly occurred in 1600, this extraordinary fact would be matched by equally powerful evidence demonstrating its validity; expected evidence that Hume himself subsequently articulated. Meader, however, beats Hume at his own game by showing that probability modeling suggests Hume's own hypothetical evidence would not be enough to make the hypothetically true event probable!

After that opening salvo, the book turns its attention to atheists' Hume-like arguments that Christians should have extraordinary evidence for such an extraordinary claim as the resurrection of Christ. Because probability modeling is based on the prior likelihood of an explanation being true, much of the book focuses on establishing the prior probabilities associated with things that contribute to our understanding of Jesus's resurrection, ranging from naturalistic worldviews to psychological mechanisms involved in interpretations of the event. At the close of the book, Meader then quantifies all of these probabilities into a series of statistical models that consistently show that the Christian explanation is the most likely.

The primary strength of the book lies in its much-welcome application of the probabilistic method to apologetics. Even if one disagrees with the conclusions—and Meader acknowledges the limitations, quite admirably calling the model a "work in progress"—the application of probabilistic models to such an important religious event is (at a minimum) a meaningful conversation starter. It forces both sides to truly evaluate the probability estimates that, *in reality*, are already a part of their argument calculus.

The primary weakness of the book is an offshoot of this strength: Meader (who is an extremely successful and highly cited scientist) is of course aware of that the output of any probability model is only as good as the prior probability estimates that go into it; this explains why the book spends the majority of its energy defending the specific probabilities that go into the model. I imagine, however, that many of these probability estimates will be the source of future debate. For the sake of brevity, I will here limit my own comments to specific examples from my own areas of expertise within psychology.

In almost every psychological case (ranging from cognitive dissonance to mass psychosis), I agreed with Meader's prior probability estimates. However, two possible difficulties stood out to me. First, in chapter 8, Meader argues that Christian theology has a higher probability of being true because it is *simpler* than naturalism. I have spent my entire career studying psychological complexity,[1] and I find this argument lacking. Something is not more likely to be true because it is simpler. As I argued in my Christian apologetics book *Complex Simplicity* (2017), the world is, in fact, quite complex. Mere psychological or structural simplicity does not increase the probability of a *match* with that reality. Further, Christian doctrine is (as Meader acknowledges) often quite complex, and theism is almost by definition more complex than naturalism in that it posits everything naturalism posits *plus* the supernatural.

Second, Meader discusses many psychological arguments that might offer alternative accounts of the spread of Christian belief, but in my view he fails to clearly articulate the most probable one: an explanation based not in mass psychosis or cognitive dissonance, but in the much more mundane psychological properties of selective communication. Research suggests, for example, that information is passed on because it is communicable or interesting independent of its truth value.[2] As anyone who has played the game "telephone" can attest, it does not take very long in a communication chain for reality to be reshaped. Of course, communication often does work, and most of what we know that is true about our world is because of *accurate* communication from other people. But even though I disagree with atheists' ultimate conclusions, I have nonetheless thought communication distortion was their best argument—and it seems omitted from Meader's probability models.

To help offset these difficulties inherent in estimating prior probabilities, Meader provides multiple estimates in which he changes the parameters in a more atheist-friendly way. On balance, these alternative estimates—despite being biased *toward* atheism—still show a pro-Christian conclusion. (Indeed, I wanted more of this kind of analysis; the most useful part of the technique is to illuminate exactly what it would take for each side to "win" the probability debate). However, I could not entirely shake the feeling that the overall result seemed at times like a large kitchen sink that is in danger of running the very risk Meader is trying to overcome: If the final probability estimate is dependent on the author being right on *this* many things, perhaps the model itself cannot be trusted?

No work is perfect, especially one that attempts such a grand undertaking as Meader does. But in the final analysis, this book is well worth reading. Indeed, *Resurrection* accomplishes an amazing double: It provides an excellent summary of the burgeoning area of *probabilistic apologetics* for the curious outsider *and* simultaneously offers a remarkable novel contribution for the knowledgeable insider. I have never read anything quite like it, and I hope it inspires a generation of Christian apologists to use probability theory to honestly explore—and defend—our faith.

Notes

[1]For example, Lucian Gideon Conway III and Alivia Zubrod, "Are US Presidents Becoming Less Rhetorically Complex? Evaluating the Integrative Complexity of Joe Biden and Donald Trump in Historical Context," *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 41, no. 5 (2022): 613–25, https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X221081126.

[2]For a summary, see Lucian Gideon Conway III and Mark Schaller, "How Communication Shapes Culture," in *Frontiers of Social Psychology: Social Communication,* ed. K. Fiedler (Psychology Press, 2007), 107–27.

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TECHNOLOGY

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TEACH LIKE A HUMAN: Playful Practice and Serious Faith in the Age of AI by David J. Mulder. Wipf & Stock, 2025. 170 pages. Paperback; $27.00. ISBN: 9798385258413.

Are the machines taking over the classroom? In *Teach Like a Human*, David Mulder answers that anxious question with neither panic nor naïve enthusiasm, but with something rarer: a theologically grounded, pedagogically wise, and gently playful invitation to rethink what it means to teach as embodied, image-bearing humans in an age of artificial intelligence. Written for Christian educators navigating the rapid rise of AI tools, the book goes beyond tips and warnings to reshape readers' imaginations about technology, humanity, and education.

The author is a professor of education at Dordt University and writes from nearly three decades of experience in Christian schooling and educational technology instruction at the university level—this dual background shows. The book sits at the intersection of classroom practice, theological reflection, and technological literacy. It joins a growing body of Christian engagement with AI and digital culture, yet distinguishes itself by its sustained focus on teaching and by its insistence that the central question for educators is not what can AI do, but what kind of humans are we becoming as we teach with these tools?

The book unfolds in eight parts that move from cultural analysis to biblical theology, and then from technical explanation to classroom application. Early chapters explore the stories that shape our fears and hopes about AI, drawing on familiar cultural touchstones such as *2001: A Space Odyssey*, *The Terminator*, and *The Matrix*. These chapters are not pop-culture detours; they serve to surface the imaginative lenses through which educators interpret new technologies. Are machines our rivals, our servants, or our saviors? The author argues that before we can use AI wisely, we must recognize the narratives already discipling us.

From there, the book turns to consider AI in light of "the big story" of Scripture. Mulder asserts that Creation, Fall, redemption, and restoration provide the theological backbone for a Christian understanding of humanity and technology. Within this framework, human beings are not reducible to information processors. Because teachers and students are not computers, teaching and learning are not simply matters of data transfer; rather, they are relational, formative practices involving bodies, emotions, moral agency, and worship. In this sense, the book resonates strongly with Christian scholarship that frames education as formation rather than mere information transmission.

The book's middle chapters demystify artificial intelligence in clear, accessible prose. Chapters on neural networks, machine learning, and large language models avoid both technical overload and oversimplification. The author emphasizes the probabilistic and pattern-matching nature of AI systems; this helps explain both their impressive fluency and their profound limitations. This portion of the book will be especially helpful for educators whose fears are fueled by the unknown; by showing how AI "thinks" very differently from humans, the author clears conceptual space for more measured ethical discernment.

The heart of the book lies in its treatment of teaching and learning as distinct but related activities. AI, the author suggests, may assist with certain teaching tasks—drafting questions, generating examples, organizing materials—but cannot replace the slow, embodied, and often frustrating process by which students actually learn. The book contrasts "arriving" with "becoming": education is not about efficiently reaching correct answers, but about forming persons who can love God, truth, and their neighbors. In this light, the book's call to "playful practice" names a posture of experimentation, humility, and joy that resists both technocratic control and despairing withdrawal.

The final section of the book features practical AI use cases (such as for leveled reading materials, rubric