

where do warranted good works begin? Does not scripture authorize the development and use of technology to reduce suffering and to love our neighbors? To what extent can we delight in inventions without making them idols?

Unfortunately, Reinke does not answer these questions; quite the opposite. He criticizes Christians wrestling with such issues for using descriptive labels (e.g., scientism) because, in his view, they limit “thoughtful conversations on technology” (p. 29), yet he is unequivocal in opposing proclamation of a “Gospel of Technology” (pp. 163–73). But again, how should Christians find our limits under God’s rule? This question seems less important to Reinke than simply believing God will make the most of whatever happens.

Yes, the final chapter highlights the necessity of wisdom in *using* technology, wisdom that is available from God alone. But does not God give insight to all people? May we reasonably view science and technology as evidence of common grace, but deny that common grace could affect how society organizes and operates? Reinke praises the Amish for making deliberate decisions regarding technology, suggesting that all Christians would do well to do the same, but what criteria should we choose?

Ultimately, Reinke leaves all the big questions to God. Confident in him, Christians should just do the best they can, and then be content with the results. They are, after all, ordained by God. Surely this is true to some extent, but this leaves Reinke’s “biblical theology of technology” open to the classic criticism of Reformed thought: under its banner, Christians are not fully responsible for the results of their actions.

On this point, deep differences appear between Reinke and other Christian observers of technology development. For example, in *A Christian Field Guide to Technology for Engineers and Designers*, Ethan J. Brue, Derek C. Schuurman, and Steven H. VanderLeest argue that, compared with others, Christian innovators bear a *greater* responsibility than others. Informed by biblical ethics and wisdom, they must go beyond minimal success measures. Engineering leadership means faithful conformance to rules, and then some; supererogation is the requirement. But in the end, the message is the same: follow the rules—expressed in either policy or scripture—and the results will surely be good. Well, history reveals limits to that idea. And again, judgement is required. We must not only recognize that moral choices shape technology and its use, but also avoid an empty and uninformed tech moralism.

We might want clear lines separating good from evil in technology, but neither Reinke nor other Christian

authors can supply them. But to be fair, to what extent do people note and observe the clear lines God gave us in the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, and many other passages? Until we leave this troubled world, clearly, we must walk by faith, not sight. So, as we walk through our technoscience-saturated world, Reinke and other Christians with biblical views of technology serve the church well. Surely, many ASA members, from diverse theological traditions, will find *God, Technology, and the Christian Life* interesting—either stimulating or frustrating—as well as contributing to further explorations of technology in the light of scripture.

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**THE END OF THE LAW? Law, Theology, and Neuroscience** by David W. Opderbeck. Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2021. 260 pages. Paperback; \$31.00. ISBN: 9781498223898.

“It’s not you but your brain.” As this powerful meme has begun to characterise our generation, we encounter children under neurological treatment for their behavioral/mental deficits and seniors losing their self-identity due to neurological degeneration. It is indeed evident that our mental experiences are bound to our brain states—yet are we really nothing else than our brain? Many intellectuals of our day argue so—our psyche is an epiphenomenon of our brain state, and so we have no free will.

Recent advances in neuroscience, especially with non-invasive neuroimaging techniques enabling scientists to “read out” one’s decision ahead of a person being consciously aware of their own decision, have underpinned a new movement called *neurolaw*. According to *neurolawyers*, humans are no longer legally or morally accountable for their behaviors as science leaves no room for the existence of free will; consequently, law should be re-oriented from retribution to treatment of criminals. Indeed, *neurolaw* seeks “to explain and reform the legal system from the ground up based on neuroscience” (p. 2). Despite, or because of, its radicality, the *neurolaw* movement can be an attractive alternate to the legal tradition of Western civilization, which is rapidly losing its Greco-Roman/Christian foundations in law and ethics. It is also in line with the trend that our contemporaries increasingly seek justice through facts/science and empathy instead of transcendent values and rationality.

Although *neurolawyers* optimistically hope that this shift will lead our world from conflicts in subjective

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values/beliefs to facts of science, and from moral retribution to humane treatment of criminals, in this book Seton Hall University Law School Professor David Opderbeck carefully considers their optimism legally, philosophically, and theologically—and concludes that, with no place for transcendence, their optimism is misplaced. Neurolaw's reductionism loses not only the place of personal responsibility in law and jurisprudence, but loses a rich and complex understanding of human nature and relationality. Opderbeck argues that theology can defend the transcendence of law and human morality, without losing its integrity to science, by understanding the laws of nature as empowering nature to fulfill its *telos*—its divine purpose. This move is key to a unified epistemological view on science and law, such that human-made laws empower humans with freedom and personhood—physically, legally, and morally. Consequently, the author reframes positive law (i.e., human-made law) as calling humans to the divine law of love.

In the first three chapters, Opderbeck illustrates how Western law made the historical shift from its foundational transcendent values, through legal positivism, to neurolaw. Contrary to the contemporary jurisprudential trend, the four rudiments of Western law, i.e., Ancient Greek, Roman, Hebrew, and Christian jurisprudence, commonly state that positive law has transcendent sources and is preceded by the ideal of law or universal moral principles (chap. 1). In contrast, today's Anglo-American legal scholarship, dominated by legal positivism and instrumentalism, removes transcendent grounds for law, replacing it with a hope that economics and science can guide the law by providing a measurement of "good" and predictions of its outcome (chap. 3). The current reductionist trends in neuroscience paint this picture with a greater hope by revealing detailed biological determinants of human behavior.

In chapters 4 and 5, Opderbeck provides a methodological basis for his analysis in the later chapters. He favors critical realism and *fides et ratio* approaches as they permit separate and yet complementary research in the two domains. He then demonstrates how together these can help to uncover the meaning of the law from the facts of paleoanthropology and sociobiology. Whereas sociobiologists such as David S. Wilson suggest that the contingent evolution of social orders in animals indicates that law is a construct with no transcendence, Opderbeck highlights the emergence of unique human cognitive abilities such as abstraction, language, and writing, which he argues enable the law to transcend the social orders observed in other species.

After showing that the facts of paleoanthropology and sociobiology can be interpreted differently from a materialist view, Opderbeck continues his philo-

sophical criticism of the reductionism/materialism on which neurolaw is based (chap. 6). He points out that the fields of neuroscience and the philosophy of mind retain positivist assumptions. The author then identifies three problems in materialistic/reductionistic/positivist views of the law. First, reductionism cannot provide a coherent epistemological ground to make a truth statement since reason and consciousness are only illusory. Second, neurolaw proposes social engineering toward achieving behavioral normalcy in the population, but this leads to obscurity in value judgement—and, more seriously, to totalitarianism. Finally, materialism easily leads to nihilism.

Opderbeck's theological vision (and counterproposal to neurolaw) is uncovered in the last three chapters of the book. In chapter 7, he discusses the ontology of the human mind and free will. For this, he rejects the nonreductive physicalism of theologians such as Nancey Murphy and Robert van Gulick. He then finds more promising a neo-Aristotelian, teleological understanding of natural law as "powers and capacities" that emerge within nature (p. 173). These, rather than deterministic neurobiological rules, can be key to theological synthesis of science and law. To him, this view not only provides a plausible causal or explanatory framework but requires complementary room for transcendence: God's trinitarian, perichoretic transcendental love provides the *telos* for creation, and so the purpose of positive (human-made) law is to fulfill this transcendental *telos* through the "powers and capacities" of natural law

Opderbeck then assigns his last chapter to an applied problem, namely the problem of violence in the enforcement of law. Indeed, this issue appears to be one of the most important motivations for neurolawyers: neuroscience seeks to transform the means of law enforcement from retributive violence to more humane, neurological treatment. Nonetheless, through discussions of Pascal, Derrida, and Agamben, the author demonstrates that the law cannot bring justice without violent enforcement. Therefore, by forgoing divine transcendence it is impossible for neurolaw to overcome the problem of the violence of law. Opderbeck thereby puts forward the necessity of Christian teleology for an ultimate hope. Law is not a matter of deterministic rules but of love and life, and law is not of enforcement but empowering. What makes humans is not our capacity to make free choices but to be free to love and live; this is our *telos*.

*The End of the Law?* is a scholarly interdisciplinary book, which crosses over the philosophies of law, mind, science, and theology in order to challenge or re-orient the current dominance of legal/scientific positivism, reductionism, and physicalism among intellectual groups.

This dense book suits those who are already exposed to philosophical analysis on some of these topics (or, for readers unfamiliar with some of this terrain, but willing to do some background reading). Despite the degree to which it engages questions in philosophy, the book ultimately seeks to re-orient the law around Trinitarian theology. As this will limit its plausibility in public legal spheres, I do wonder if the philosophical argument could have been further developed for those who do not hold to Trinitarian theology (or any theology).

As a neuroscientist I would add one further note. There is little interest within neuroscience today in the problem of free will. In fact, students are discouraged from studying the question, as it is considered an unsuitable subject for scientific investigation. Most of us stay “scientifically agnostic,” although individual scientists have their own philosophies or perspectives. Given that neuroscience is still restricted to a deterministic regime, free will can only be falsifiable but not verifiable, because it is widely considered beyond the laws of nature. It is, therefore, not surprising that one finds only evidence against free will, which comes from the epistemological constraints of the discipline of neuroscience today. I strongly suggest that proponents of neurolaw scrutinize at what point neuroscience reaches its methodological limits before assuming a particular ontological interpretation of experimental results to be “neuroscientific” or even unfalsifiable. The neurolaw program appears to be built without adequate recognition of these interpretive limits within neuroscience, no doubt due to its positivist assumptions. Overall, in Opderbeck’s book readers will encounter rich and complex discussions across different fields integrating law, science, and theology. Although Opderbeck writes from a Roman Catholic perspective, this book does not feel like an in-house discussion—his foundational arguments are rooted in classical Trinitarian metaphysics and Protestants willing to work through Opderbeck’s conceptually dense discussions will find much of value in this work.

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**THE INTEGRATION OF PSYCHOLOGY & CHRISTIANITY: A Domain-Based Approach** by William L. Hathaway and Mark A. Yarhouse. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press Academic, 2021. 199 pages. ISBN: 9780830841837.

Reading *The Integration of Psychology and Christianity* brought to mind the lively discussions about integration that I had with my fellow undergraduates at Gordon College some twenty years ago. We were hampered in reaching any agreement by the fact that our assigned

text, *Psychology and Christianity: Four Views*,<sup>1</sup> presented four authors who each defined integration in their own idiosyncratic way, which then resulted in us students talking past each other.

If only we’d had this book! Hathaway and Yarhouse resolve these confusions by offering a “domain-based approach.” Rather than advocating for a particular integration approach, as has been common in integration scholarship, Hathaway and Yarhouse outline the multiplicity of ways in which the Christian psychologist might choose to integrate faith and psychology. This approach is one I found immediately useful, given my position as chair of psychology at a small Christian liberal arts college where I frequently mentor junior colleagues with less experience in Christian higher education as they learn to integrate faith into their teaching. Hathaway and Yarhouse’s categories include the following: worldview integration, theoretical integration, applied integration, role integration, and personal integration. These categories not only offer a shared vocabulary for integration conversations, but they can serve as an inventory of one’s comfort level in different types of integration (one may be quite comfortable doing personal integration while finding theoretical integration challenging, for example). Overall, the book is excellent as a catalyst for personal reflection and growth for the Christian psychologist, whether they be researcher, professor, or clinician.

A particular strength of the book is its emphasis on clinical and applied psychological work. The most original contributions are the chapters on applied integration and role integration. The former adapts a secular model for a Christian population or develops Christian interventions from Christian thought and practice while the latter describes living out the role expectations of a particular vocation (e.g., counselor) in a way that is consistent with Christian identity. These chapters have many examples from Yarhouse and Hathaway’s own experience in navigating these areas. Their clear articulation of the professional duties of the Christian who joins the counseling guild, for example, was extremely useful. I found myself grateful to have their take on role integration to offer to my aspiring therapist students, who often find themselves torn between personal conviction and professional obligations. Yarhouse and Hathaway offer a well-argued Christian perspective that emphasizes the priority of those professional obligations.

A few criticisms. I mentioned that this book reminded me of my integration discussions in the early 2000s. While the integration resources are helpfully updated and the whole book is very well resourced, I found that the core approach to integration had remained largely unchanged. That is to say, this is very much a book