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for another as “the centerpiece of human morality” (p. 124). But as the authors point out with a telling example, acts of kindness based upon feelings of sympathy for another are inadequate to explain the complex nature of the ethical lives of humans. If I feel sympathy for a neighbor who cannot pay her rent and out of emotional empathy for her anxiety and shame decide to pay it for her, such an act may be morally laudable. But now suppose my neighbor is a heroin dealer and my empathy for her plight leads me to pay her rent anyway. Surely, now our empathy is getting in the way of doing the right thing; and even though we felt these moral emotions, paying her rent does not qualify as morally right since she is endangering her own life and that of the entire neighborhood.

In a different but related point, the explanatory gap between biological altruism and fully human altruism is brought out when the authors consider the position of biologist David Sloan Wilson. Like Churchland above, Wilson makes a promising start when he defines altruism as “a concern for the welfare of others as an end in itself” (p. 148). But, in his discussion he dismisses the relevance of motivation when defining the nature of altruism on the grounds that it is incapable of empirical measurement and it is “not right to privilege altruism as a psychological motive when other equivalent motives exist” (p. 149). The difference between external, behavioristic altruism and altruism motivated by genuine concern for the other is insignificant, says Wilson, just the difference between being “paid in cash or by check” (p. 149). The authors are not impressed with this clever but spurious analogy:

Do you only care that your spouse acts as though she loves you? That she says complimentary things to you, that she appears to enjoy conversation with you ... appears to be sexually attracted to you, and remembers your birthday? What if you discovered that she does all of these things without feeling anything for you—or worse, she does all these things while secretly detesting you? Would Wilson claim that this is just a “cash or check” situation—just so long as she’s doing all the observable things she would do if she really did love you, then the underlying motives, intentions, and desires are irrelevant? (pp. 149–50)

For Hunter and Nedelisky, the new moral scientists have become “moral nihilists” precisely because morality and the good life are not suited to the methods or measurements of science, especially in their program of reductive materialism. The book fruitfully engages the sciences and humanities, and readers will come away with a healthy apprecia-

tion of the limits of science and its methodology in explaining the meaning of the moral life.

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THE TERRITORIES OF HUMAN REASON: Science and Theology in an Age of Multiple Rationalities by Alister E. McGrath. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019. ix + 288 pages. Hardcover; \$35.95. ISBN: 9780198813101.

In *The Territories of Human Reason*, Alister McGrath argues against the dated “conflict” and “independence” models of science and religion by carefully cultivating a sophisticated integrative model which affirms an ontological unity of existence, complemented with an epistemological plurality of knowledge discourses that inquire into the nature of that existence. The book comes in two parts: Part 1 (chapters 1–3) provides an overview of the concept of rationality, carefully delineating how rationality is expressed in “distinct, yet occasionally overlapping and competing, epistemic territories and communities” (p. 3). This fact secures the distinct autonomy of science and theology. Part 2 (chapters 4–8) moves on to the process of critical engagement between science and religion.

Since both natural science and religion are vast topics, McGrath narrows his focus to the relationship between the physical and biological sciences on the one hand, and specifically Christian theology on the other (with a particular focus on theology since the late-nineteenth century). He seeks to adopt an empirical approach to the subject which eschews reductionism while grappling with the complexity and integrity of each field in its respective domain. In this way, he seeks to pursue what he calls a colligation, that is, “an ‘act of thought’ that brings together a number of empirical facts by ‘superintending’ upon them a way of thinking which united the facts” (p. 211). The end goal is a true consilience between respective fields, though not the kind proposed by E.O. Wilson which is a bottom-up scientific imperialism. The goal, rather, is an integration in which respective fields grow into one another in mutual understanding and illumination, rather like the merging sections of a jigsaw puzzle (my image).

For McGrath, rationality emerges as natural human cognitive processes interact with the overarching metanarrative through which one thinks, while engaging with the specific dataset available to oneself informed by one’s community and tradition (p. 25). It should be kept in mind that plurality exists

within the disciplines: thus, there is no single scientific method, but rather multiple methods, each specific to its domain of inquiry. For example, some modes of scientific inquiry depend on repetition or prediction as an essential heuristic, while others (e.g., particular historical scientific investigation) are concerned with the best explanation for unique and unrepeatable past events (e.g., the origin of the universe).

Given the complexity and richness with which reason is expressed, McGrath argues that we should think in terms of a multiplicity of distinct rationalities. The challenge arises when we mistake culturally contingent forms of reasoning for the intellectually necessary (p. 46). That, of course, embodies the seductive error of the Enlightenment which has emerged time and again, as in logical positivism of the mid-twentieth century and the new atheism of our own day.

McGrath also identifies levels of explanation and the symbiotic relationship between both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms (p. 66), which need to be synthesized into a unified picture of reality. When it comes to imaging what that looks like, McGrath invokes the illustration of five biologists offering five different explanations of a frog jumping into a pond: from the physiologist to the evolutionary biologist, each offers a unique insight and the challenge is to bring them all into a seamless account of reality (p. 59).

As noted above, McGrath is committed to an ontological unity of reality, one that maintains a critical realist orientation, not least because “the success of science would be a miracle if our theories were not at least (approximately) true” (p. 107). That said, the fact that we can advance in understanding objective reality from our particular situatedness is no basis for triumphalism, for a healthy grasp of these multiple, perspectival rationalities should remain open to mystery. McGrath devotes chapter 7 to a careful articulation of the concept of mystery—both that which is temporary and that which may be intrinsic—that conditions all our enquiries, whether in science or theology.

In the middle chapters, McGrath explores several topics, including the nature of theories as complex explanatory frameworks with particular virtues such as objectivity, simplicity, beauty, and prediction (chap. 4); the relationship between causality and unification as two aspects of explanation (chap. 5); and the primary tools of inquiry and argument, including

deduction, induction, and abduction (chap. 6). The book concludes with the above-mentioned chapter on mystery (chap. 7) and a concluding chapter on consilience with an interesting parallel exploration of how natural science might relate first to socialism and then to Christian theology.

From the perspective of this reviewer, there are some lacuna in the book, and while some may seem nit-picky, others are perhaps more substantive. While McGrath’s discussion of mystery engages in passing with the mysterianism of atheist Colin McGinn, there is no engagement with some of the important recent work among Christian philosophers such as James Anderson’s work on paradox, J. C. Beall on nonclassical logic and dialetheism (true contradictions), or the sizable literature on skeptical theism. It is also unfortunate that there is a general absence of analytic theology in McGrath’s discussion. While I recognize that one cannot cover every recent school of thought in a prolegomenal survey of this type, the absence is most notable when McGrath discusses deductive, inductive, and abductive models of reasoning in theology, at which point he focuses on arguments drawn from theism simpliciter (e.g., the Kalam cosmological argument). This seems to me a lost opportunity, as recent analytic theology is yielding a harvest of sophisticated deductive, inductive, and abductive arguments which are not limited to mere theism but also distinctively Christian doctrines such as incarnation, atonement, and Eucharist.

Perhaps more notable is the absence of any mention of intelligent design theory. While I recognize that for many the cultural associations of intelligent design with conservative Christian hermeneutics and courthouse shenanigans have constituted a poison pill for further discussion, the basic question of whether (or under what conditions) natural science may appeal to intelligent/agent causal explanations is a critical one which is right on the vanguard of fruitful scientific and theological interaction. It seems to me that the movement deserves at least a mention, even if a critical one.

In my view, the most significant challenge to McGrath’s project is another point which receives insufficient attention in the book, and that is the unique plurality that characterizes contemporary theology. Theology is fractured not only into multiple competing models (e.g., neoclassical, process, and open models of God) but also into fundamental disagreements on the function of doctrine (e.g., post-liberalism, metaphorical theology, analytic theology). McGrath clearly privileges a realist orientation in

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theology, but it would be interesting to hear more on the specific challenges that theology faces in addressing this fracturing, perhaps in an exploration with the similar debates over models and methods that characterize modern science.

While those may be taken as criticisms, they are admittedly modest. For the most part, I found *The Territories of Human Reason* to offer a rich and eminently helpful survey of the land. McGrath's realist orientation combined with his commitment to multiple situated rationalities strikes just the right balance between the Scylla of Enlightenment reason and the Charybdis of postmodern skepticism. *The Territories of Human Reason* would make an excellent (and surprisingly affordable) textbook for a course in science and theology, prolegomena/fundamental theology, or philosophy of religion.

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PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE

ENHANCING CHRISTIAN LIFE: How Extended Cognition Augments Religious Community by Brad D. Strawn and Warren S. Brown. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2020. 176 pages, including title pages, acknowledgments, and indexes. Paperback; \$21.00. ISBN: 9780830852819.

"I'd like to supersize it" is not a statement I usually utter without guilt and some consternation. However, in *Enhancing Christian Life: How Extended Cognition Augments Religious Community*, Strawn and Brown present an argument that makes me question whether I say it enough—in the right contexts—and whether I live in a way that makes it so.

Strawn, a clinical psychologist, and Brown, an experimental neuropsychologist, wrote this book for individuals invested in deepening Christian lives. Across ten chapters, they develop an evidence-based argument in support of their assertion that "No one is Christian (or "spiritual") entirely on their own" (p. 12). Writing in response to the focus on single persons (e.g., individual spiritual experience) at the forefront of many Western evangelical churches, Strawn and Brown argue that such a prioritization of these internal, private experiences produces no more than a "puny" Christian faith and life.

The text is divided into three parts, guiding the reader through evidence about what persons are like (section 1), how persons function in the world

(section 2), and what this knowledge of persons—what we are like and how we function—means for the church and Christian life (section 3).

Section 1 explores how different views about human persons influence behavior and religious practice. Strawn and Brown contextualize the modern priority of internal, private, and emotional spirituality within the philosophical and historical framework of soul-body dualism. Following Owen Thomas,¹ Strawn and Brown propose that Christian spirituality and spiritual formation should be decentered away from personal piety and the "inner world of a person" (p. 33) and recentered on "the reign of God" and "how one lives one's actual life in the body (the outer)" (p. 33). This perspective, expounded in section 2, lays the groundwork for the implications of understanding persons as embodied, embedded, and extended.

Section 2 begins with the premise that relinquishing Cartesian dualism does not automatically solve the problem of prioritizing internal experiences or its consequences (i.e., salvation of souls as primary; activities related to physical, economic, and social needs are pursued secondarily, if at all). Indeed, some materialist views of persons have replaced Cartesian dualism with a Cartesian materialism wherein the brain, like an encapsulated and isolated computer, functions like a (relabelled) soul. Strawn and Brown reject this notion as well, as it reinforces the idea that there is some "inner reality (whether a soul or a brain) that is the real person" (p. 42).

Pointing to embodied cognition as a robust alternative to Cartesian dualism and materialism, Strawn and Brown note,

Embodied cognition argues that the processes of thinking actually involve the entire body—that is, what we refer to as our "mind" is grounded in interactions between the brain and the body, and is not solely dependent on brain processes. (p. 45)

This profoundly integrated sense of a whole person should also be understood as "fundamentally relational ... A self is a body whose actions are embedded in, and contextualized by, a community" (p. 56). Taken on its own, this view of human persons has important implications for religious practice and community. Yet, Strawn and Brown further the discussion by exploring how embodied and embedded individuals engage in the world in ways that surpass physiological boundaries; that is, humans are capable of extension—*supersizing*—beyond their embodied and embedded capabilities.