inductive generalizations from past experience—which is just what laws of nature are. McGrath rightly sees evolutionary arguments debunking religion as committing the genetic fallacy and self-defeating if human rationality is flawed, since that could equally well affect judgments in areas other than religion, notably science. There is a good section on natural theology and the role of explanation.

In the next chapter, McGrath turns to models and analogies: first, as found within the natural sciences and then, within religion. After considering what the terms mean more generally, he gives specific examples for the sciences, including the kinetic theory of gases, wave-particle duality, Galileo's analogical reasoning which led him to postulate mountains on the moon, and Darwin's metaphor of "natural selection." In the theological sphere, he considers Aquinas's notion of *analogia entis* whereby the creation bears a likeness to its creator, and Ian Ramsey's model of the "divine economy" utilizing the Greek concept of *oikonomia*. He looks at Arthur Peacocke's theological application of models as linked to "critical realism," and Sally McFague's metaphors in theology—though he could perhaps have allowed more than one sentence on Janet Soskice. He then examines specific theological examples: creation and theories of the atonement. He has a helpful section on the notion of "mystery" in science and religion before returning to Ian Barbour on models.

McGrath's final chapter considers a number of contemporary debates. Noting Hume's distinction between "ought" and "is" he critiques the idea that science, say, evolutionary biology or neuroscience, can determine ethics and moral values. That leads to a more general critique of the imperialist stance that science can answer all interesting questions or that the only reality is that disclosed by science. An interesting example is mathematics, which discovers truths that do not belong to the natural sciences. It is also utterly astonishing that mathematics is effective in describing nature and very hard to explain on an atheistic view.

An important area considered is theodicy, which is arguably made more difficult by the long process of evolution, preceding the existence of humans by hundreds of millions of years. McGrath provides an overview of the helpful contributions of Christopher Southgate and his former student Bethany Sollereder. For these scholars, there is "no other way" for God to create such a rich diversity of creatures, with whom God suffers, and for whom God will bring eschatological fulfilment. On transhumanism, McGrath describes the approaches of Philip Hefner and Ted Peters who, while recognizing the creativity of technological enhancement, are also aware that, given fallen human nature, this can also be abused.

McGrath returns to the anthropic principle and fine-tuning. He says that fine-tuning is strongly consistent with a theistic perspective, but the debate about a multiverse as a possible explanation continues. He also considers the legitimacy of teleological language and directionality in biology. Simon Conway Morris's notion of convergent evolution may be the "best explanation" of what is observed and is resonant with a religious perspective but, like cosmological fine-tuning, does not prove that God exists.

McGrath concludes with two sections on the psychology of religion, considering whether this field can "explain away" religion. Religion may be "natural," but it is debatable as to whether that has any implication at all about the existence of God. Moreover, it is a long way from primitive apprehension of some vague supernatural agent to the systematic theology of, say, Thomas Aquinas or Karl Barth. To my mind, this is not unlike the difference—to give a scientific analogy—between the discovery of fire by early humans and the modern scientific understanding of combustion.

This is an excellent introduction to the field and very well suited to its pedagogic purpose. There are a few typographical errors (e.g., "magisterial" for "magisteria"). I also noticed that British cosmologist Paul Davies is mistakenly described as American. But these and my earlier minor points should not detract from a volume that provides a vital resource to educators and their students.

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ANIMAL SUFFERING AND THE DARWINIAN PROBLEM OF EVIL by John R. Schneider. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020. xii + 287 pages. Hardcover; $99.99. ISBN: 9781108487603. Kindle; $60.49. ISBN: 9781108767439.

In *Animal Suffering and the Darwinian Problem of Evil*, John Schneider seeks to tackle four interconnected difficulties of reconciling evolution with a Christian understanding of God's creation: (1) deep evolutionary time and the startling reality that there have been hundreds of millions of years of violence; (2) the "plurality of worlds," the masses of now-extinct life that once inhabited our planet; (3) the discovery of "anti-cosmic micro-monsters," the realization that microbial life shares the violent and competitive world that macro scale life experiences; and (4) "evil inscribed," the discovery that natural selection is the very driving mechanism of creation, if evolution is to be believed.

Schneider does not set out to create a theodicy, in the technical jargon of the field, but follows Michael Murray's lead in his 2008 *Nature Red in Tooth and Claw* and seeks a "*causa Dei*": a possible reason for God to allow animal suffering that is more plausible than not. Schneider does not claim to know the actual reasons for natural evil, but only suggests probable reasons. The central suggestion is that, in line with Marilyn McCord Adams's work, evil must be defeated for God to be

justified. Evil is defeated when it is "a constitutive part of a valuable composite whole that not only outweighs the evil but could not be as valuable as it is without the evil" (p. 7).

Schneider spends the first six chapters setting out his space in the existing literature. He gives convincing reasons for avoiding animal theodicies that depend on a human or Satanic fall, which he finds "implausible in the extreme" (p. 100) for philosophical, scientific, and biblical reasons. He also rejects the "only way" approach developed by Christopher Southgate. Rather, he sees chaos (symbolized by the figure of the serpent in Genesis 2) as "incorporated into the original, 'very good' cosmic design" (p. 107). To defend this thesis, he develops an aesthetic approach to the problem of evil. God should be viewed as an artist, in which natural good and evil "create an overall picture of evolution as something like a larger story" (p. 155). Both the beauty and ugliness of nature call us to recognize a tragic sublime that helps us "see" a sense of divinity in the world. Schneider draws on biblical texts—in particular, the book of Job—as a source of theodical insight. Surprisingly, Schneider makes no use of Southgate's 2018 *Theology in a Suffering World* or Joel C. Daniels's 2016 *Theology, Tragedy, and Suffering in Nature* which might have been helpful dialogue partners for this approach because they offer aesthetic explorations of seeing God in the tragic side of creation.

Schneider presents two last interesting thoughts. First, that Jesus's death takes the place of the sacrificial animals in Hebrew tradition, not as a symbolic gesture, but so that in the purification rites of Yom Kippur, the one animal is not slaughtered, and the scapegoat does not have to be exiled and die in the wild. "On the cross, Jesus assumes both these animal roles—for the sake of the animals *themselves*" (p. 240, italics original). In so doing, Jesus enters "symbolically into the place of non-human and human alike, and thereby 'declaring' that responsibility for the suffering of animals inscribed into the design of nature finally falls on God" (p. 240). While not dissimilar to Southgate's suggestion that, in the Cross, God takes responsibility for all suffering, human and nonhuman, this more literal exchange brings a particularity to the instances of animal suffering that is directly linked to Jesus's death.

Second, Schneider takes seriously the idea of animal resurrection, but holds that the usual solutions for that do not do enough to defeat the evil that animals experience. Schneider suggests instead that animals should be elevated "to a high heavenly standing analogous to the venerated position enjoyed by human martyrs" (p. 264). They are honored for the part their suffering played on Earth and enjoy the admiration of others for their sacrifice.

As with any good book, there are things to quibble with. Schneider follows the work of Carol Newsom and Samuel Balentine closely in his reading of the book of

Job. Newsom's assesses Job's gain in the all-important divine speeches as "tragic insight," a view that points to the limits of dialogue and the end of anything left to be said (Carol Newsom, *The Book of Job* [Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009], 253). Yet Schneider says, "I must depart from her conclusion on what Job 'saw,'" instead forwarding a view that offers a "*transfiguration of tragedy into faith*" (p. 191, italics original). Schneider maintains that if one is to create a *causa Dei*, or a defense, one must meet a "seeing condition": that is, must "provide a perspective in which one can at least begin to 'see' that God is engaged in the defeat of evil now" (p. 195). Schneider's insights on the book of Job as meeting that condition depend on his departure from Newsom's interpretation. Yet he defends the strength of his larger theodical argument because it is based on an interpretation of Job that is "grounded … in the scholarship of specialists on the historical and literary character of the book" (p. 199). Schneider's appeal to authority here is questionable given that he differs from those authorities on the key hermeneutical issue of the book.

I also was glad for Schneider's extended treatment on my own work, *God, Evolution and Animal Suffering*, which overall, was fair (he is right, for example, on p. 257, that my proposals do not meet the seeing condition). However, his assessment of the moral-justificatory concerns on pp. 259–60 caused me to raise an eyebrow of surprise, as my example of how the death of dinosaurs could be seen as a meaningful part of the beauty of Bach's music was taken in a direction I never anticipated. Schneider took me to mean that "if God's aim all along was to bring forth mammalian and distinctly human life, then the dinosaurs had to be exterminated by some means" (p. 260). So, the death of the dinosaurs, and indeed of all prehuman life, was an engineered steppingstone to humans. This could not be farther from what I intended, as I hoped my engagement with Ruth Page's concept of "teleology-now" would show. Instead, I meant that God could link two seemingly unrelated historical events in a way that each created meaning for the other. If dinosaurs had not died in an asteroid strike, perhaps God might have created creatures in God's image among the descendants of the velociraptors. By no means do I think that God engineered animal death for particular historical ends, but rather that God creates ways of redeeming all suffering by an act of creation of meaning.

Regarding Schneider's thought that animals should be thought of as martyrs, the odd thing about this proposal is that martyrs are honored, not for dying, but for dying willingly for the sake of Christ. Schneider writes, "martyrs do not have to pass tests for entry into Heaven" (p. 266), but this overlooks that the very imagery he is drawing on in the book of Revelation assumes that they have already passed tests in what they suffered by refusing to recant Christ (Rev. 2:10, 6:9). This puts martyrs in quite a different place from the suffering experienced by animals, which is always unwilling even if equally

innocent. Martyrs are honored for their choice to suffer when the option of being spared was presented to them—just like Jesus did. Animals are given no such choice, so it is difficult to see how being honored for an unwilling death undoes the injustice of putting them through suffering in the first place.

Yet, despite the ongoing quibbles, this is a concise and insightful book. It sets out a valid set of criteria and goes a long way toward achieving arguments that meet those criteria. I think it will become a staple of animal theodicy courses and is appropriate for upper-level undergraduate reading. It engages well with the other books in the field, and while it takes a more analytical and philosophical approach to this question compared to Christopher Southgate's *The Groaning of Creation* or my own *God, Evolution and Animal Suffering*, it does so with rich engagement with biblical texts and theological tradition.

A comment on the physical copy of the book I received: the printing was done with extremely rough pixilation, which has resulted in rather crude lettering. The book uses a serif font, but these were not printed in their totality and many letters have small gaps in them. While reading, this makes the letters look blurry and out of focus, or as if the printer ran out of ink. It is disappointing that the printing quality is so poor in a book that costs so much. Readers who will be bothered by this should opt for the digital edition where the letters are fully present.

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ANALOG CHURCH: Why We Need Real People, Places and Things in the Digital Age by Jay Y. Kim. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2020. 192 pages. Paperback; $18.00. ISBN: 9780830841585.

There is a thought-provoking irony about this book. *Analog Church: Why We Need Real People, Places and Things in the Digital Age* by Jay Y. Kim was written prior to the 2020 pandemic, and published at its first peak around March of that year. The book serves as a creative warning about the church "over-embracing" modern technology and all that the digital age offers, at the cost of stifling its original purpose, a purpose steeped in analog principles of empathetic relationship. Fair enough! But along come the COVID-19 restrictions, and the church (and every other part of our institutionalized life) jumps full steam ahead as digital technology becomes essential. My own perspective is from Canadian Presbyterianism. It, with some exception, has been slow to embrace many technological advances when it comes to "doing church." Nonetheless, it and many other churches have been dragged into the twenty-first century with near abandon. The number of churches doing meetings and Sunday worship via YouTube, Zoom, Facebook, and other platforms has skyrocketed.

The prophetic voice inherent in *Analog Church* is speaking to the church community at a time when it is relying on digital technology to continue functioning. The introductory section of the book focuses on how technology, in and of itself, is not adequate to reach those who are searching for a transcendent meaning and purpose in life, and may, in fact, steer people away from such a relationship. In an introductory section entitled "When Values Turn Vicious," the author notes that "the digital age's technological advancements boast three major contributions to the improvement of human experience …" (p. 15). These are speed, choices, and individualism. He notes that when such values unduly influence the church and aren't held accountable, "they turn vicious." Speed has made us impatient, choices have made us shallow, individualism has made us isolated.

It is on this premise that the author uses the remainder of the book to detail his warnings and his reasons for hope. The chapter titles are provided here, as they are descriptive of the content. Part 1 has two chapters which examine worship: "Cameras, Copycats and Caricatures: Worship in the Digital Age"; and "To Engage and to Witness: Analog Worship." Part 2 considers community: "Rebuilding Babel: Community in the Digital Age"; and "A Tax Collector and a Zealot Walk into A Crossfit: Analog Community." Part 3 looks at scripture: "Jackpot: Scripture in the Digital Age"; "HowToReadABook: Analog Scripture"; and "The Meal at the Center of History: Communion."

An example of the author's approach can be taken from the section on worship. He has the reader consider "how the digital age and technology's influence have subverted much of what worship life of the gathered people of God is meant to be" (p. 35), in part in the church's effort to reach new generations. Here he invokes the wisdom of Canadian philosopher and media guru Marshall McLuhan. He notes how McLuhan's 1960's prophetic voice is making a return due to the precise nature of his pronouncements, and how they match current circumstances. He summarizes McLuhan's "Four Laws of Media" (media in a very broad sense), as applicable to our use of technology today in the church, and, in this case, worship. The laws are summarized as follows: what does it enhance, what does it push aside, what does it retrieve that was previously pushed aside, and, what does it turn into when pushed to an extreme? As Kim moves into the value of analog worship, he notes that "digital informs," but "analog transforms," and similarly, "digital entertains, analog engages."

The author works into his narrative a number of stories based on his own life experiences, and pastors and speakers will find these worthy of using in their own teaching. While there are biblical references scattered throughout, this reviewer particularly appreciates the detailed way some scriptural passages are handled.