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built upon other research and relied on collaboration at least as much as individual genius. Larson focuses on a particular neuroscience project and makes some valid criticisms, but then he generalizes his observations to all of science in ways that I do not believe to be accurate. His argument that all of science is moving away from theory toward shallow observations is not as obvious as he claims, nor is it supported by the evidence offered in the book.

As a counterexample, the research that resulted in the COVID-19 vaccine could be considered “swarm science” and was effective. Large amounts of funding were very suddenly directed to many scientists for one goal: understand and prevent the coronavirus. Due to both new funding and established research, we developed and approved multiple vaccines in one year. I was not convinced of several of Larson’s generalizations in this third section. Tension between celebrating collaboration and individual genius will persist. However, it appears that there is more collaboration in science today. This is likely due to a variety of reasons, including a scientific community connected by the internet and more contributors receiving appropriate credit for their work.

The Myth of AI is a broad view of AI that should prove valuable and comprehensible to readers with or without a technical background. The first two sections offer a clear explanation and history of AI, and the third offers food for thought on how the process of science has been shaped by advances in AI and computer technology. The first sections would be a good introduction to someone not familiar with AI or looking to think about the philosophy of AI and I would recommend the book for these sections.

While the book avoids religious claims, the philosophical discussions of what it means to “understand” and the level of trust we place in AI are essential questions for Christians working in technology-related disciplines. *The Myth of AI* presents a jumping-off point for much deeper reflection about using AI responsibly and what it means to be human.

Reviewed by Elizabeth Koning, graduate student in the Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801.

THEOLOGY

SCIENCE IN THEOLOGY: Encounters between Science and the Christian Tradition by Neil Messer. New York: T&T Clark, 2020. xii + 191 pages. Paperback; \$22.95. ISBN: 9780567689818.

When reading this title, I confess that I wondered if we really need another book on science and theology, or another typology of the relationship between the two, or another critique of typologies. On finishing the volume, however, I believe that it does indeed make a helpful contribution to the expanding literature on the subject.

Neil Messer, professor of theology at the University of Winchester, UK, has a PhD in molecular biology and an MA in Christian ethics. *Science in Theology* is a well-researched, accessible treatment of the relationship between the two. The preposition in Messer’s title is intentional, suggesting that we focus on what part science plays *in* our Christian conceptions about ourselves and our world in relation to God, rather than adopting a modern view of science *and* theology as separate categories. This hints at his welcome prioritizing of theology—faith seeking understanding, not faith looking for science to justify faith’s veracity. Like many, he considers both the voice of the Christian tradition (incorporating the familiar quadrilateral of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience) and the scientific voice (including only the last two aspects of the quadrilateral). Messer argues that previous typologies are too broad and have difficulty accommodating the diversity and complexity of current literature in the field.

He proposes a five-fold typology, which I find appealing in its simplicity and applicability:

1. Only the scientific voice contributes; contributions from Christianity are denied or dismissed.
2. Both voices contribute, but the scientific one is dominant; Christian claims must be adjusted to fit the scientific perspective.
3. Both voices contribute equally.
4. Both voices contribute, but the Christian one dominates in shaping the encounter.
5. Only the voice of the Christian tradition contributes; scientific claims are denied or dismissed.

What is unique about Messer's work is not just his new typology, but the fact that he tests it and, in doing so, also provides a summary of the current literature in three diverse areas of the science-faith dialogue: divine action, natural evil, and the cognitive study of religion. Messer notes that his typology focuses on the approach to a topic, not on the content of the argument. Thus, two authors may use the same method but disagree with each other's conclusions. In addition, the contribution of each tradition is qualitative as well as quantitative; how much as well as what we learn from science or theology is important.

Messer acknowledges that it is easy for types to meld together: a Type 3 plan can easily slip into a Type 2, and a Type 4 approach could be similar to the concept of non-overlapping magisteria (more like Type 5). He cautions that his typology can only describe particular positions, and thus should not be used to make generalizations. He also admits that his typology focuses on cognitive aspects of faith to the exclusion of confessional and practical aspects, and that not all topics allow integration (e.g., Christ's incarnation and resurrection, eschatology). However, Messer's typology does allow for flexibility and nuance—he claims that his typology makes diversity more visible. Furthermore, each approach can be used as a critique to the others.

Messer notes that Types 1 and 5 tend to close down the dialogue but offer helpful contributions on occasion. Interestingly, he notes an example of a Christian who uses a Type 1-style argument: cognitive scientist Justin Barrett uses only empirical evidence and reason to support claims about God's existence and nature. Messer believes that Types 3 and 4 are generally the most helpful approaches. This is interesting because it is often assumed that ideal science-faith integration should allow equal contributions. But a true Type 3 approach is challenging because we all start from a particular position. If we view the world through a Christian lens, then Type 4 becomes the aim.

With respect to his first topic, divine action, Messer appropriately notes that most of the work done in this area, namely the Divine Action Project, has been of a Type 2 variety. The critique is that excess reliance on science may limit our conceptions of how God acts in the world. This was personally helpful,

as I have questioned the feasibility of such a project—categorizing it helps to explain my doubts. Messer discusses the recent “theological turn” in the debate, noting that it too has problems.

On the topic of evolution and natural evil, Messer, not surprisingly, refers to his own publications, categorizing his work as Type 4. He argues that Type 2 approaches require unnecessary distancing of God from his creation, and that the “only way” or “best of all possible worlds” (Type 3) argument of Christopher Southgate inadequately accounts for suffering, and places too much weight on science as a means for understanding God's goodness. Messer instead follows Barth in viewing evil as “nothingness,” a by-product of creation, and emphasizes our need to counteract evil.

I especially appreciate Messer's inclusion of scientific studies of religion as his final test case; this topic is not often considered in science-theology texts. He considers cognitive factors in religious belief, evolutionary accounts of religion, and neuroscientific studies of belief. Type 3 examples include Barrett's “confessional natural theology” and Nancey Murphy's idea of theology as secondary to experience. Barth's critique of theology that starts with human experience is used as an example of Type 4 (although Barth would not have known about scientific studies of religion). Perhaps because of the diversity of the topic, the treatment of it was less clear than in previous chapters. Works used to illustrate the typologies are often addressing quite different questions. This chapter would have benefited from a clarification of the distinctions between faith and religion, and a consideration of differing presuppositions, such as the mind-brain relationship, in the various positions.

In his conclusion, Messer interestingly considers other voices aside from science and theology, namely, philosophy and the arts. I love that he offers a nod to poetry as a nonscientific way to understand reality. Unfortunately, these discussions are very brief. I would have liked more discussion on how the arts relate to his typology, or a broader typology such as models of the relationship between culture and Christianity.

Finally, Messer offers suggestions for how to use this book, either as a means to evaluate, clarify, and categorize other works, or to write a new one. Naturally,

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I evaluated my own recent work on causation and discovered that although my intent was more Type 3, I ended up perhaps closer to Type 4! It will be interesting to see how others apply Messer's typology.

Although I appreciate its brevity, I would have read this book even if it were longer! I do wonder if some topics could have been addressed with greater detail, and if other topics, such as technology, creation care, or astrobiology could have been included. Nevertheless, *Science in Theology* offers a very helpful new framework for conceptualizing the dialogue between the two subjects as well as providing an excellent introduction to some contemporary issues, suitable for students or for the nonspecialist looking to further his/her education on the topic.

Reviewed by E. Janet Warren, Past President of the Canadian Scientific and Christian Affiliation.

THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION: A Constructive Kuyperian Approach by Bruce Riley Ashford and Craig G. Bartholomew. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2020. 366 pages, appendix, bibliography, index. Hardcover; \$50.00. ISBN: 9780830854905.

This book is a welcome addition to our need for more work on the doctrine of creation. The authors, one Baptist (Ashford) and one Anglican (Bartholomew), offer what they term a "Kuyperian" or Dutch neo-Calvinist perspective (perhaps more properly, neo-Reformed?). They seek to be exegetical, not merely creedal, in their exposition. In 366 pages of text, they offer a doctrine of creation that comprehends the classical loci and add some of more recent concern.

The authors cover the classical loci in a systematic, well-organized way. In the first, creedally based, chapter, they lay out their approach and orient readers to their exposition of the doctrine. The following two chapters provide a brief but very well-done history of the doctrine. In the chapter from the early church up to the modern period, they survey the teachers of the church, with Irenaeus holding pride of place. This survey touches on the right people and draws out the constructive contributions that each makes. The only group that is treated almost entirely negatively is, predictably, the Anabaptists (pp. 66–68). The authors select negative examples, confuse an Anabaptist doctrine of the world with a doctrine of creation, and make tendentious use

of selective quotes. It's hard to credit Anabaptists with a denigration of creation (or earthly matters) when they have well-formed practices of communal life, the sharing of goods, and, to be anachronistic, a thoughtful political theology rooted in particular practices of pacifism. Anabaptists are far from perfect, but they do not lack a doctrine of creation. It's just not one that's discernible through Dutch neo-Calvinist eyes.

The following chapter is an insightful tour of some highlights of the Modern Period with welcome attention to the wrongly neglected Johann Georg Hamann (pp. 75–80). In a clear and concise account of interpretations of Genesis 1 and the entanglement of God, creation, and science, Ashford and Bartholomew describe five positions that depend on "the conclusions of modern science" (p. 98). They then espouse a "literary framework theory" represented by Lee Irons and Meredith Kline, which argues that Genesis 1 reveals "three creation kingdoms" (days 1–3) and "three creation kings" (days 4–6). The picture is completed on day 7 when "God establishes himself as King on the Sabbath" (p. 98). This is filled out in the authors' later chapter on Genesis 1: the three creation kingdoms are "light; sky/seas; land/vegetation;" the three creation kings are "luminaries; sea creatures/winged creatures; land animals/men" (*sic*, pp. 155–70). This chapter concludes with a foundational assertion:

In the twenty-first century, a full-orbed Irenaean doctrine of creation presents itself as a salient remedy for the ills of our modern and postmodern eras ... Among Christian traditions in the modern period, the Dutch neo-Calvinist tradition is, in our opinion, particularly fruitful in providing resources for a recovery and renewal of the Irenaean doctrine of creation. (p. 99)

Following from this, the authors "outline the broad contours of the neo-Calvinist view of creation in seven propositions ..." (p. 103). Most of these propositions are familiar and commonplace within Christian orthodoxy. But two require further comment. The sixth proposition states that "*sin and evil cannot corrupt God's good creation structurally or substantially*" (p. 102; italics theirs). There may be profound truth in this, but the question of corrupt structures must be clarified. How does a "Kuyperian approach" empower a critique of injustice and oppression in, for example, the over-familiar case of apartheid?