I have taught a number of adult discipleship classes at my home church, some on issues that involve science. Bringing science into the church and helping people talk about science and faith is important to me. I consider helping Christians who are non-scientists to integrate science and faith faithfully, a responsibility of scientists who are people of faith. I am glad that I found and read this book, and I will be adding it to the list of potential topics for a future adult discipleship class at our church. It is a class I'd be eager to teach, in large part because this is such an excellent resource. I hope more scientists pick up this helpful book and use it to facilitate discussion on *Jesus, Beginnings, and Science* in many contexts.

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## Φ Philosophy

**ON HUMAN NATURE** by Roger Scruton. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017. 151 pages. Hardcover; $22.95. ISBN: 9780691168753.

The distinguished writer and philosopher Roger Scruton has written an admirable and clear account of what we might call the human difference in his book *On Human Nature*. It is, in some respects, a scaled-down version of *The Soul of the World* (Princeton University Press, 2014). As in his earlier work, Scruton takes aim at reductionist accounts of human beings, whether from evolutionary psychology, biology, or neuroscience. This is, probably, the strongest part of the book and of most interest to readers of *PSCF*, so that is where I will be concentrating my energies in this review. Though he draws upon other philosophic traditions, Scruton's main influence is Immanuel Kant; throughout his book, Scruton demonstrates the continuing relevance and contribution of the Kantian tradition to an account of personhood.

While Scruton accepts that we are biological beings governed by biological impulses and demands, he rejects the notion that reductionist views of human beings could ever capture, without remainder, our humanity. We are middling beings with one foot in biology and the other in culture. We have emerged from our biological past into personhood, and that means not just consciousness, but also self-consciousness, freedom, and moral awareness. Scruton uses an analogy to talk about the nature of personhood as an emergent reality. A portrait painter may work with lines and blobs of paint, and, looking at the painting, we may see mere lines and blobs, but assuming that the painter is skilled, eventually we shall also see a human face emerge from the canvas. At some point, never mind when exactly, the number of lines and blobs "conspire" to become a face. There is, Scruton says, quoting Hegel, "a transition from quantity to quality" (p. 38). On the one hand, the face can be viewed as a property of the canvas distinct from the blobs of paint "for you can observe the blobs and not see the face, and vice versa" (p. 31). On the other hand, it can be argued that the face is *not* "an additional property of the canvas, over and above the lines and blobs." This is true because, as soon as we see the lines and blobs, we see the face. Scruton suggests that this is the way we should view our personhood: rooted in the life and behavior of the body, but not reducible to it. Put another way, Scruton believes that reality is multilayered, that some new and unprecedented whole can spring from the parts.

As persons, we come to exist in a new order of things with new potentialities. One of these potentialities is that we are free beings. The emergence of freedom opens a new relation with ourselves as a conscious center of self and a new kind of relation to others, as we realize that they, too, are self-conscious beings. We come to recognize that we not only have desires but that we can also evaluate those desires, asking ourselves whether those particular desires are worthy of being desired. This process of recognition and evaluation is the emergence of the ethical in us. For Scruton, the emergence of these things makes human beings qualitatively different from our closest living ancestors, the chimpanzee and bonobo.

Related to these points, but with a little different emphasis, is Scruton's discussion of "the intentional stance." The intentional stance means that we experience ourselves from the first-person perspective and can know and welcome others as sharing in our life when we address them as "you." Scruton takes issue with the "eliminative materialism" of Paul and Patricia Churchland, since they seek to dissolve the human self and agency in a welter of neurological soup. The first-person comportment so essential to Scruton's worldview is lost to a third-person account of synapses and the neurochemistry of the brain. No place for personhood here, let alone such things as intentionality or moral responsibility. Scruton is wary of the Churchlands' project since what is eliminated in their materialist account of the person is *the person*. For Scruton, the first-person stance peculiar to human beings is the essential ground of our ability to experience and appreciate "the second-person standpoint" (p. 50). The second-person perspective (in conjunction with the first-person stance) serves as the basis of our sense of moral responsibility to the other.

Scruton ventures into an analysis of the nature of the political, a critique of utilitarianism ("moral arithmetic"), and the sacred, but space prevents me from considering these. Instead, let me close by turning to his engaging, Kantian-inspired critique of pornography. I turn to this topic chiefly for the way in which Scruton's analysis touches upon some of the important themes of the book, namely the emergence of the self and how this is related to the ethical dimension. Scruton makes the interesting point that porn depicts such a depersonalized space in which arousal and desire occur that observers are encouraged to regard themselves as if they were disengaged automatons, that is, non-selves engaged in using the other as a kind of apparatus. With porn, human agency and intimacy is banished since there is, in a sense, no "I" or "You" in relation, only "It."

> The real evil of porn lies not in its portrayal of other people as sexual objects but in the radical decentering that it effects in the sexual feelings of the observer. It prizes sexual excitement free from the I-You relation and directs it to a nameless scene of mutual arousal, in which arousal too is depersonalized, as though it were a physical condition and not an expression of the self. This decentering of arousal and desire makes them into things that *happen* to me, occurring under the harsh light of a voyeuristic torch instead of being part of what I am to you and you to me, in the moment of intimacy. (p. 74)

I do not know if this is the best book on the topic, but, in his many books, Scruton has surely done us a service in helping us to see the vital role that philosophy and the humanities must play in a world increasingly given over to the conviction that only the quantifiable is real, only the measurable is important. I recommend this book for undergraduate libraries in the humanities.

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**THE ASHTRAY (OR THE MAN WHO DENIED REALITY)** by Errol Morris. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2018. xii–207 pages plus cast of characters, bibliography, and index. Hardcover; $30.00. ISBN: 9780226922683.

Perhaps you long have had your fill of reading Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* [*SSR*] (University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1st edition) or one of the later three editions, as well as books or articles by his many philosophical and historical critics. *The Ashtray* by Errol Morris, the illustrious filmmaker and creator of such classics of documentary investigation as *The Thin Blue Line* and *The Fog of War*, provides an account that may reawaken your interest. This book revives an argument that Morris had with the historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn in 1972. And what a combative revival it is—complete with personal anecdotes, illustrations, film references, and interviews with philosophers and scientists. This book recalls a formative event: the tossing of an ashtray filled with cigarette butts and ash at a belligerent graduate student in the hallowed halls of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey—the event that led to Morris's expulsion from Princeton University and ended his intended study of the history of science. One could question: Should we even attempt to revive the past? Morris clearly thinks it is imperative that we do. Is it time, after almost half a century, for a student to take revenge on his former professor? Morris is not obtuse. He intends to launch a personal "vendetta" (p. 3, fn. 5 ). But why (the ashtray aside)?

In *SSR*, Kuhn outlined a revolutionary model of scientific change and examined the role of the scientific community in preventing and then accepting change. Kuhn's conception of scientific change, occurring through revolutions, undermined (or at least questioned) the traditional scientific goal of finding "truth" in nature. The picture Kuhn presents is one in which exemplary achievements yield a family of techniques constituting a paradigm which, in the course of its extension, proves appropriate for solving certain problems or puzzles.

A paradigm is not specifiable as a list of theoretical propositions or methodological rules; it is not developed by logical deduction from premises. Rather, the exemplar is learned as a model problem solution and is applied by analogy to what are judged as similar phenomena. To the extent that the problems presented by new phenomena are solved, the paradigm continues to be adhered to, expanding and modifying its range as time goes on. This is what Kuhn calls normal science. As exemplary problem solutions, paradigms are learned as ways of seeing and doing. Quite a lot of the process of scientific education, in Kuhn's view, consists of imparting unarticulated skills and interpretive dispositions. The required perceptual and motor abilities that apprentice scientists must learn cannot be fully spelled out as a set of rules.

Clearly there are circularities in Kuhn: "A paradigm is what members of the scientific community share, and conversely a scientific community consists of men [people] who share a paradigm" (*SSR*, 1970 edition, p. 176). The circularity could be avoided, he suggested, if the investigation were to begin with a discussion of the community structure of science. In his effort to explain a community's consideration of a paradigm shift or conversion, Kuhn appealed to