life and an intellectual defense of religious belief and practice. This defense was conducted, first, by a demonstration of the rationality of so-called "primitive" religions; next, by a challenge to anthropology to reject positive science in favor of a humanist approach to social history (p. 110); and then, by a rejection of the notion that religion can be reduced to other arenas of life. "He who accepts the reality of spiritual beings," stated Evans-Pritchard, "does not feel the same need for such explanations" (p. 99).

Mary Douglas, Larsen's next anthropologist, was raised and remained a practicing and devout Catholic for her entire life. She especially defended the church and wove her commitment to it into her theorizing about the nature of hierarchy and its necessity for social life. Douglas is followed by Victor and Edith Turner, who began their adult married life as atheists, but converted to Catholicism as a result of their anthropological work on ritual in Africa. Victor Turner openly defended Christianity when describing his conversion:

> It seemed more reasonable to hypothecate a purposive somebody behind the structure of the universe than a purposeless something … if materialism be right, our thoughts are determined by irrational processes and therefore the thoughts which lead to the conclusion that materialism is right have no relation to reason. (p. 185)

Edith, however, wandered into quasi-animist thinking after Victor's death, and now defends the existence of the "supernatural" in ways that would have helped Tylor make his point that it is all nonsense. The ring is complete.

Larsen's book is helpful in providing background information for the history of the discipline and for demonstrating the complexity of its relation to Christian faith. The anthropologist La Fontaine had said, "Once you stop religious thought, you start thinking anthropologically" (p. 167). Yet, as Larsen points out, theology has been there all along as a conversation partner (p. 225). All of these anthropologists, whether hostile or friendly to faith, used biblical words, concepts, and analogies in their theorizing. Larsen concludes that "Christian thought continues to invite and repel anthropologists, to intrigue and to haunt them, even in the second half of the twentieth century and into the new millennium" (p. 226). Though a bit inclined to "purple prose," the book will be valuable to Christian students and scholars of anthropology who would like to find ways to incorporate faith into the discipline.

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THE TERRITORIES OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION by Peter Harrison. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 300 pages, including 100 pages of notes, bibliography, and index. Hardcover; $30.00. ISBN: 9780226184487.

A revised version of Peter Harrison's 2011 Gifford Lectures was recently published as a monograph under the title *The Territories of Science and Religion*. The book lays out an in-depth study of how the modern concepts of religion and science emerged in European history and grew to take on the prominent roles that they have today. Harrison identifies the medieval virtues of *religio* and *scientia* as important progenitor concepts, and by following the story of their evolution, he expands a historical narrative developed in his previous work. The lecture format makes for a bit of redundancy from chapter to chapter, but the interleaving themes are complex and merit repetition. In any case, the writing is crisp, the documentation is extensive, and the arguments are clear. One of the book's most original and important contributions is the recovery of a close historical connection between the world of value and moral normativity on the one hand and the world of factual knowledge and belief on the other. In the words of the author, the focus on virtues offers "an entirely new perspective on these issues" and allows us "to more closely relate the history of moral philosophy to the history of science" (p. xi).

As Harrison reminds us straightaway, our modern concepts of religion and science are not permanent categories that map neatly onto distinct territories or natural kinds of human activity. To use his geopolitical example from chapter 1, our concepts of religion and science are historically contingent in the same way that our concepts of Israel and Egypt are. It is meaningless to talk about the relationship between the nations of Israel and Egypt in the year 1600, because those nations did not exist at that time. Similarly, it does not make much sense to discuss the relationship between religion and science in 1600, because people then did not organize their thinking in this way. Of course, there were ideas, beliefs, and practices through which people served God and conceptualized physical reality, just as there were lands and territories in the region where the states of Israel and Egypt lie now. However, prior to the modern era, people's activities were not aggregated in ways that correspond to our current categories of religion and science. The use of our categories to explain those activities can only obscure our understanding of historical reality. The historian's job is to reverse the order of explanation, so as to show us where our modern concepts came from, and thereby to explain how we got from there to here.

One of Harrison's previously established theses is worth summarizing here. It starts with the Protestant Reformation, which rejected both the allegorical mode of interpreting the Bible and the related emblematic tradition that gave spiritual meanings to natural things and creatures. Prior to this shift, the two books of scripture and nature were understood to be consistent cross-references. The allegorical and emblematic hermeneutical strategies were mutually reinforcing. However, once these forms of reading were prohibited, Christians were left with only literal meanings in the words of scripture and no meanings at all in the things of nature. This crisis of meaning created a void that the newly emerging experimental philosophy was well suited to fill. Harrison's *The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science* pursues these arguments in detail and establishes that the rejection of traditional hermeneutics played an important enabling role in the development of belief-testing empirical methods during the seventeenth century.

In *Territories*, Harrison rehearses this earlier thesis but focuses more intently on a second Protestant rejection—namely, the abandonment of the teleological framework of Aquinas's moral philosophy. As this framework dissolved, a comprehensive conception of Christian piety was lost, and virtues such as *religio* and *scientia* ceased to be parts of an integrated moral picture. Consequently, just as the denial of allegory left words and things with few ways of pointing toward divine meaning, the denial of teleology left individual people with no sure way of directing their capacities toward divine purposes. Moreover, without meaning or purpose to orient them, the essences of worldly creatures and human capacities became difficult to see. New uncertainties surrounded the notions of *what things are* as well as the notions of *what things are for*.

With meaning and purpose up for grabs, Protestant Europe became a "wild West" of Christian philosophy. Individuals and sects explored various forms of ra-tionality and piety, while governments, churches, and other emerging social institutions tried to establish new regimes of order. Although the political dynamics of this period are not Harrison's main concern, acknowledging them here may help to explain his central argument. In *Territories*, the shift that defines modernity is the relocation of moral and intellectual standards from the "internal" world of individual intentions to the "external" world of society and shared policies. Modern concepts of religion and science are both products of this externalizing shift. As such, they play key roles in defining and maintaining societal order.

The movement from *religio* to "religion" in the seventeenth century is the first case in point. During this period, new levels of social discord were fueled by doctrinal controversy and radical sectarianism. The adjudication of conflicts called for judgments based on acceptable criteria, and these were to be found in Protestant confessional documents and the evidence-generating methods of the emerging experimental philosophy. In this procedural context, the moral virtue *religio*, which previously steered the human heart toward God, was flattened into a mere willingness to accept certain doctrinal tenets. Creedal statements became the legal checks and balances of faith. Eventually it was understood that "one's religion" consisted in the system of beliefs to which one subscribed. Moreover, according to Harrison, there was a growing sense that personal faith could be properly directed toward God only if it were first directed toward (or through) correct doctrine, or "true religion." This development represents a decisive step in the creation of our modern concept of religion.

The historical path of *scientia* is also closely tied to social realities. Traditionally, this virtue corresponded to habits of intellectual rigor in studies of mathematical, geometrical, and logical demonstration. Its purpose in medieval moral philosophy was the cultivation of rational faculties that served the higher purposes of the theological virtues. In the seventeenth century, proponents of the experimental philosophy initiated their methodological revolution by combining the demonstrative elements of *scientia* with principles of observation and induction. The arguments supporting this "mixed methods" innovation took Christian moral philosophy in a new direction. The main goal was no longer the deepening of each person's relationship with God, but rather the advancement of knowledge and the betterment of society. Along with this change came a new calling for natural philosophers to contribute to a storehouse of knowledge that might be accessed by others and used for practical purposes. In these changes we see the seeds of the idea that science is an ever-growing body of knowledge that can exist independently outside of the human mind.

In these early stages, says Harrison, "the natural sciences gained considerable social legitimacy through their sharing of intellectual territory with religion" (p. 115). Indeed, the new territory that they shared was not only intellectual but also moral, for a new vision of human progress had taken root. The prospect of achieving societal peace and prosperity is what precipitated the view that religions are sets of doctrines, and it is also what drove the formation of institutions of science, such as the Royal Society.

Harrison suggests that this new vision of progress represents another modern relocation or externalization of human value. To medieval Christians, progress in matters of faith was related to one's internal, spiritual well-being; now progress meant the advancement of external, societal well-being. *Scientia* and *religio* had served the old kind of progress; science and religion would serve the new.

The Christian West spent the better part of two centuries growing into its new philosophical framework. In the absence of allegorical connections, the books of scripture and nature continued to be linked by way of a focus on their common Author. Natural theology took on the new complexion of physico-theology, which churned up new empirical knowledge and regarded the discoveries as indicators of the Creator's wisdom and power. Early modern sciences thus developed the aim of accumulating a storehouse of evidences that could be used for the purposes of theological reflection. As for explanations within the sciences, the rise of mechanistic causation gave footing to a new theological conception in the "laws of nature." With teleological explanations boycotted, natural objects lost their intrinsic causal powers. However, objects could still be understood in terms of their subjection and responses to divinely mandated universal laws. This conception aligned closely with the idea that humans, under the moral law, were called to decipher the laws of nature and to put them to work in fulfillment of the cultural mandate.

So goes the story of Protestantism's role in motivating the development of modern science and technology. However, Harrison points out that Christians were never unanimous in their support of the new kind of progress. In every age, there were those who suggested that something had been lost. Piety was compromised in the "'brain religion' that placed propositional belief ahead of God and neighbor" (p. 115). The moral shaping of individuals was shortchanged by a stunted sense of vocation that aimed at the mere accumulation of knowledge. The reality of human fallenness threw a persistent shadow of doubt on the reliability of empirical knowledge. And to top it all off, the societal benefits of "useful applications" were questionable. An important point emerges from these considerations—namely, that Christians have never been unanimous in thinking that science supports faith or serves society in ways that are thoroughly or unambiguously positive.

While the ambiguities of the modern mindset were disturbing to some all along, it was not until the nineteenth century that the concepts of science and religion were renovated once again to create the impression of a deeply antagonistic dichotomy. This movement was driven by a triumphalist advocacy of science and a low view of the aims of physico-theology. Harrison's primary example is the X Club, which was led by Thomas Henry Huxley and active from 1864 to 1893. This group sought to professionalize science through the exclusion of clerical ranks from the Royal Society and the elimination of God talk in scientific discourse. Owing mainly to such efforts, science came to be understood as religion's opposite, so that by the end of the century, it was easy enough to draw clear boundaries between the two concepts. Moreover, it became possible to construct a tale about their timeless and intrinsic hostilities toward each other, which were purportedly based on deep differences in their understandings of what knowledge is and what its purposes are. The narrative of conflict and warfare was immortalized in the well-known books written by J. W. Draper (in 1874) and A. D. White (in 1896).

The conflict myth haunts us today in more ways than we usually imagine. Harrison's account is important in this context, because it makes us aware of the myth's faulty assumptions and encourages us to avoid repeating the same mistakes. To those who would enter the fray of "science-and-religion," whether by reading or writing, *Territories* offers a number of cautionary lessons. First, the modern concept of religion emerged only during the seventeenth century while the idea of science was still gestating. As a matter of historiographic logic, neither term should be used uncritically to explain the historical situation prior to or during that period. Second, during the nineteenth century, the concept of science was reconstructed in opposition to religion, giving rise to a pairing that is parasitically dependent on the warfare metaphor. Consequently, anyone wishing to describe "the relationship between science and religion" as one of compatibility or cooperation must either struggle to redefine the concepts or remain content in making a category mistake. Third, throughout their history, the modern categories of science and religion have always served a "socialized" conception of human progress. Harrison draws attention to the fact that this conception, too, has a history that tends to be ignored in contemporary discussions.

All of this suggests that there can be productive and unproductive ways for Christians to engage in these discussions. Countering the conflict myth seems to be a worthy goal, but clichéd claims about the alliance of faith and science are unhelpful in this effort. Such claims may represent an attempt to recover physico-theology as a plausible project, but they are no more respectful of historical change than are other forms

of nostalgia. As Harrison says, "Advocates of constructive dialogue are thus unknowingly complicit in the perpetuation of conflict" (p. 198). Furthermore, they tend to disregard the principled objections that Christians through the ages have registered against the purported alliance. We may do better by letting these objections echo in the present day, so that our thinking about science and religion is done in full recognition of the possible downsides of accepting the modern idea of progress. Presumably, the notions of piety, vocation, fallenness, and servanthood remain important in Christianity. All of these are at stake in the way we conceptualize the goal of human progress, and therefore also in the ways we imagine science and religion to be serving that goal.

Territories leaves us with a difficult challenge. In principle, there is no single characterization of the science-religion relationship, nor any wholly positive or negative set of characterizations, that will suffice in the present day. We face this situation because the categories themselves are not direct mappings of an unchanging reality, but are, rather, products of the social conventions and politics of a tumultuous past. What they mean for us now is largely a matter of the meanings we have inherited from our immediate forebears. However, to some extent it is also a matter of what we are willing to accept. For instance, if we refuse to accept the terms of the conflict thesis, we should also resist making unreflective use of those terms—that is, the terms "science" and "religion"—when we want to make our case. In other words, if we wish to argue for a different way of carving up the territories that science and religion presently occupy, we have to change the terms of engagement.

This line of discussion creates an opportunity for studies of science and religion to make further contact with cultural history and ethics. Harrison begins to show the way by situating his project alongside those of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. MacIntyre is known for his characterization of modern moral philosophy as a makeshift collage of principles drawn from disparate traditions. Harrison likens his own view of science to this picture. Given that astronomy, biology, chemistry, geology, physics, et cetera, have such different histories, there is little reason to believe that an overarching principle should bind them together. Speaking of the situation of the nineteenth century, he says,

> The various strategies to pull together particular "scientific disciplines" were successful at rhetorical, political, and institutional levels, but, as a number of contemporary philosophers of science have observed, this does not necessarily confer any metaphysical unity on modern science. (p. 187)

Connections with Taylor's work, particularly with his signature monographs *Sources of the Self* and *A Secular Age*, are rich with possibilities. Harrison does not cite Taylor extensively but regards his idea of modernity's "new conditions for belief" as a key component in the story of the emergence of modern religion (p. 189). The projects of these two scholars have always been closely parallel but largely complementary. Taylor has concentrated on political and moral philosophy but has rarely paid careful attention to natural science. Meanwhile, until now, Harrison's work on science and religion has not brought politics or ethical theory to the fore. One can hope that *Territories* will succeed in initiating a sustained conversation between these two authors. There are gains to be had on both sides of the conversation if the history of science and religion can be integrated successfully into broader historical narratives that help us find our moral bearings in the modern world.

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DEALING WITH DARWIN: Place, Politics, and Rhetoric in Religious Engagements with Evolution by David N. Livingstone. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. x + 265 pages, notes and index. Hardcover; $39.95. ISBN: 9781421413266.

Dealing with Darwin comprises the prestigious Gifford Lectures delivered in 2014 at the University of Aberdeen by David N. Livingstone, professor of geography and intellectual history at Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland. Livingstone is no stranger to religion's encounter with Darwin. Earlier books, *Darwin's Forgotten Defenders: The Encounter between Evangelical Theology and Evolutionary Thought* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987); *Adam's Ancestors: Race, Religion and the Politics of Human Origins* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); and a chapter en-titled "Situating Evangelical Responses to Evolution" in *Evangelicals and Science in Historical Perspective,* ed. David N. Livingstone, D.G. Hart, and Mark A. Noll (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) gave ample evidence of Livingstone's intellectual interests.

Dealing with Darwin has been many years in the making, but well worth waiting for. It is a delight to read, both from a literary and intellectual standpoint. Elegant prose abounds giving evidence of the author's love of language, coupled with a penchant for alliteration (two of many choice examples may suffice: reading the historical record "I find complexity and contradiction, contingency and complication that defy simple typecasting" (p. 2), or, "place was